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ABSTRACT

Hearings on The Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983 are presented. Objectives of the act are to help ensure the nation's independent factual knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes. The U.S. Congress has stated that certain essential functions are necessary to ensure the existence of that knowledge: graduate training; advanced research; public dissemination of research data, methods, and findings; contact and collaboration among government and private specialists; and first-hand experience in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries by American specialists. Testimony is presented that suggests that the act would allow the United States to enter into meaningful relationships and understandings in the military and political spheres in order to know the Soviet Union. The act will also insure the continuation of academic exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These exchanges provide important insight into current developments in these countries. The legislation will also make it possible to strengthen studies of the Soviet Union in certain disciplines. such as economics, in which the United States has been particularly weak. (SW)

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THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND TRAINING ACT OF 1983

ED243389

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 601

TO HELP ENSURE THE NATION'S INDEPENDENT FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, TO HELP MAINTAIN THE NATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR ADVANCED RESEARCH AND TRAINING ON WHICH THAT KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS, AND TO PROVIDE PARTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL PROGRAMS TO SERVE BOTH PURPOSES

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., ON
MARCH 22, 1983

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor

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THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND TRAINING ACT OF 1983

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1983

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education,
Committee on Education and Labor,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2257, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Simon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Simon, Harrison, Coleman, Gunderson, and Packard.

Staff present: Nicholas Penning, legislative assistant; John Dunn, legislative assistant; and Betsy Brand, minority legislative associate.

Mr. Coleman [presiding]. The Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education will come to order.

I might explain that Mr. Simon is not here yet, and he does have a statement which will be made part of the record.

I have a few opening comments of my own. We are here to hear testimony on H.R. 601, the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, which is an attempt to address the problem of lack of knowledge of the Soviet Union, its government, its social institution, and its people. The bill would create a $50 million endowment fund to be used for furthering research and writing in the area of Soviet and East European affairs.

[Text of H.R 601 follows:]

[H.R. 601 98th Congress 1st Session]

A BILL to help ensure the Nation's independent factual knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, to help maintain the national capability for advanced research and training on which that knowledge depends, and to provide partial financial support for national programs to serve both purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983".

FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS

Sec. 2. The Congress finds and declares that—

(1) factual knowledge, independently verified, about the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is of the utmost importance for the national security of the United States, for the furtherance of our national interests in the

conduct of foreign relations, and for the prudent management of our domestic affairs;

(2) the development and maintenance of knowledge about the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries depends upon the national capability of advanced research by highly trained and experienced specialists, available for service in and out of Government;

(3) certain essential functions are necessary to ensure the existence of that knowledge and the capability to sustain it, including—

(A) graduate training;

(B) advanced research;

(C) public dissemination of research data, methods, and findings;

(D) contact and collaboration among Government and private specialists and the facilitation of research based on the extensive data holdings of the United States Government; and

(E) firsthand experience of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries by American specialists including onsite conduct of advance training and research to the extent practicable;

(4) three existing institutions already organized to conduct the functions described in this section on a national scale are the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the International Research and Exchanges Board of the American Council of Learned Societies; and

(5) it is in the national interest for the United States Government to provide a stable source of financial support for the functions described in this section and to supplement the financial support for those functions which is currently being furnished by Federal, local, State, regional, and private agencies, organizations, and individuals, and thereby to stabilize the conduct of these functions on a national scale, consistently, and on a long range basis.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 3. As used in this Act—

(1) the term "Board" means the International Research and Exchanges Board organized in 1968 by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council;

(2) the term "Center" means the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution;

(3) the term "Fund" means the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Fund established by section 4;

(4) the term "institution of higher education" has the same meaning given such term in section 1201(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965;

(5) the term "National Council" means the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, a not-for-profit corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia in 1978; and

(6) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Treasury.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND TRAINING FUND

SEC. 4. There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Fund. The Fund shall consist of—

(1) amounts appropriated to it under section 5; and

(2) interest and proceeds credited to it under section (8)(c).

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FUND

SEC. 5. Effective October 1, 1983, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Fund, without fiscal year limitation, $50,000,000.

USES OF PAYMENTS FROM THE FUND

SEC. 6. (a) The interest on any obligations held in the Fund shall be available for payments to the National Council, upon approval of an application in accordance with section 7, for use in accordance with subsection (b).

(b)(1) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year shall be used by the National Council—

(A) in consultation with officials of the United States Government designated by the Secretary of State, to develop and keep current a research agenda of fundamental research dealing with major policy issues and questions of Soviet and Eastern European development; and

(B) to conduct a national research program at the postdoctoral or equivalent level in accordance with that agenda, such program to include—

(i) the dissemination of information about the research program and the solicitation of proposals for research contracts from American institutions of higher education and not-for-profit corporations, which contracts shall contain shared-cost provisions; and

(ii) the awarding of contracts for such research projects as the Board of Trustees of the National Council determines will best serve to carry out the purposes of this Act after reviewing the proposals submitted under clause (i).

(2) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year shall be used by the National Council—

(A) to establish and carry out a program of graduate, postdoctoral, and teaching fellowships for advanced training in Soviet and Eastern European studies and related studies, such program—

(i) to be coordinated with the research program described in paragraph (1);

(ii) to be conducted, on a shared-cost basis, at American institutions of higher education; and

(iii) to include—

(I) the dissemination of information on the fellowship program and the solicitation of applications for fellowships from qualified institutions of higher education and qualified individuals; and

(II) the awarding of such fellowships as the Board of Trustees of the National Council determines will best serve to carry out the purposes of this Act after reviewing applications submitted under subclause (I); and

(B) to disseminate research, data, and findings on Soviet and Eastern European studies and related fields in such a manner and to such extent as the Board of Trustees of the National Council determines will best serve to carry out the purposes of this Act.

(3) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year to the National Council shall be used for payments to the Center—

(A) to provide fellowship support and research facilities in the District of Columbia for American specialists in the fields of Soviet and Eastern European studies and related studies to conduct advanced research with particular emphasis upon the use of data on the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries; and

(B) to conduct seminars, conferences, and other similar workshops designed to facilitate research collaboration between Government and private specialists in the fields of Soviet and East European studies and related studies.

(4) One part of the payments made in each fiscal year to the National Council shall be used for payments to the Board to conduct specialized programs in advanced training and research on a reciprocal basis in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the countries of Eastern Europe designed to facilitate access for American specialists to research institutes, personnel, archives, documentation, and other research and training resources located in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern European countries.

APPLICATIONS; PAYMENTS TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL

SEC. 7. (a) The National Council shall prepare and submit an application to the Secretary once each fiscal year. Each such application shall—

(1) provide a description of the purposes for which the payments will be used in accordance with section 6; and

(2) provide such fiscal control and such accounting procedures as may be necessary (A) to insure a proper accounting of Federal funds paid to the National Council under this Act, and (B) to insure the verification of the costs of the continuing education and research programs conducted by the National Council under this Act.

(b) The Secretary shall expeditiously approve any application that meets the requirements of this section.

(c)(1) Payments to the National Council under this Act shall be made as soon after approval of the application as practicable.

(2) Payments to the National Council under this Act may be made in installments, in advance, or by way of reimbursement, with necessary adjustments on account of overpayments and underpayments.

MANAGEMENT OF THE FUND

SEC. 8. (a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to invest such portion of the Fund as is not, in his judgment, required to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States. For such purpose, such obligations may be acquired on original issue at the issue price or by purchase of outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for which obligations of the United States may be issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act are extended to authorize the issuance at par of special obligations exclusively to the Fund. Such special obligations shall bear interest at a rate equal to the average rate of interest, computed as to the end of the calendar month next preceding the date of such issue, borne by all marketable interest-bearing obligations of the United States then forming a part of the public debt; except that where such average rate is not a multiple of one-eighth of 1 per centum, the rate of interest of such special obligations shall be the multiple of one-eighth of 1 per centum next lower than such average rate. Such special obligations shall be issued only if the Secretary determines that the purchase of other interest-bearing obligations of the United States, or of obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States on original issue or at the market price, is not in the public interest.

(b) Any obligation acquired by the Fund (except special obligations issued exclusively to the Fund) may be sold by the Secretary at the market price, and such special obligations may be redeemed at par plus accrued interest.

(c) The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or redemption of, any obligations held in the Fund shall be credited to and form a part of the Fund.

REPORT

SEC. 9. The National Council shall prepare and submit to the President and the Congress at the end of each fiscal year in which the National Council receives assistance under this Act a report of the activities of the National Council, and the activities of the Board and the Center, supported by assistance under this Act, together with such recommendations as the National Council deems advisable.

Mr. COLEMAN. We have before us today a number of leading experts on Soviet Union and East European affairs testifying before the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to hear this testimony and to weigh it and assess the needs of the legislation I am sure it will be a great help to the subcommittee.

It is my understanding that General Odom has to leave shortly. I see that my colleagues from the House are not here yet. So I think it would be appropriate for Maj. Gen. William E. Odom, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army, to come forward.

The general is going to be joined, I understand, on a panel by Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, U.S. Air Force (retired), former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Paul Simon follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL SIMON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION

Today we turn our attention to a relatively small function of the Federal Government. Small in terms of dollars, but of enormous importance in terms of its impact. Our subject matter is U.S. national expertise on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Last fall I learned from our distinguished colleague, Lee Hamilton of Indiana, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, that the corps of national experts on the Soviet Union and its satellites was in danger of being depleted.

The distinguished scholars which serve this Nation so well by providing us with the crucial ability to understand the world's other power will soon retire, leaving research institutions with insufficient manpower to carry on the job. Unless we act to provide the necessary extra support, we may end up with a government that is poised to aim missiles at a Nation whose leaders we could easily misinterpret or misunderstand.

We owe it to our children and grandchildren to keep the focus of our foreign policy on our ability to understand and negotiate, and not on our willingness to use threats and display our nuclear might.

The bill before us today would simply provide the extra support our Soviet and East European scholarly institutions need in order to keep constant the supply of experts in this vital field.

I must stress, however, that the trust fund we establish in H.R. 601 is based on the solid foundation of Title VI International Resource Centers which are supported by the Department of Education. The Administration has proposed elimination of all funding for international education activities in its 1984 budget. Such a move would destroy the base of support for Soviet and East European expertise that exists today. A base that H.R. 601 could not hope to replace. In addition, the cutting of international education, as the Reagan Administration has proposed, would cripple our ability to understand the world's many and varied nations—most of which are inhabited by people who speak languages other than English and possess cultures completely foreign to ours. I offer my support today for this extra push for Soviet studies but I do it with the understanding that we must fight to the wire to retain the solid foundation of expertise and research that exists in the programs funded under Title VI of the Higher Education Act and under the Fulbright-Hayes Act.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE, U.S. ARMY

General ODOM. Mr. Chairman, I would, rather than read my brief remarks here, submit them for the record and continue my testimony with a few remarks on what I think is critical about the way the bill is going.

First, I am a great supporter of the effort that this legislation stands behind. I strongly encourage you and all other members of the committee to carry it to fruition. I think it is terribly important that we build at least an austere fiscal floor under the whole of the area of Soviet studies in the United States.

I would like to pick up that point and elaborate it slightly for any further refinements you may want to make in the legislation.

Some of the people who were involved in the original conception of this whole idea of doing something in this field gathered in Princeton, N.J. in 1980, and out of that came the view that we should not just try to throw a great amount of money at a particular aspect of the field, but that we recognize that it takes 8, 10, 12 years to train really a first-class area expert in the Soviet field.

Therefore, we need to identify those functions, beginning with graduate school and going on through to the completion of that kind of training maturation, to make sure that in the key functional areas there is a modicum of funding that insures that the area doesn't deteriorate the way some areas seemed to be deteriorating in the 1970's and the early 1980's—at least as was judged by a number of people in the field who paid regular attention to the health of specific disciplines.

Those functions, it seems to me, break down into, first, graduate training—that is, some funding for graduate fellowships—second, some salary augmentation for teaching positions in key Soviet areas such as Soviet economics—I mentioned that field because a number of chairs have disappeared, a number of teaching positions have disappeared in economic faculties. They were moved to the non-Soviet area because there was more student demand for them and there seemed to be less future for people in that area. In those cases, in order to keep a reasonable infrastructure of teaching faculty, we should augment salaries.

Then there would be two kinds of, it seems to me, travel assistance. One would be for travel to the area to do actual research in the Soviet Union, or as close to it as one might be able to get. The second would be travel inside the United States to support meetings and individual research and those sorts of things, because it is much easier to bring scholars from distant parts of the United States to large rich holdings of Soviet or Russian materials—Washington, New York, Boston—than it is to recreate the Library of Congress or some similar holdings in many places in the United States.

Finally, two other functions seem to be critical for sustaining the field—postdoctoral research and support to key journals, perhaps some university presses, to publish materials that might not otherwise, under the market demands, see the light of day in publication form.

To the extent the bill supports those functions, I think it is very, very good. It seems to me a little foggy on the first function. I think you could decide that it covered all of that. It says graduate training. I certainly would like to see that graduate teaching and graduate study.

The other point, and then I will end my remarks, that I would like to make is concern with quality over quantity. It is not clear to me in the execution part of the bill how you will be sure that you will know that the funds will achieve an allocation toward better quality rather than drifting into an approach of allocating on sort of a welfare function where everybody gets his share. It seems to me terribly important that these small moneys be invested in a few high-quality endeavors rather than spread out by any kind of fairness formula. I realize that is sort of hard to say. But to enforce that will require, I think, some tough-mindedness and some clear intellectual leadership in the direction of funds.

I make those points only for your consideration, whatever you might want to do in the way of very minor modifications to the bill in the future.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you.

Mr. Coleman. Thank you very much, General Odom.

I know you have to leave, but if you could stay for a couple of questions, we would appreciate it.

General Odom. Sure.

[The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]

Prepared Statement of Maj. Gen. William E. Odom, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues today. The issue at hand, support to Soviet Area Studies, is a critical one in need of serious and urgent attention. Judging from the bill you have introduced, it is clear that you also believe that it is time to take action to shore up our nation's pool of Soviet area expertise and the infrastructure that produces it. I highly commend that action, and I want to offer whatever support I can to your vitally needed endeavor to provide an endowment for Soviet Area Studies.

Others will testify to the state of the field of Soviet studies. Let me only say that I believe it has gone through a phase of expansion and contraction in the postwar decades that has not been conducive to a steady flow of high quality work on Soviet affairs. Two things are required, in my judgment, to rectify the situation. First, the emphasis must be on development of high quality and high standards for the intellectual leadership of the field. Second, a resource floor should be put under the whole field that takes account of the many years it takes to train someone to a respectable level of competence in Soviet affairs. It requires a decade in most cases to educate a person adequately to make him a broad gauged area expert.

In designing the legislation, I would encourage you to consider a functional approach to creating the resource floor that will provide this lengthy educational opportunity. By a functional approach, I mean that we should identify the set of activities that are necessary to provide teaching, student financial aid, field experience, access to research material, support for advanced research, and support for publication of research findings. That set would seem to include the following:

Graduate fellowships two or three years in duration. A couple of dozen such fellowships would ensure a steady flow of high quality graduate students into the field if they are competitively awarded.

Salary augmentation for teaching posts to ensure that universities with strong Soviet graduate programs do not eliminate essential courses and disciplines from their programs because of fiscal constraints. Such salary awards, naturally, should be on a competitive basis and in the context of the overall availability of faculty in subareas of the Soviet field.

Fellowships for travel to the USSR and East Europe to do field research and to gain firsthand familiarity with the region.

Travel assistance to scholars and students who want to come to the places of major holdings of Soviet materials in the U.S. Washington, for example, is such a place. It is cheaper to bring scholars here than it is to build large library facilities in many universities throughout the country. In this regard, meetings and seminars at major U.S. centers would be appropriate for such support.

Grants for post-doctoral research should be provided on a competitive basis and national needs.

Finally, support to a few key journals in the field and aid to university presses for publication of high quality manuscripts are essential.

Fiscal support in modest amounts to all of these activities would provide the basis not only for the years of graduate work but also for sustained work in the area during a six or eight year period after graduate school. While it would not underwrite fully a decade of individual education, it would offer aid at several critical junctures for the aspirant who decided to pursue seriously a career in Soviet studies.

Such a program based on an endowment for Soviet studies would require enlightened and sustained leadership. And I believe that leadership exists today. It is simply a matter of organizing properly to exploit it.

Your bill, as I understand it, goes a long way toward providing precisely the kind of fiscal floor the Soviet field needs. It seems to cover the critical functions as I have outlined them.

I hope these remarks have been of some assistance in pursuing your goal. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear and express my views on the matter.

STATEMENT OF GEN. EUGENE F. TIGHE, USAF RETIRED, FORMER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General TIGHE. I wonder whether or not questions wouldn't be in order so that General Odom could leave.

Mr. COLEMAN. How long is your testimony?

General TIGHE. Mine is very short.

Mr. COLEMAN. Why don't you go ahead. I think he has to leave by 10:30, so that would give us enough time for questions.

General TIGHE. All right, very good.

First off, I speak not as an expert on the educational area. I am not eloquent and I am not going to present a lot of statistics to Paul Simon. A lot of other people have kept track of these very important statistics far better than I could pretend.

I am privileged to appear here today to lend my small voice in support of the Soviet Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983.

When I met with some of this Nation's experts on Soviet research in Princeton several years ago at the invitation of Dr. George Kennan, I was the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and I had direct knowledge of how painful our drying knowledge of the Soviet Union and Soviet thinking on a daily basis really was. I had for a number of years petitioned the Congress for attention to the shrinking of the Nation's information base. Members of both Houses had been very generous in response. Among those responses, DIA, for example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, now has funds for a very small academic research support program to stimulate foreign area studies and foreign language in our universities.

As a member of the Kennan Institute, I discussed regularly the sad plight of our Nation's understanding of nations around the world. I could cite instances of great national embarrassment when U.S. decisionmakers blundered in their foreign policy, economic, and military actions, because their knowledge of the nations of the world, for the most part, in my view, was fragmentary, archaic or, quite often, wholly wrong.

Time and again during my 37 years in military intelligence, I have known the challenge of intelligence failure, and intelligence failures there have been. But I tell you without hesitation that information voids have been far more disastrous to this Nation and the world by orders of magnitude than the sum total of intelligence failures during the few short years this Nation has had a professional intelligence establishment.

The U.S. Government has spent more on seeking to know precisely what Soviet military capabilities are all about than all the others of research on that Nation. And it is right that we should. But I know that we know very little about what makes a Soviet citizen tick, what a Soviet military man really thinks and plans, how he behaves and he is likely to fight. We simply know very little about most of the Soviet people. There are small boxes of clarity, to be sure. We usually find those boxes of clarity a little outdated. Here I am speaking of such things as the military thought papers which the U.S. Air Force has so loyally and persistently translated and published for the past several years. Those are unique pieces of information, but they are usually very much out of date when they are printed.

While we also know very, very little about most of the rest of the world, to know too little about every facet of Soviet life and thought, in my judgment, may well be disastrous to this Nation. Our greatest challenge as a free society comes from a Soviet Government which apparently answers to few—a supposedly classless society in which a tiny few reap the material rewards of their leadership—and pass it on to their children. A huge nation blessed with more natural resources than any other, and one which shows regularly a determination to dominate the world.

We have no other choice as a nation than to start spending significantly greater amounts of our annual budgets in order to know the Soviet Union. I know of no other way which will allow us to enter into meaningful relationships and understandings in the military and political spheres. The intelligence failures which may come up if we enter the next two decades without greater attention to Soviet life and thought may be our last. H.R. 601 is a brilliant, if tiny, start at reversing the trend away from national attention to Soviet and Eastern European studies which, by the way, tend to go up and down, as far as I am concerned, with fadism in this country, a tragic thing for so important an area of studies.

I recall several instances where colossal blunders resulted from a lack of area and language training in confrontational areas minuscule in importance compared with our interactions with the Warsaw Pact nations. In the Middle East, in the Southwest Pacific, in Southeast Asia and in Africa. I recall an almost total breakdown in the negotiating—this is a very tiny example—of a huge military contract between the U.S. and a NATO ally a couple of years ago solely because the commercial translating service which we had to rely on after language specialists had been cut from the defense payrolls blundered horribly in their translating critically important documentation. That is a tiny little example of the lack of preparation for our international positions.

The hundreds of young U.S. military dead which piled up on Tarawa's beaches during World War II were there because of a lack of amphibious landing studies and fragmentary data on ocean currents there, a tiny little information void, to be sure, compared with what we are talking about. Lack of detailed knowledge of the topography of Laos allowed the logistics to the Vietnamese battle front to move from Hanoi through many channels of the Ho Chi Minh Trail unhampered simply because we didn't know what the landscape looked like under all of those tall trees. We simply couldn't find the trails.

Because our professional analysts were not well educated in the Arab thinking process, the 1973 attack on Egypt was a complete surprise to us—a national information failure, not an intelligence failure. Our people failed to understand that even certain military failure could be justified by Egypt and described later as "victory" because they viewed their cause as just.

Of all the nations on Earth with which we seem most eager to compete, Japan, I find little evidence that U.S. decisionmakers really study the Japanese psyche, the realities of Japanese life as opposed to surface effects which stem therefrom in their dealings with Americans.

Africa, probably one of the most important continents to our industrial health, the source of very critical minerals, is probably least known by Americans of any part of the Earth. Our understanding of her peoples reached its hiatus in our dealings with her colonial masters. Little understanding is shown by Americans of the hundreds of individual tribal languages and customs and traditions which drive Africa. We will never deal with what has become a principal target of Soviet expansionism unless we learn how they think and act and dream.

So, Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly applaud your efforts to put some money on this priority-one area. We are speaking here of the top of the peak. It is so important to find better ways to move to peaceful solutions of our international problems.

By the way, I would like to say as an aside—I quite often am asked by people around the United States how it can be that almost annually a debate between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Ageny on three principal issues—the Soviet energy problems, the Soviet defense spending problem, and the general Soviet economic health—how there could be diversion and complete difference of opinion year after year. I point out that there are very few times when the intelligence agencies of this Nation disagree when they have the information and the intelligence necessary to make a good judgment. It is only when they don't know what they are talking about that they found reasons to disagree, in my judgment.

Therefore, I think, to do less than to spend money on this very, very important area is to make a mockery of all of the other means we take to insure our independence as a Nation.

I thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Tighe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR., USAF (RET.) FORMER DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Chairman I am privileged to appear here today to lend my small voice in support of the Soviet Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983.

When I met with some of this Nation's experts on Soviet research in Princeton several years ago at the invitation of Dr. George Kennan, I was the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and had direct knowledge of how painful our drying knowledge of the Soviet Union and Soviet thinking on a daily basis was. I had petitioned the Congress each year for attention to the shrinking of the Nation's information. Members of both Houses were generous in response. DIA now has funds for a very small academic research support program to stimulate foreign area studies and foreign languages in our universities. As a member of the Kennan Institute I discussed, regularly, the sad plight of our Nation's understanding of nations around the world. I could cite instances of great national embarrassment when U.S. decision-makers blundered in their foreign policy, economic and military actions, because their knowledge of the nations of the world, for the most part, was fragmentary, archaic or wholly wrong.

Time and again during my 37 years in military intelligence I've known the challenge of "Intelligence failure" and intelligence failures there have been, but I tell you without hesitation, information voids have been far more disastrous to this Nation and the world by orders of magnitude than the sum total of intelligence failures during the few short years this Nation has had a professional intelligence establishment.

The United States Government has spent more on seeking to know precisely what Soviet military capabilities are all about than on any other of research. Its right that we should. But I know that we know very little about what makes a Soviet citizen tick—what a Soviet military man thinks and plans—how he behaves and how he's likely to fight. We simply know very little about most of the Soviet people. There are small boxes of clarity in the picture—usually outdated. Here I speak of the military thought publications which the U.S. Air Force has so loyally and persistently translated and published for the past several years—unique pieces of information, but usually very much out of date when printed.

While we also know very, very little about most of the rest of the world—to know too little about every facet of Soviet life and thought, in my judgement, may well be disastrous. Our greatest challenge, as a free society, comes from a Soviet government which apparently answers to few—a supposedly classless society in which a tiny few reap the material rewards of their leadership—and pass it on to their children: A huge nation blessed with more natural resources than any other and one which shows, regularly, a determination to dominate the world.

We have no other choice, as a nation, than to start spending significantly greater amounts of our annual budgets in order to know the Soviet Union. I know of no other way which will allow us to enter into meaningful relationships and understandings in the military and political spheres. The intelligence failures which may come if we enter the next two decades without greater attention to Soviet life and thought may be our last. H.R. act 601 is a brilliant if tiny start at reversing the trend away from national attention to Soviet and Eastern European studies.

I recall several instances where colossal blunders resulted from a lack of area and language training in confrontational areas minuscule in importance compared with our interactions with the Warsaw Pact nations. In the Middle East, in the Southwest Pacific, in Southeast Asia and in Africa. For instance, I recall an almost total breakdown in the negotiating of a huge military contract between the U.S. and a NATO ally solely because the commercial translating service which we had to rely on after language specialists had been cut from the defense payrolls, blundered horribly in their translating critically important documentation.

The hundreds of young, U.S. military dead which piled up on Tarawa's beaches were there because of a lack of amphibious landing studies and fragmentary data on ocean currents there. Lack of detailed knowledge of the topography of Laos allowed the logistics to the Vietnamese battle front to move from Hanoi through many channels of the Ho Chi Minh Trail unhampered. We simply couldn't find the trails.

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So, Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly applaud your efforts to put some money on this priority-one area—the Soviet Eastern European Area. It is so important to find better ways to move to the peaceful solutions of our international problems. To do less is to make a mockery of all the other means we take to assure our independence as a nation. Thank you.

Mr. COLEMAN. I thank both of you for your statements.

Both of you are in positions to know what our capability is and isn't. I suppose maybe, without getting into areas which you obviously must limit because of the sensitivity of your answers, do we have sufficient capability now to provide ourselves access to information which calls into question our national security?

In other words, how bad is it? Can you get into any of this more specifically? If you might, I know that General Tighe did not want to pepper us with statistics, but perhaps some statistics for the record, if you could supply those later on, might be appropriate.

Can you quantify a little bit how we really stand, other than being the peak of the mountain, as the general said?

General TIGHE. It is nice to be retired. I don't know if General Odom would like to comment first, but I think I would rely on his currency first.

General ODOM. I can't quote statistics, any figures that would bear immediately on this. I would like to make the following points on the importance.

I don't think the field of Soviet area studies is the disaster scene as some seem to picture it today. I do think that the trends downward in some areas are very disturbing, and the field is what I would call very uneven in what it produces. I said earlier and elsewhere that it is the boom-to-bust cycle that I think has put us into this condition.

Let me cite two areas where I think the field is behind what it could be in the academic or nongovernment area. The first has to do with the Soviet economic system. In the fifties, we had numerous fine-grain monographs on how Soviet factories worked, how the system worked. We had careful studies of the effort to decentralize the economy in 1957. We do not have similar analyses—at least I have not seen them lately. Maybe some are about to be published or have been published very recently and escaped my attention.

For instance, in the early seventies, Brezhnev made an effort at a reform which didn't go very far, but that has not been studied in the close institutional fashion that was the habit in the fifties.

The other area related is Soviet military policy. From where I view the Soviet economy, I am very much concerned with the military industrial sector. I can only say that people who don't take that into account are very much like people studying—one of the blind Indians talking about an elephant who had only its tail or its leg or its nose and didn't realize the enormity of the rest of the beast. Failure to understand the constraints that the Soviet military policy places on overall economic development in the Soviet Union is one that I think greatly distorts the academic and public view of Soviet economic growth, the kinds of problems they have, and what they are likely to do about it.

General TIGHE. I would like to speak to a couple of areas that I think—I support the lack of fine-grained studies, for example, on the economic means that the Soviet Union uses today to turn out what they turn out. But I would suggest that one of the great concerns that I have had down through the years is real understanding of how the Soviet military forces as glue for the Soviet Socialist Republic, which I think is their first order of business.

In that process, I think it is important for this country to understand how the military establishment is involved in that peacekeeping business among their own, what the differences of views are among the locals and the problems that they have, and how various and sundry ethnic problems rise to challenge those forces, which is a very important thing for U.S. military planners to know, it would seem. And I find very little light shed on that process.

The industrial analysis that General Odom spoke of used to be something that we had access to in very, very great detail. I can assure him that I have neither seen anything of that nature, nor have I seen any of the analysis that should have been around in abundance on attempts to change industrial procedures and to reform some of them.

We have heard a great deal in general of the names of people who have gone up and down the ladder of importance in Soviet hierarchy for their attempts to reform. But I haven't seen a great deal of very fine-grain analysis on the impact of those reforms and whether or not we are gradually seeing an erosion of the monolithic establishment that we have all taken for granted is there.

I guess what I am speaking to is that the analysts that are hired in the Defense Intelligence Agency—and we hire interns every year—and those with whom we interact in the other organizations in this town seem to lack a considerable foundation in the fine-grained look at what actually the Soviets are all about.

I think one of the comments that was made at the Princeton symposium here several years ago was the fact that there is virtually no one in this country paying attention to any of the literature from anywhere but Moscow, that to have someone looking into the presses that is relating to the whole of the Soviet Union is virtually an impossible thing to find in this country. It is astounding to think on those issues, and maybe it is not a correct statement. But it seems to me that if it is anywhere near correct, it is akin to looking to a central publication here in the United States and expecting you to know all about Americans.

General ODOM. May I add a comment? Let me give you an example of the kinds of deficiencies that I can see having very practical and real influence on Army officers who specialize in the Soviet area.

We have an old and well-established program for training Soviet foreign area officers in the Army. The thing that I have noticed in the last 8 to 10 years about people going through that program is that they come out of their graduate training with little or no knowledge of the political developments in Eastern Europe in 1945 to 1953, that they have little idea of the World War II settlements, they really don't know what I would call Marxist-Leninist ABC's, and they have not really been drilled in the categories of Marxist-Leninist analyses which are still quite operative in most Soviet policy statements today.

I think that reflects a decline in the quality of classroom education at the graduate level in many of our graduate schools. And I think that decline is no small part because money has gone away from the funding of the chairs, the teaching posts in those areas, and students have not been coming. Therefore, the infrastructure has begun to decline. The thing I like about the approach to this bill is that it promises to restore some of that infrastructure.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do I get it right that these are students who have graduated from graduate school, and they are in the Army?

General ODOM. They are majors, lieutenant colonels who have completed a 3- or 4-year program of, first, Russian language study; second, graduate education at some American university; and third, a phase of more advanced Russian studies at a school we manage in Europe.

Mr. COLEMAN. Are they coming out without the basics?

General ODOM. Very often, they come out quite weak in the post-World War II historical developments. Very few of them can sit down and tell you the years in which all the party congresses took place. That used to be sort of ABC information that graduate students either brought to graduate school or learned very quickly after they got there.

Mr. COLEMAN. Both of you are in the intelligence community. I wonder if you would look at the bill and tell me whether or not you feel that the moneys used should be strictly limited to studies that would have a value to our national security? In other words, we are not suggesting that we study, are we, 14th century art of the Soviet Union?

General ODOM. I don't see how you can tell from the bill what the money will go to in that regard. I don't know whether that is good or bad.

I would not object to seeing the funding directed more heavily toward things that bear on national security. At the same time, I am inclined to take the view that if you want a healthy university infrastructure, too-close guidance or too-much direction may not be a healthy thing. Although I would not like to see the major portions of such funds go only to 14th century literature or medieval Russian history, I don't rule those disciplines out as playing a very significant role in training people in the area.

I will give you an example. I found my own personal interest in Russian and Soviet literature an enormous aid, both in understanding a lot of things about the Soviet Union, and in establishing personal rapport with Soviet citizens and Soviet officials. Therefore, I think it is very difficult to decide where to draw the line.

That is why I made the point in my earlier remarks here that I think the point is not so much to push it all toward national security, but rather to insure that a few key centers develop very high-quality studies and produce the kind of intellectual leadership, without which no real major accomplishments will be seen in the Soviet area studies in our university system.

General TIGHE. I would add, too, that it is hard for me to imagine any facet of Soviet life that wouldn't bear on national security. I think it is very important that we understand what makes those people tick and how they act and how they have acted and how they got there.

I would, as General Odom, be very, very inclined not to specifically guide our educational institutions into specific channels. I think all of it will lead to a healthy national security if we have a very broad interest in knowledge of the Soviet Union.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would perhaps make a suggestion that the Department of State have some sort of input into this, which is not in the bill now—Treasury has a perfunctory role, I think, under the bill—because that would determine basically the thrust, the policy areas the official government is concerned about, notwithstanding the desire to have other aspects go into it.

Let me make sure that I understand a little bit what General Odom was saying. I think I agree to the extent that you are suggesting that salary help be given to teaching positions in order to keep the positions going, and that that is one of the areas that we are falling down on. We don't have the experts to teach, and we don't have the ramifications of students learning.

Isn't it true that we have plenty of interest in people wanting to study, but we don't have any positions to give them once they become experts in the area? In other words, without creating a Soviet scholars welfare program here, how are we going to keep these people in a job, on their own, if you will, and under our system where they are not just going to be on the Government payroll? How are we going to provide a system that is ongoing and able to fulfill the needs of the country as well as fulfill the economic needs of the individuals involved in the analyses and studies?

General TIGHE. One way, of course, is that as soon as pockets of excellence arise, competition arises. I think you are going to find a healthy respectful academic position creating an interest in the studies themselves. I think that today, without that excellence in the teaching arena, without areas of funding for continuing debate and discussion of issues—travel, an ability to see what the other side looks like first hand and talk with individuals—unless you have that overall fertile environment for Soviet studies, you are not likely to enhance the quality of the studies in general.

From that, though, I would suggest the stimulation for positions will come not only in Government—I would hate to see that happen—but, by virtue of an availability of new excellence, stimulate some new interest in exchange of, going back to and studying over, and stimulating the whole educational environment.

The positions that you speak of, this country, of course, had an immense decline over an almost 10-year period in governmental interest in Soviet studies, and the numbers of positions available throughout the Government everywhere have shrunk, as you know. That has been changed by the Congress, and I think there is a healthy new approach to increasing the studies within the Government as well. So there will be positions available if there are people qualified to fill them.

Mr. Coleman. I was going to follow up on that. I think it is relevant to the General's remarks. It is not as much maybe that we don't have people who are interested and trained as much as it is positions available. It is my understanding that in the Congressional Research Service, there was recently an entry level position for which a person would have to have a background or knowledge of Soviet and East European affairs. They got 100 people who actually sat for the interview, let alone made applications. This was a $16,000 to $18,000 job. That says to me that we have interested people out there, but there are no jobs for them to hold. If there are no jobs for them to hold, they are going to go into another field where they can at least make a living. I would like to have you all respond to that.

General Odom. The way I would suggest that be handled is that the functions I spelled out be monitored by some sort of oversight group and some judgment made each year about what the future prospects for jobs are. The number of scholarships that would be granted ought to be brought into line with what the assessment of future needs will be 10 years out.

If you tie these functions together with some sort of oversight to make sure that each one is funded in some regard—in a very minimal or austere fashion—you have the possibility, it seems to me, to keep a steady flow going through which will not create this boom production that provides many, many people for that one job which you just described in the Congressional Research Service.

I quite agree that there are large numbers of people who have had graduate training in the Soviet area looking for jobs right now. As I said earlier, I think we went from boom in the 1960's to bust in the 1970's. That has created that kind of scene.

I don't think that ought to be a reason for doing nothing. I think that ought to be a reason for trying to flatten the signwave curve of production a little by putting a floor under it and pushing it up to a very modest level in trying to assess how many you put into graduate school or how many people you ought to really encourage to go to graduate school, in light of future prospects for teaching, for Government service, et cetera.

Mr. Coleman. One last question before I turn it over to Chairman Simon.

You mentioned that, in the 1950's, we had a lot more information coming out. Is the lack of available information because of the Soviet attitude? Is it because they aren't allowing people to study?

If we had the capability, do you think we could go in and make these significant studies, or have the Soviets changed in the sense of not wanting to be as forthcoming—if that is what they were in the 1950's? I can't imagine that that was the case.

General ODOM. No. You might force the Soviets to accept more exchange students into areas they are not now accepting them in if you really take a hard-nose line and just threaten to cut theirs off. However, I am not intimately familiar with what the score is in that kind of game right now. Therefore, I think we probably could get some better access.

I don't think that access is what generated the good work in the 1950's. I think it was the intellectual leadership of the field at the time and the specific focus and willingness to do tedious institutional studies. It is much more attractive today to massage econometric models on computers than it is go through very boring literature of Soviet journals to try to trace down what the real rules of behavior are in making allocations of funds in certain sectors of the Soviet economy. That kind of tedious work isn't very attractive. It doesn't pay a student off very well. Nor does it promise publication of that kind of material, nor does it seem to insure tenure for young Ph.D.'s in the system or professorships in many universities. They need something that has differential equations in order to impress their colleagues.

General TIGHE. I also, if I might comment, think that during the 1950's, there was a general appreciation of an almost total lack of important knowledge of the Soviet Union wherever you went in this country. We were humble enough to know we didn't know, and we really applied ourselves to finding out. We almost started from scratch in many areas, particularly in the defense arena. The Soviet defense establishment began to be something, and we were interested in how it was developing. It was new and it was very, very vigorous.

So I would suggest that, since that time, there has been a position of mind in this country that we kind of know it all, and we are beginning to find that we didn't at all and that we have let it slip very badly.

In response to the 100 applicants for jobs at the Congressional Research Service, it would be marvelous if they would rather stay in an academic institution where they could earn a living and study things that are very important to us, than necessarily taking a Government job and always having to look for a Government job. I think this bill would very much help stimulate that kind of environment.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Simon has returned. Perhaps he has some questions.

Mr. SIMON [presiding]. I want to thank my colleague, Tom Coleman, for taking over. We had a Democratic caucus call. I apologize to the witnesses.

I will read your testimony. I have had the chance to work with General Odom. General Tighe, I have not had the chance to work with you, but I appreciate your interest in this subject and your leadership, and we are grateful for your testimony.

Thank you very, very much.

We have two of my colleagues who are here. I will call first on Representative Lee Hamilton, who is the chief sponsor of the bill. He has provided leadership in this area, as well as in other areas of foreign relations. He is chairman of the key subcommittee for the Foreign Relations Committee. We are pleased to have you here, Mr. Hamilton.

STATEMENT OF HON. LEE HAMILTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.

I want to express my appreciation to you for the interest you have shown in this and the priority that you have given it. Obviously, I think it is an important bill, but I would like to express my appreciation to you for your concern and your interest and your willingness to move ahead on it.

I know you have a long morning ahead of you, so I will be quite brief. I would ask, of course, that my testimony be put into the record in full.

Mr. SIMON. It will be.

Mr. HAMILTON. I also have an addendum I would like to put in with it, which includes some excerpts from other persons that I think might be helpful to the subcommittee. I would like that to be put into the record as well.

Mr. SIMON. That will also be entered into the record.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Soviet Union obviously is our chief rival. That is true today, and it is going to be true for a long time to come. I have become increasingly aware of the fact that we just don't have the amount of information about the Soviet Union that we ought to have in the detail that we ought to have it. We face a very serious threat to our security from them, and our ability to understand what is going on in the Soviet Union is limited and, I think, indeed in serious jeopardy.

We have had a significant portion of experts currently studying the Soviet Union who are going to be retiring very soon. We are not getting the number of young specialists that we want to get into this area, and funding for area studies on the Soviet Union for every source, private as well as Government, is sharply down. You get some very strange results. We have more college students today studying Latin than are studying Russian. We have more studying Norwegian than are studying Polish. We have a declining number of candidates for the Foreign Service. We have a drop of about 50 percent in the number of graduate students and young faculty who are participating in scholarly exchanges between ourselves, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe.

What we don't need is a pattern of boom and bust on these specialists like we have had in the past, sometimes creating surpluses, sometimes creating shortages. What we want is stability, consistent support for graduate studies and for research. I think that is the whole idea of this bill.

There have been important private initiatives taken in this area in recent months. Those are important. But I don't think they begin to meet the long-term problem that is before us. This bill, as you well know, addressed two problems, graduate and postdoctoral support, and funding for advanced research, both of which are critical.

If you look at what the Soviets are doing and how much they know about the American scene, you can't help but be impressed. We all remember the grain deals of a few years ago when the Soviets showed amazing detailed knowledge about our commodity exchanges. If you visit with Soviet people who work, for example, in the Institute of the United States and Canada, you cannot help but be impressed with their very, very detailed knowledge of America, the American political system, American economics and a lot of other areas.

So at a time when we are losing Soviet experts in this country, when we are not bringing the skills that we need—not only languages, but on experts on Soviet sciences, experts on Soviet technology, experts on the Soviet economy—at a time when we are cutting back, the Soviets are expanding their efforts, and they have a remarkable group of scholars who are very familiar with the details of American life.

So I think this bill goes a long way toward correcting an important problem. The bill doesn't solve the problems of higher education. It is not a substitute for title VI. It is not an answer to the lack of foreign language study in the country, which I know the chairman has been exceedingly interested in. It doesn't provide for a massive infusion of funds. It is a one-time, $50 million appropriation, the interest of which will be used to fund research and scholarship.

So I think the endowment will help reverse a very serious decline in our analytical capacity with the most important country in the world, as far as the United States is concerned now, and for a good many years to come. I hope it has strong bipartisan support. I think it does. We have a lot of cosponsors to the bill. I would hope that this subcommittee would concur and demonstrate that concurrence by rapid approval of the legislation.

[The prepared statement of Congressman Hamilton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LEE H. HAMILTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity to offer testimony on this important legislation. I commend the Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for their cooperation and interest in this bill.

The Soviet Union is America's chief rival in world affairs, and is likely to remain our major competitor for a long time to come. In my capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee with responsibility for the USSR and Eastern Europe, I am aware of the difficulties encountered by American policy makers resulting from lack of information about this key region. I come before you today to support legislation aimed at improving the quality of the information available to American leaders and policy makers.

Constraints on the collection of information about Communist regimes have always made it very difficult to put together an accurate picture of conditions and policies in those countries. Despite the enormous obstacles imposed by restrictions on travel, limited access to publications, and censorship in these societies, American area specialists have done excellent work interpreting the behavior of the Soviet Union and its allies. But even at its best, our information about this region has been less than we would like.

Now we face the prospect that at the very time the Soviet Union presents the most serious threat to our security around the world, our ability to understand its internal development and international behavior is in serious jeopardy. Economic conditions, difficulties in higher education and inconsistent support for area studies in our educational system have combined to produce a situation that may legitimately be called a crisis.

Declining support for area studies is in part a result of other problems affecting our higher education system. Universities are strapped for funds for all purposes. Faculty positions are being eliminated, library budgets are being slashed, and funds for research are vanishing. Support for graduate students has declined. We face the prospect that there will be fewer people teaching in our colleges and universities, and that fewer of them will be specialists in critically important areas.

While many of these difficulties affect our entire system of higher education, the specific problems in area studies are especially severe. Funding for area studies from virtually every source has decreased in the past few years. A Rockefeller Foundation survey for the period 1980–82 projected that government support would decline by 55 percent; corporate contributions by 22 percent; individual contributions by 30 percent; university allocations by 20 percent and endowment funding by 18 percent. These reductions must be viewed in light of the 50 percent reduction in federal contracts for foreign affairs research in the decade 1967–76. The practical impact of such cuts is perhaps even more striking: In 1980 more American college students were studying Latin than Russian; more were studying Norwegian than Polish. In the last half of the 1970's, only five or six Americans per year were completing doctoral dissertations on Soviet foreign policy. This number is hardly enough to meet the needs of academia, much less staff our policy institutions and meet other international affairs needs.

There is substantial evidence that the crisis is already upon us. A recent study indicated that the United States government currently needs 1600 area specialists to meet optimum staffing requirements. In the past few years there has been a sharp drop in the number of foreign service applicants in general, not to mention the greatly reduced number of applicants with area studies backgrounds. The number of graduate students and young scholars applying to participate in scholarly exchanges with the Soviet Union has dropped nearly 50% in the past few years.

While it is true that there are many PhDs unable to find academic positions in America today, this situation compounds the problem of training specialists for future needs. Young persons surveying the PhD "glut" find it hard to believe there will be a serious shortage of specialists in five to ten years. At present we still have the institutional capacity to train the specialists we need. If we allow that capacity to atrophy, it will require an enormous investment of time and money to restore it.

The large infusions of support for Soviet studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s have been substantially curtailed in the past decade in addition to suffering the ravages of inflation. It is not likely we will see a return to earlier levels of funding, and this is not necessarily desirable. What is required is stability: consistent support for research and training in important areas. Recently several foundations have discussed reviving their activity in this area. Renewed foundation and private support will help, but it is not enough. I have received a letter from officials of the Rockefeller Foundation stressing that their new program is a modest contribution to an enormous problem. It in no way reduces the need for the endowment. The Rockefeller Foundation and the new Harriman Institute will provide support for just two or three academic centers, while the endowment will be available to students and scholars throughout the country.

This legislation really addresses two aspects of our problem. Through a program of graduate and post-doctoral support, it will help us attract top people to the field to meet future needs; by providing support for advanced research, it will encourage more scholars to conduct research on needed topics. In many vitally important specialties we have a dangerous shortage of experts. Among the disciplines that might be identified as under-staffed are Soviet politics, particularly Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa; Soviet nationalities studies, including the languages of Soviet minority regions; the Soviet and Eastern European economies; demographic trends; and Soviet science and technology.

The problems facing area studies in the United States are in marked contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union. At the very time that support for these subjects has declined in our country, the Soviet Union has been engaged in a massive program to increase its capacity to learn about the world. In our emphasis on the Soviet's military buildup, we may have paid too little attention to an equally important information buildup.

At Moscow's Institute of the USA and Canada there are over 300 scholars working full-time on various aspects of American political and economic life and our international behavior. There are eleven other academic institutes in Moscow alone where Soviet scholars study international affairs and world economic subjects. Soviet scholars visting the United States have mastered the intricacies of our commodities markets and can discuss the inner workings of the Iowa presidential caucuses. We are not developing similar knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

It would be a mistake to overstate the quality of Soviet scholarship. Many of their scholars are trapped in heavily bureaucratic institutions that stifle creative thought. But the sheer size of the Soviet effort means that an enormous volume of information is collected and made available to the best analysts and policy makers.

The differences between the Soviet and American systems of research are worth noting. In the Soviet Union, a large number of scholars spend their entire careers doing research at institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences or the Republican Academies. In the United States, the vast majority of area specialists are based at colleges and universities where their research is an adjunct to major teaching commitments. This has the overwhelming advantage of insuring that American students are exposed to the latest information collected by active scholars, but it also can reduce the amount of research generated by capable scholars.

Although it is difficult to match the scale of the Soviet effort within our diverse education system, diversity is a major source of our intellectual and analytical strength. we would not reap the maximum benefits from a massive program of government research. Many of our best scholars prefer the academic lifestyle. Rather, we should encourage experts in the academic community to carry out research meeting the needs of policy makers at the same time that they train younger people to assume positions in teaching and in the government. Such an approach maximizes the benefits of our university-based system, simultaneously generating personnel to staff future vacancies and a knowledge base for the academic and government communities.

This legislation represents a solution to some of the problems resulting from the cyclical nature of support for Russian and Eastern European studies. At the same time. there are a number of things this endowment is not. It is not a solution to the serious problems facing America's institutions of higher education. It is not in any way a substitute for Title VI support for area studies—indeed, it would be the height of irony if at the very moment we are creating an endowment to make better use of area studies centers at our universities we were to reduce support for the institutions that train the people we want to encourage. The endowment is not a solution to the extremely acute lack of foreign language study in the United States. And it is not a massive infusion of funds. Rather, it is a carefully targeted program intended to meet pressing national requirements in specific areas.

Questions have been raised about other regions of the world—Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East. All are important; all merit increased study; research in these subjects should be encouraged and supported. As our economy mends it may prove valuable to provide similar kinds of endowment support for these fields. But no other country has thousands of nuclear warheads targeted against the United States. Poor understanding of any area of the world is profoundly disturbing; in the case of the Soviet Union and its allies it could be catastrophic.

In discussing this legislation with my colleagues and with representatives of the administration, most have expressed strong enthusiasm for the project. The sole reservation I have heard concerns the need for an oversight mechanism to guarantee that the endowment is used in ways suited to the needs of the nation. An amendment will be introduced establishing a Oversight Committee to supervise activities conducted under the endowment. In considering this change in the legislation, I would urge my colleagues to keep in mind the difference between Congress controlling the program and Congress running the program. The oversight mechanism we are proposing insures that government bodies will review and comment upon the activities of institutions receiving funds under the endowment. This is fitting and proper. But we do not want those same government agencies involved directly in the allocation of endowment resources. Such a role would go against the tradition of independent scholarly inquiry upon which our system of higher education is built, and would make it very difficult to retain the longer time frames required if we are to train needed specialists.

The oversight system that will be proposed mandates supervision of activities on a regular basis and provides for consultation with the Congress in the event that significant changes are needed. I strongly encourage you to adopt it.

Properly handled, the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Endowment will help to reverse a serious decline in our analytical capacity. The strong bipartisan support with which it has been greeted indicates that it addresses broad national needs rather than partisan political purposes. I hope this Subcommittee will concur, and demonstrate its agreement by rapid approval of the legislation.

In response to a number of questions about the specific purposes to which the endowment funds woud be put, I ask consent to append to my testimony excerpts from statements presented to Senator Lugar's Subcommittee on European Affairs in September 1982 by Dr. Herbert S. Levine, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research; Dr. Alan H. Kassof, Executive Director of the International Research and Exchanges Board; and Dr. James H. Billington, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. I would also like to include a brief outline of how the funds from the endowment might initially be allocated among these institutions.

I would again like to thank the Committee and its Chairman for the opportunity to appear this morning, and for their expeditious action on this legislation.

ADDENDUM

It is not advisable to legislate the specific activities each institutional recipient will undertake with endowment funds, since to do so might encumber future adjustments to meet changing needs and financial circumstances. However, it is important that the Congress have a clear understanding of the uses to which these funds will be directed. The following excerpts from testimony presented before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on September 22, 1982 indicate the nature of the programs that will be funded by the endowment.

From the testimony of Dr. Herbert S. Levine, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research:

FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL UNDER THE ACT

Under the provisions of the proposed Act, the National Council will, first of all, monitor all dispersals of funds and will report to the Congress, the President, and the Secretary of the Treasury on activities supported by assistance under the Act.

Secondly, the Council will use its allotment to continue to carry out its research-based program in pursuit of its three long-term objectives: (1) to provide information, interpretation and policy recommendations to the Government; (2) to check the national decline in postdoctoral research on the Soviet Union and East Europe; and (3) to help ensure the development and availability of a cadre of highly competent professionals in the field to step into the shoes of the post-war generation of specialists.

It will provide funding by contract to universities on a cost-sharing basis for use in individual post-doctoral research projects focusing on such issues as the operation of and long-term prospects for the Soviet and East European economies, including the defense burden; long-term developments in Soviet and East European foreign policies, especially as they affect the United States; long-term trends in Soviet and East European societies; and Soviet and East European intentions, objectives and policy options. Such studies should be especially concerned with the ability of the regimes to foster, manage, and contain processes of change and with the possible consequences of their efforts to do so. The Council will also provide funding for meetings, conferences, workshops, consultations, pilot studies and other activities to design, stimulate or facilitate relevant research, and the publication of results.

Finally, the National Council will organize a National Manpower Development Program and a Public Information Program.

NATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The purpose of the National Manpower Development Program will be to foster flexible comprehensive integrated manpower training programs for young specialists pursuing long-term Ph. D. disciplinary and short-term Masters-level area studies educational programs. The Program would seek to provide support at each stage in the training of Soviet and East European affairs specialists. Funds would be made available on a competitive basis for students entering area studies programs. In addition, students, following a year or two of graduate training in an academic discipline, would be encouraged to apply for a Preparatory Fellowship. The aim of the Preparatory Fellowship Program would be to attract students who have already proven themselves in disciplinary programs, into the Soviet field. Preparatory Fellows could receive up to two years support at this stage of their educational careers to supplement their disciplinary training with work in the Soviet and East European field (such as the study of appropriate foreign languages). After the Preparatory Fellowship period, a student would be eligible for the IREX exchange. Following the exchange experience, a graduate student could then apply for Dissertation Support or funds to support additional training necessary for the completion of the graduate education cycle of career development. In this manner, an integrated national program of long-range support for individual scholars based upon targeted goals of national need could develop.

The funding proposed is estimated to allow a pool of 40 students to receive support under the National Manpower Development Program at any one time. Since the length of the training program is envisaged to be on the average 4 years (excluding the year in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under the IREX program), this pattern would generate an entry group of approximately 10 scholars each year. Therefore, the National Manpower Development Program will serve only as a minimal program designed to supplement already existing sources for graduate support. However, the new program would be sufficiently flexible and attractive as to encourage talented students to move into Soviet studies from various social science disciplines in order to pursue research interests and language training for areas of particular need.

The reorientation of many university social science programs away from area studies toward disciplinary approaches has made the initial placement of young Soviet and East European affairs specialists in teaching positions increasingly difficult. A National Junior Faculty Placement Program will be established to allow those participants in the National Manpower Development Program who choose to pursue an academic career an opportunity to teach through a cost-sharing program with universities. It is also hoped that universities lacking a particular component of a well-rounded Soviet and East European Affairs Program might be encouraged by the existence of this cost-sharing arrangement to hire a younger scholar to meet such a need. The funding available would allow the placement of approximately 10 teaching fellows on a 50/50 cost-sharing arrangement in any one year. The term of appointment would vary according to the need of the scholar and of the university. However, three-year average terms of appointment would probably be the norm. It is anticipated that junior faculty would then be in a position to move into regular tenure track positions at the end of the fellowship period.

The National Manpower Development and National Junior Faculty Placement Programs would combine to create a coordinated program of support for young specialists in the Soviet and East European fields from the time a young scholar has established his or her position in a graduate program through to job placement. It will maximize the possibility of encouraging students to move into areas of particular national need while eliciting institutional responses to the decline of their Soviet and East European Studies Programs which might otherwise not be possible. In this manner, it would inhibit the further erosion of our Soviet and East European training capability while encouraging the production of trained specialists for public, private and educational service.

PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM

The Public Information Program of the Soviet-Bloc Research and Training Fund would be used to support a variety of activities undertaken by other institutions selected through a national competition designed to encourage the interaction of academic specialists with government analysts, members of the business community and the mass media, as well as the public at large. For example, the fund could support a series of Summer Workshops focusing upon specific topics. These workshops would bring together scholars, public officials, businessmen and journalists to discuss in depth a specific subject area of particular concern during a given period. Such a workshop program would, in particular, serve the needs of young faculty, businessmen and journalists who are located throughout the United States in areas that do not have strong research centers in Soviet and East European Studies. In addition, funds could be used to support public forums at which Soviet affairs specialists might discuss new developments in that part of the world. Finally, a significant proportion of the Public Information Program's funds would go to help finance university-supported media productions which would make use of local academic and non-academic specialists. Such programs have already been successful, for instance, in the State of Washington, where University of Washington officials produced a series of programs examining the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for the local Public Broadcasting System affiliate.

With the National Council performing the functions just described, no new administrative bureaucracy will need to be created to administer the Act, either within the Government or outside of it.

From the testimony of Dr. Alan H. Kassof, Executive Director, International Research and Exchanges Board:

The IREX programs are made possible by grants from the United States Information Agency, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and from private foundations and corporate donors. While we shall continue to be dependent on this mix of public and private support and are deeply grateful to all those who have worked so hard to make it possible, it has not been fully adequate to the national need.

First, most of the budget must be sought on a year-by-year, catch-as-catch-can basis, so that the funding levels for the programs typically are not known until the very last minute; in fact, in most years we find ourselves several months into the programs without assurance that they can be completed. Apart from the immediate practical difficulties resulting from this pattern of uncertainly, it is a serious discouragement to the field as a whole when even near-term research plans, not to mention longer range expectations, are subject to this constant risk and fluctuation.

Even more serious, there are substantial and continuing gaps in the budget that have required us to turn away from important opportunities and to curtail, suspend, or cancel a number of programs that are essential to Soviet and East European studies in the United States. Their loss has aggravated the overall problems of the field.

The bill under consideration would make a significant contribution towards the solution of both these problems, even though by itself it is by no means a substitute for other sources.

What are the most urgent gaps in our national coverage, and how would this bill help?

Already in 1975, IREX was obliged for budgetary reasons to reduce by about half the exchange quotas with a number of East European countries. These cuts, which were to have been temporary, have never been made up. While in some cases the remaining quotas are about adequate to the current needs of the highest quality researchers, a limited restoration of selected quotas with some countries would be very productive.

A second serious gap in coverage is that we are unable to provide short-term research opportunities for senior specialists who need to spend several weeks in Eastern Europe or the U.S.S.R. in conjunction with current research; our limited exchanges budget must be reserved almost entirely for longer-term stays, typically of a semester or a year, so that we have been unable to provide for briefer visits by researchers who need to consult sources in the field for the efficient completion of work in progress.

A third need concerns mid-level graduate student trainess. Because of financal limitations, the exchange quotas currently are restricted to those who have completed all of the requirements for the Ph. D. except the dissertation, and to senior researchers. We need to make provision for trainees sooner in their careers if they are to gain early on an effective, on-the-ground familiarity with the countries of their specialization. Moreover, for those who plan government or public service rather than academic careers and who will complete their training at the M.A. level, there currently are no provisions at all for in-country experience.

A fourth and highest priority need is for the restoration of IREX's preparatory fellowship program. This program, previously funded by private foundations, provided supplementary language and area training for graduate students in specialities underrepresented in the exchanges in which important research opportunities for field research have become available, but which the United States has lacked the manpower to exploit. The earlier effort, now suspended for lack of funds, made critical contributions in such fields as sociology, economics, and Central Asian studies. Neither our USIA nor NEH funds can be used for this purpose, and so far it has not been possible to persuade the foundations to take this up again. The demonstrated success of IREX's pioneering efforts have led to the inclusion in this bill of provision for a program of preparatory fellowships to be administered by the National Council on Soviet and East European Research. But there will still be a need for IREX to provide training grants in specific areas where new in-country research opportunities develop, and which would also provide for the re-training of faculty-level specialists to move into undermanned areas. For example, we have been trying to find funds to train a small number of experts who will have competence both in Latin American and Soviet studies in order to monitor the growing Soviet research on and involvement in Latin American affairs. Although a private foundation has offered the possibility of partial funding, we have been unable to raise the additional sums required to undertake this program.

The fifth need has to do with our project-based research cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Through a series of agreements that supplement the exchanges of individual scholars, IREX has created commissions on the social sciences and humanities with the U.S.S.R., Hungary, Poland and East Germany.

Joint research projects identified and facilitated by these commissions make it possible for our U.S. specialists to become acquainted with the latest work of their counterparts in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., and expand their access to institutions and sources in the bloc countries that previously were beyond our reach. While we have been able to maintain a certain number of these projects with the assistance of NEH and by miscellaneous grants from private foundations, others have had to be curtailed or delayed because of funding limitations.

The bill under consideration would help make it possible for IREX to respond more fully to these national needs, and would strengthen the U.S. research capacity on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

From the testimony of Dr. James H. Billington, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars:

The Wilson Center serves as a focal point where issues of concern to the large community of academic institutions, government agencies, and private organizations in the greater Washington area are discussed in a congenial atmosphere. Approximately 7,000 people a year participate in Center events.

The need for a national and non-governmental center for Russian and Soviet studies in Washington, D.C. was discussed at a meeting of 23 senior specialists in May 1972, at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Largely as a result of this meeting, the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars established the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in 1974. The institute served the following purposes: bringing scholars and researchers in the field in closer contact with the resources available in Washington—specifically the Library of Congress; giving guidance and structure to the field of Russian Studies throughout the country; providing a place where mature researchers can pursue advanced studies relieved of regular teaching commitments and other involvements; supporting the publication of monographs and periodicals and facilitating channels of scholarly communication in the field; maintaining liaison with foreign institutions and extending hospitality and research facilities when possible to foreign scholars.

The Kennan Institute attempts to provide a well-balanced field of scholars; 29 American academic institutions and two government agencies as well as 13 institutions in 8 foreign countries have been represented by Institute Fellows. Since its inception, the Institute has sponsored 47 Fellows from a wide variety of disciplines—mainly history, political science, economic, and Russian language and literature.

The Director of the Wilson Center awards a small number of Guest Scholarships each year for periods of time from one month to four months. The Kennan Institute has sponsored 15 Guest Scholars since 1975, representing three American academic institutions, two government agencies, and academic institutions in four foreign countries. Research disciplines include history, political science, economic, language and literature, and geography.

The Kennan Institute, with private foundation support, has established a program of Visiting Grants intended to help scholars at institutions distant from major library facilities and to provide opportunities for junior scholars to conduct advanced research in Washington, D.C. The grants are awarded quarterly (March, June, September, and December) for periods of up to one month. Since 1976 when the program was initiated, 120 Visiting Grants have ben awarded. These scholars have come from 58 academic institutions, public and private, representing over 30 different states. In keeping with the international focus of the Center, 38 awards have been made to scholars from 11 foreign countries. Again, the majority of these scholars pursue topics in history, political science, and economics. Research is also conducted on such topics as art, music, law, philosophy, demography, and anthropology.

The Wilson Center and the Kennan Institute conduct conferences, colloquia, seminars, meetings, media briefings, and other events related to Soviet and East European studies. Since its inception the Kennan Institute has sponsored 40 conferences attended by area specialists, government analysts and interested private organizations. Four conferences are being planned for 1983. In addition many colloquia, meetings and seminars are held—often in cooperation with other organizations and government agencies. Wednesday Noon Discussions are held each week during the academic year on topics of broad interest for a wide range of participants in a format that permits questions and discussion.

Publication and dissemination of current research is an important aspect of the Center's activities. The Kennan Institute has issued 160 Occasional Papers and distributed them free of charge to a wide range of interested readers. The Institute has also published a 403-page scholars' guide to Russian and Soviet resources in the Washington area. A second edition of the guide is in preparation. Three volumes resulting from conferences held at the Institute are to be added to its Special Studies series. Other publications of the Institute include a three-volume guide to Soviet research institutes, a guide to sources of support in Russian and Soviet studies, and several bibliographic reference works.

The objectives of the proposed legislation, Soviet Bloc Research and Training Act of 1982, appears to be consistent with the charter for the Wilson Center, particularly in the area of Soviet studies. If enacted, the legislation would provide funding to various institutions involved in Soviet and East European studies. The Wilson Center has been specifically identified in the proposed legislation.

In fiscal year 1983, the Wilson Center plans to allocate about $316,000 from its federal appropriation and private contributions to continue the above activities at the Kennan Institute. A similar level of support is expected for fiscal year 1984. We believe that this level of funding is appropriate to carry out the current objectives and direction that the Center's Board of Trustees had identified for the Institute. This planned funding level is consistent with the President's budget and fiscal objectives. If additional responsibility is given the Woodrow Wilson International Center.

The specific amounts to be allocated to each institution should, for similar reasons, not be fixed by law. We want to insure rapid and flexible responses to future changes in needs and financial circumstances. It does seem prudent, however, to indicate my understanding of how the funds might be used initially. It must be stressed that these are tentative and non-binding estimates. An endowment intended to establish stable support free from the constraints of annual appropriations should be equally free from other administrative restrictions, permitting it to respond as needs change over time.

With these reservations in mind, we might expect a distribution of 55 percent to the National Council for its programs of graduate training and advanced research, 25 percent to IREX and 20 percent to the Woodrow Wilson Center and Kennan Institute. Assuming an 8 percent return on the endowment investments, this would mean approximately $2.2 million to the National Council, $1 million to IREX, and $800,000 to the Woodrow Wilson Center and Kennan Institute. Again, I want to stress that these are speculative figures that would require adjustment over time and might fluctuate from year to year depending on needs.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you very, very much.

Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You were here when I asked the generals a question about this boom and bust—you mentioned it yourself. How are we going to guarantee these people will have jobs after they go ahead and establish themselves as Soviet experts and very knowledgeable if there is not a demand for their services? Are you telling us that there is an insatiable demand here for their services?

Mr. HAMILTON. Not insatiable. I am saying that there is a steady, constant demand for high-quality Soviet scholarship in a great variety of areas that it is just critical that this country have.

It seems to me that one of the advantages of this bill is that it does seek to supply a steady small amount of funds available for this single purpose. And it works against the kind of boom and bust that we have had, it seems to me.

Mr. COLEMAN. I would certainly support the thrust of the legislation. It is just that I am not sure how we are going to insure that, once we train these people and create this wealth of knowledge, they will have something they will be able to market and to be able to support themselves. I don't know that we want them to be employees of the Federal Government or whatever. We can hire some of them, I suppose.

But I am not sure how we are going to solve this boom and bust problem, particularly by this bill, other than creating a group of people who will not be looking for employment in this area; unless there is some reason to employ them through our intelligence community, through private industry—through whatever reasons—

through university chairs that might be endowed. I just wonder if we are going to solve this boom and bust which is the thrust of the legislation.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Obviously your concern is a legitimate one. Your perspective on this subcommittee is much broader than mine because you look at higher education in a much broader perspective than I do. It has to be weighed seriously. I look at it from a foreign policy standpoint, and I am very much aware of the fact that in large areas of Soviet studies, we are just not getting the kind of information that we need.

I am under the impression now that there are hundreds of area specialists that are currently needed by the U.S. Government in the area of Eastern European and Soviet studies. And we have very, very few young qualified people coming on. You don't prepare these people in a matter of a year or two, it takes 8 to 10 years to prepare an expert on some aspect of Soviet life. We are facing a critical point already, it seems to me, in the shortage there.

Mr. **Coleman**. I pointed out to the generals that you have to start somewhere, and the Congressional Research Service recently advertised for an entry-level position for somebody with knowledge in Soviet-Eastern European affairs. It was an $18,000 job. They had enough applicants that they could interview 100 people for what is considered not that attractive a position. So I just wonder what we are going to do with the other 99 and what we would have done under this bill. But that is just a question I raise.

Mr. **Hamilton**. Sure.

Mr. **Coleman**. Let me ask you this. How do you see the funding divided up between these various groups? It is not specified in the legislation. Do you have a suggestion to us as to how you might see this funding divided?

Mr. **Hamilton**. I put it forward only as a suggestion to you, and obviously this is a matter that rests in your discretion in the committee, but one possible funding distribution that you might consider is roughly 55 percent to the National Council for its programs of graduate training and advanced research; about 25 percent to the other group that is identified in this bill, IREX, which is an established group; and 20 percent to the Woodrow Wilson School and the Kennan Institute.

Those are rough kinds of figures, speculative in some degree. They may require some adjustment from time to time. They might even fluctuate from year to year. But I submit that for your consideration.

Mr. **Coleman**. Thank you very much.

Mr. **Simon**. I would just comment on the question that Tom Coleman posed. It seems to me that there is no way we can guarantee anyone is going to have a job. What we must guarantee is that this Nation have a reservoir of people who have knowledge and ability in this area. I think, inevitably, the demand is going to grow in our academic institutions, in the State Department, and in a variety of ways. But there is no way that Lee Hamilton or Paul Simon or anyone can guarantee anyone that you are going to have a job if you become a Soviet specialist.

Mr. **Hamilton**. One thing the committee might want to keep in mind is that we now have in place the institutional capacity to train these people. But we are not going to be able to keep that institutional capacity in place if we don't have bright young scholars coming along to fill the slots. So, in that event, if that were to occur, the institutional capacity would atrophy and then it is going to be much, much more difficult to meet. If we act now, then we have that institutional capacity, and it will not require the kind of enormous investment it would if we let it dissipate.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you very, very much for your testimony and your leadership.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. We are pleased to have Mary Rose Oakar here, our colleague from Ohio.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARY ROSE OAKAR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Ms. OAKAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity to testify before this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I am here to positively endorse H.R. 601, which I think is a modes proposal, to say the least.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my remarks for the record and just speak a little bit extemporaneously, if I could.

Mr. SIMON. Your remarks will be entered in the record.

Ms. OAKAR. Just in reference to the areas that were just mentioned in the dialog with Congressman Hamilton, the sponsor of the legislation, I am reminded as a former teacher myself of the advice that was given to students 10 years ago not to go into math and science because there was a surplus of teachers in those areas, and now there is a shortage. There was the advice given to women not to go into nursing because so many were going into nursing, and now there is a tremendous shortage. I don't have to tell this committee of other areas where we have given those kinds of prophetic kinds of ideas.

But this is an area that is so subtle, and yet so important, that I hope that it doesn't slip through our hands. The Soviets, as we know, invest a great deal of money and talent into studying our society, much more than we invest in studying theirs. This relative neglect on our part puts us at a tremendous disadvantage with the Soviet Union, at times causing the kinds of opportunities that we have missed or at times blundered.

Take the much-debated issue of trade with the Soviets. Recently, I became aware of—and I think any of us who have traveled to other countries have seen—the appalling lack of knowledge of our business community in terms of being able to have dialog with their traders in the native tongue of the country they are visiting.

We are aware, for example, that in our own Embassy in Moscow, it has never been adequately staffed with diplomats conversant in the cultures and languages of the major non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, even though the language issue in the question of national rights are so important to people in that area and to their relatives in our own country.

Millions of Americans, for example, besides a Russian background, trace their origins to the Ukraine, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and other countries that are now part of the Soviet Union. Our Government must make it a priority, it seems to me, to be aware of their interests and concern and continue to seek people who can adequately address these concerns. Of course, we will continue to need a keen analysis of the larger context of global competition. The pursuit of Soviet scholarship in its comprehensive form is essential, it seems to me, to serve these various ends of our policy with the Soviets, being one of the two superpowers in the world.

One area that I am concerned about is that the subcommittee recognize that sound foreign policy must be based, not only on the expertise of highly educated specialists, but also on the broad support of the citizenry. I hope that scholarship that results from this legislation will involve a broader sector of our country than the three distinguished institutions that are specifically mentioned in the bill. Certainly, they are obvious candidates for some of the funding for the bill.

But, Mr. Chairman, you and I are from the Midwest and I think we know that so many people who trace their background to the Slavic element very often are the ones that we depend on in terms of pursuing this kind of scholarship. I would just like to mention one institution, John Carroll University, a Jesuit-run institution in northeast Ohio that, for 22 years, has had an Institute for Soviet and Eastern European studies, and has been serving the surrounding region—people come from all over the country to attend this institution—by pursuing traditional scholarship, and certainly more vigorously involving the community which very often relates very much to the whole thrust of the Soviet Institute.

Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, to give you an example of what a small but very excellent academic institution can do, every summer, between 50 and 100 high school history teachers participate in a 6-week session to learn about the Soviet Union. I think if there was one thing I found lacking in my own educational background, and I think most of us from my generation would agree, is that we forgot about the global community. We usually studied a lot about the Western European countries—or a little bit, anyway, particularly England—and certainly our own history, but we really did not delve into the intricacies of areas like the Soviet Union and the Middle East and Asia, et cetera.

So here you have an institution of this caliber that has lecturers from all over the country who attend and gives these people firsthand exposure to Soviet life. Over the course of the 22 years, it has not only attempted to serve those who are educators, but many, many students.

So I would just like to put in a plug for smaller institutions, and this particular institution specifically, that when you are considering the bill, I hope you don't just limit it to the biggies that everybody knows about. I think it is important to spread it around so that our whole country has access to this kind of scholarship which I feel is very, very important.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that this committee will favorably dispose of this legislation with perhaps some add-ons. I think it is imperative that we not forget how lacking in knowledge we are as a country about other cultures, and this culture in particular, which I think is not only important in terms of our relationships with the global community, but for our own national security.

I think it is important that not only the scholars know about this, I think it is important that young people know about the Soviet Union. Think of the high schools, for example, that offer Russian as a second language or any of the Slavic languages or any of the other languages that relate to the Soviet Union. I bet you could count them on one hand. That is part of the problem that we have. That is why the thrust of this legislation is right on target, and I personally think it is an extraordinarily modest proposal. I hope that you will favorably look upon this legislation and perhaps even embellish it somewhat.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Congresswoman Oakar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARY ROSE OAKAR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

I would like to commend the members of the subcommittee and its distinguished chairman for recognizing the importance of Soviet scholarship to our country's foreign policy. Obviously, our leaders can only make proper foreign policy decisions when they have adequate information based on thorough research and sound analysis. It should be no less obvious, that we also need an informed citizenry to support that policy, one that we hope reflects their well-considered concerns.

The Soviets, as we know, invest a great deal of their money and talent into studying our society; much more than we invest into studying their's. This relative neglect on our part, puts us at a disadvantage with the Soviet Union, at times causing us to miss opportunities or to blunder. Take the much-debated issue of trade with the Soviets: I was surprised to find that American businessmen routinely engage in commerce with the Soviets using Soviet-supplied translators simply because we do not have enough of our own businesspeople who speak Russian. Even more surprising, is the fact that our embassy in Moscow has never been adequately staffed with diplomats conversant in the cultures and languages of the major non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, even though the language issue and the question of national rights are important ones in the Soviet Union. Millions of Americans trace their origins to Ukraine, Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and other countries that are now part of the Soviet Union. Our government must make it a priority to be aware of their interest and concern and continue to seek people who can adequately address those concerns. And, of course, we will continue to need a keen analysis of the larger context of global competition. The pursuit of Soviet scholarship is essential to serve these various ends of our policy with the Soviets.

I am concerned, however, that the legislation the subcommittee is considering also recognize that a sound foreign policy must be based not only on the expertise of highly educated specialists, but also on the broad support of the citizenry. I hope the scholarship that results from this legislation will involve a broader sector of our country than the three distinguished institutions that are specifically mentioned in the bill.

Permit me to mention in this regard, a fine institution that I feel can serve as a model for others in disseminating knowledge about the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China. For 22 years now, the Institute for Soviet and Eastern European Studies at John Carroll University outside of Cleveland has been serving the surrounding region and the nation by pursuing traditional scholarship and instruction, certainly, but even more by vigorously involving the community in the serious consideration of foreign policy.

Every summer, between fifty and a hundred high school history teachers participate in six-week sessions to learn about the Soviet Union. Lecturers include American scholars as well as people with first-hand exposure to Soviet life—journalists, diplomats, recent immigrants who had been professors in the Soviet Union, writers, etc. Over the course of the Institute's 22 years of existence, hundreds of teachers from the Ohio area and surrounding states have gone back to the classroom to teach many thousands of students, perhaps inspiring some to pursue further studies in the subject. During the course of the academic year, the Soviet Institute sponsors a number of lectures, conferences and seminars on topics of current interest. Many of those who participated in the summer sessions come back during the school year to participate. Invariably, an interesting cross-section of citizens joins John Carroll students in hearing lectures and discussing the ideas of the speakers. Several years ago I had the privilege of addressing a large gathering at the Soviet Institute after a trip to Mainland China that I took with the Banking Committee. I have also sat in the audience at the Soviet Institute to listen to what others had to say.

Recently, the Soviet Institute has been working closely with area citizens who have compiled extensive archives and collections of materials relating to Eastern Europe and to the immigrant experience in Clevland. That experience spans the 19th century when people first came to our steel mills, to the most recent years when the Greater Clevand area welcomed a good many Soviet Jewish immigrants.

I mention the Institute for Soviet and Eastern European Studies at John Carroll University to illustrate how a small, modestly-funded institution can provide a community with invaluable services in the area of Soviet Studies. Their's is not a stereotypical "ivory tower" environment. It is an approach I commend to others as one that involves broader sectors of the community in foreign policy questions, helping to create an informed citizenry. The Institute also does valuable field work by introducing audiences to personal accounts and by preserving valuable archival material. The second reason I mention the Soviet Institute is to inform the subcommittee members that during these difficult economic times, the funding sources for John Carroll's Soviet Institute are drying up, precisely at the time when the need for institutions of this type is most apparent.

I would encourage the subcommittee to find room in the bill or in the report accompanying the bill for consideration of this institution so that it may continue its current activities and expand its services by providing better facilities for the extensive archival material I mentioned. I thank the members for their attention and again commend them for their commitment to the development of intellectual capabilities as a nation.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you very much.

If I could just comment on a point or two. One is that you are absolutely right about the non-Russian languages, we have to pay more attention to them. There is some disagreement among scholars as to exactly what is happening, but either a majority or close to a majority of people born in the Soviet Union today do not have as their mother tongue Russian. We have to be thinking about people who can speak Usbek and all kinds of languages that we are not paying attention to.

Second, one thing you mentioned triggered off in my mind that we speak about the Soviets having a closed society and, in many respects, they do have a very closed society. But there are a lot of periodicals that are published there that we don't even translate. They could be more open to us than they are if we paid more attention to what is going on.

The third point, and one that has troubled me a bit—I am not sure exactly how we handle it—and that is the question of just a few elite institutions having the funding here.

The fourth point is covered in part by a companion bill which Lee Hamilton and I have introduced that has been referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee which would encourage more exchanges, which I hope will be reported out about the same time that this bill will be reported out.

Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Harrison.

Mr. HARRISON. I have no questions.

I would just like to say, Mr. Chairman, that as a part-time college teacher of comparative politics, I completely agree with the statement that the distinguished Congresswoman has made. I think that when we thought about comparative politics and we talked in terms of England, France, and Germany, we were ignoring better than 50 percent of the people of the world. I think that Soviet studies and, as we go down the road, Chinese studies, are important just to maintain our position in the world. It is certainly a lot more important trying to understand people than it is in simply buying more bombs to wipe them out.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. That Chair would just add that PBS a couple of years ago had a series, "The History of Civilization." Civilization was all Western Europe and North America. It was an excellent series as far as it went, but in fact civilization comprises a great deal more than Western Europe and North America.

Mr. Gunderson.

Mr. GUNDERSON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you.

Ms. OAKAR. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With your indulgence, I would like to submit to the Chair—it is a little long, and I don't think you would want it as part of your record—but just to show you what an institution can do in this field, I would like to give you some material on it so that you don't forget the small institutions when you are marking up this bill.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very, very much.

We would like now to call on Mrs. Averell Harriman and Mr. J. H. Giffin.

Mrs. Harriman, you hardly need to be introduced. We are very pleased to have you.

If the Chair could indulge in just one personal item which said something about the character of Mrs. Averell Harriman, my son was a student at Winston Churchill High School working on the school paper, and you were kind enough to give him an interview for the Winston Churchill High School Newspaper. You made one teenager very, very happy. It is one of those little gracious things that you went out of your way to do that I appreciate a great deal. We are happy to have you here.

If I can add, we are particularly appreciative of the generosity and the leadership that you and Governor Harriman have provided through Columbia University in this very area. Mrs. Harriman, we are pleased to have you here.

STATEMENT OF MRS. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Mrs. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I welcome this opportunity to testify on behalf of my husband and myself in support of H.R. 601, the Soviet and Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983.

It is our strong belief that the purposes to be served by this Act are essential to the national security of the United States.

Averell and I have been deeply concerned with the decline in our capabilities to understand and deal effectively with the Soviet Union at a time when it should be evident to all that the peace and well-being of the entire world depend upon the sensible management of our relations with the Soviet Union. For this to be possible, we need to have more and better trained specialists on the Soviet Union, as diplomats, as teachers, as businessmen, journalists, and researchers. The basis for intelligent policy and informed judgments by our people must be the flow of accurate, comprehensive information about the Soviet Union. It is our national obligation—one we have neglected—to insure that this vital element of our strength in foreign relations is maintained and nourished.

Continuity is the missing ingredient in our efforts to understand the Soviet Union. We have supported our community of Soviet scholars only sporadically, feeding its growth 1 year and starving it the next. As a result, we lack the depth of knowledge and the corps of expert analysts we need to fathom the workings and direction of the Soviet economy, the individuals and their maneuvers inside the Soviet leadership, and the forces at work within the non-Russian nationality groups under Soviet rule.

These are complex subjects. They cannot be studied effectively except on a full-time basis. We must make it possible for research in such areas to be conducted steadily and widely by men and women who can be confident that their investigations will be a rewarding career. We know that we will long have the need of such expertise. We must provide the support to build and to expand it on a steady foundation.

The proposed measure will not do all that is needed to assure our national capability for advanced research and training on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europen, but it does represent a needed step in that direction. It addresses itself to some limited but important programs by supporting some existing institutions in the field of Soviet studies that are performing the vital function of assuring continuity.

By its support of IREX, the proposed act will insure the continuation of academic exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These exchanges provide important insight into current developments in these countries, and we would be seriously handicapped without them. The legislation will also make it possible for IREX to strengthen studies of the Soviet Union in certain disciplines, such as economics, in which we have been particularly weak.

By its support of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and its Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the proposed act strengthens these institutions as a connecting link between scholarship and policymaking. They will be better able to make a base here in Washington for scholars engaged in research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a setting where academic specialists and government officials can educate each other.

Finally, the proposed measure will make it possible for the National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research to sponsor graduate fellowships and research by senior scholars on subjects of broad policy relevance, and to assure the continuity of these programs from year to year.

We think it would be wise if the bill could be made sufficiently flexible to allow for a broadening of the programs to be given support if this should appear necessary and appropriate in the future. We think it is also critically important that the scholarly independence and objectivity of these programs should be protected from volatile shifts in the political climate. Therefore, we concur wholeheartedly in making this financial support derive from interest on the endowment of $50 million to be set aside at the outset rather than from annual appropriations

The amount involved is not large, considering the importance of the program to our Nation. It will still be vitally necessary for universities, foundations, corporations and private donors to continue their support to the field of Soviet studies. Our own conviction on this point led us to seek to strengthen Columbia University's program of advanced research and training on the Soviet Union. It was our hope that this example would serve to stimulate a national effort in the same direction.

Passage of this measure should help greatly to awaken a more widespread concern over the vital importance to our Nation of maintaining and expanding our knowledge of the Soviet Union. Our enlightened action toward the U.S.S.R. depends on the spread and availability of such knowledge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you, Mrs. Harriman.

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Harriman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GOVERNOR AND MRS. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to testify on behalf of my husband and myself in support of H.R. 601, the Soviet and East European Research and Training Act of 1983.

It is our strong belief that the purposes to be served by this Act are essential to the national security of the United States.

Averell and I have been deeply concerned with the decline in our capabilities to understand and deal effectively with the Soviet Union, at a time when it should be evident to all that the peace and well being of the entire world depend upon the sensible management of our relations with the Soviet Union. For this to be possible, we need to have more and better-trained specialists on the Soviet Union, as diplomats, as teachers, as businessmen, journalists and researchers. The basis for intelligent policy and informed judgments by our people must be the flow on accurate, comprehensive information about the Soviet Union. (It is our national obligation—one we have neglected—to insure that this vital element of our strength in foreign relations is maintained and nourished.)

Continuity is the missing ingredient in our efforts to understand the Soviet Union. We have supported our community of Soviet scholars only sporadically, feeding its growth one year and starving it the next. As a result, we lack the depth of knowledge and the corps of expert analysts we need to fathom the workings and direction of the Soviet economy, the individuals and their maneuvers inside the Soviet leadership, and the forces at work within the non-Russian nationality groups under Soviet rule.

These are complex subjects. They cannot be studied effectively except on a full-time basis. We must make it possible for research in such areas to be conducted steadily and widely by men and women who can be confident that their investigations will be a rewarding career. We know that we will long have the need for such expertise. We must provide the support to build and to expand it on a steady foundation.

The proposed measure will not do all that is needed to assure our national capability for advanced research and training on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but it does represent a needed step in that direction. It addresses itself to some limited but important programs, by supporting some existing institutions in the field of Soviet studies that are performing the vital function of assuring continuity.

By its support of IREX (the International Research and Exchanges Board) the proposed Act will ensure the continuation of academic exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These exchanges provide important insights into current developments in these countries, and we would be seriously handicapped without them. The legislation will also make it possible for IREX to strengthen studies of the Soviet Union in certain disciplines, such as economics, in which we have been particularly weak.

By its support of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and its Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the proposed Act strengthens these institutions as a connecting link between scholarship and policy-making. They will be better able to make a base here in Washington for scholars engaged in research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a setting where academic specialists and government officials can educate each other.

Finally, the proposed measure will make it possible for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research to sponsor graduate fellowships and research by senior scholars on subjects of broad policy relevance, and to assure the continuity of these programs from year to year.

We think it would be wise if the Bill could be made sufficiently flexible to allow for a broadening of the programs to be given support, if this should appear necessary and appropriate in the future. We think it is also critically important that the scholarly independence and objectivity of these programs should be protected from volatile shifts in the political climate. Therefore, we concur wholeheartedly in making this financial support derive from interest on the endowment of $50 million to be set aside at the outset, rather than from annual appropriations.

The amount involved is not large, considering the importance of the programs to our nation. It will still be vitally necessary for universities, foundations, corporations and private donors to continue their support to the field of Soviet studies. Our own conviction on this point led us to seek to strengthen Columbia University's program of advanced research and training on the Soviet Union. It was our hope that this example would serve to stimulate a national effort in the same direction.

Passage of this measure should help greatly to awaken a more widespread concern over the vital importance to our nation of maintaining and expanding our knowledge of the Soviet Union. (Our enlightened action toward the U.S.S.R. depends on the spread and availability of such knowledge.)

TESTIMONY OF GOV. W. AVERELL HARRIMAN ON BEHALF OF H.R. 601, THE SOVIET-EASTERN EUROPEAN RESEARCH AND TRAINING ACT OF 1983

Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to testify in behalf of H.R. 601, the Soviet and East European Research and Training Act of 1983.

It is my strong belief that the purposes to be served by this Act are essential to the national security of the United States.

I have been deeply concerned with the decline in our capabilities to understand and deal effectively with the Soviet Union, at a time when it should be evident to all that the peace and well-being of the entire world depend upon the sensible management of our relations with the Soviet Union. For this to be possible, we need to have more and better-trained specialists on the Soviet Union, as diplomats, as teachers, as businessmen, journalists and researchers. The basis for intelligent policy and informed judgments by our people must be the flow of accurate, comprehensive information about the Soviet Union. It is our national obligation—one we have neglected—to insure that this vital element of our strength in foreign relations is maintained and nourished.

Continuity is the missing ingredient in our efforts to understand the Soviet Union. We have supported our community of Soviet scholars only sporadically, feeding its growth one year and starving it the next. As a result, we lack the depth of knowledge and the corps of expert analysts we need to fathom the workings and direction of the Soviet economy, the individuals and their maneuvers inside the Soviet leadership, and the forces at work within the non-Russian nationality groups under Soviet rule.

These are complex subjects. They cannot be studied effectively except on a full-time basis. We must make it possible for research in such areas to be conducted steadily and widely by men and women who can be confident that their investigations will be a rewarding career. We know that we will long have the need for such expertise. We must provide the support to build and to expand it on a steady foundation.

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Passage of this measure should help greatly to awaken a more widespread concern over the vital importance to our nation of maintaining and expanding our knowledge of the Soviet Union. Our enlightened action toward the U.S.S.R. depends on the spread and availability of such knowledge.

Mr. SIMON. We will ask Mr. J. H. Giffin, the corporate vice president for Armco, Inc., to speak at this time.

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. GIFFIN, CORPORATE VICE PRESIDENT, ARMCO, INC.

Mr. GIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is James H. Giffin, and corporate vice president of corporate strategy and development of Armco, Inc., and president of Armco's foreign trading subsidiary, Armco International, Inc., which coordinates our program in the planned economy countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. I am also an adjunct professor at the Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University.

Mr. Chairman, I first became interested in United States-Soviet relations over 20 years ago when I began researching a textbook on the legal and practical aspects of trade with the Soviet Union. There were few experts on the subject at that time, and even fewer materials.

Over the last 18 years, I have traveled extensively to the Soviet Union, making as many as 12 to 14 trips per year. During that period, I have had an opportunity to meet with many of the top Soviet leaders and see a good deal of the country. While there have been a great number of changes that have occurred in both the Soviet Union and the United States over the years, one trend has remained intact, the Soviets continue to educate and train an ever-increasing number of academician, economists and military specialists on the United States; while the United States continues to expend little effort in educating and training American experts on the Soviet Union. This trend can and must be reversed.

Benjamin Disraeli once said about England that "Upon the education of the people of this country, the fate of this country depends." Mr. Chairman, that statement is true about any democracy, including the United States. It is particularly true in a time when the United States is engaged in political, military and economic competition with a strong and formidable adversary like the Soviet Union. We must insure that we have an adequate number of educated and experienced scholars and professionals to represent this great country.

The key issue is, Mr. Chairman, why haven't we been able to provide the needed scholars or professionals and what can we do to correct the situation?

I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that the reason we have not been able to supply our needs lies in the inadequacies of our formal educational training and our views as to the proper practical training our Soviet study specialists should receive after their formal education. Let me briefly summarize the problem in somewhat more detail.

Let's take a look at our present formal educational system. Because Soviet expertise is not regarded highly in this country, we do not interest enough students in the subject matter. Even if students do become interested in the Soviet Union at an early age in their educational careers, we fail to provide a balance of stimulating and practical courses which will hold their interest and which will give them the background necessary to go forward with their training.

For example, as a earlier witnesses pointed out, how many high schools in the United States provide Russian language facilities and, of those that do provide such facilities, how many provide 3- or even 4-year programs? How many colleges in the United States provide courses on Russian or Soviet history, culture, art, economics, law and science? How many graduate schools of business, law or international affairs have courses dealing with the Soviet military economy or political systems or all three?

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, we do not interest students at the university or graduate level on Soviet studies because, as was pointed out earlier, there simply are not sufficient job opportunities in academia, government, or business for such students. This is not an easy problem, but we must recognize it and find a solution or we will eventually be in the unhappy position of having few job opportunities and even fewer job applicants.

Adequate funding of our Nation's universities and other institutions of higher learning will help to insure that there will be sufficient numbers of teachers and resources available to provide job opportunities for our current Soviet studies specialists and an adequate number of courses to interest new students in the field.

Second, improving our university and graduate programs will help solve the problem, Mr. Chairman, but it will not so entirely. Many of the students who are considered specialists in Soviet studies and end up in high academic, government, or business positions do so with little practical experience in dealing or negotiating with the Soviets and, in addition, do not have balanced training.

For example, few economic experts on the Soviet Union know very much about strategic arms reduction talks, intermediaterange missile discussions, or conventional arms negotiations. At the same time, few American political advisers on the Soviet Union know very much about the Soviet economy or trade practices and procedures. We must establish a system whereby Soviet studies experts can gain practical experience in dealing with the Soviets and have a broad base of knowledge about the Soviet system and how it operates.

Mr. Chairman, I support the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983 as a modest and necessary initial step that this Government must take.

However, I would like to make several suggestions to stengthen the act. I believe that the intent of Congress should not only be that knowledge about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe be of utmost importance to the national security of the United States, it should be a national priority. The act should recognize the need to stimulate interest in our top students in the study of the Soviet Union and for the provision of broader-based studies programs in our universities.

The act, Mr. Chairman, should contain language which encourages better cooperation between academia, Government, and the business community in the exchange of information, and in the provision of opportunities for Soviet studies experts to broaden their background and gain practical experience.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, while I believe that the endowment funding provided by the act is the proper method of funding such studies, the act should go further. It should state as a goal the encouragement of matching funds from the private sector. Mr. Chairman, there are differences between the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to strategic arms reductions and to the method of implementing such reductions. There are differences between the two countries with respect to Soviet actions and activities in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Poland, the Middle East, South Africa, and Central and South America. There are differences between the two countries with respect to each country's concept of human rights.

But we must realize that if progress is to be made between the two countries on these issues, we must commence serious negotiations. Negotiations require intelligent, educated, and experienced negotiators. In the 1980's and 1990's, the problems between the two countries will become even more sophisticated and require even better-trained American experts on the Soviet Union. While we are looking for leadership in the current administration to commence negotiations in order to reach agreements with the Soviets that will help insure a continued and lasting peace, the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983 will help to insure and provide for the statesmen of tomorrow to continue those discussions to the benefit of every U.S. citizen, the U.S. Government and the entire international community.

Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you both very much for your testimony.

Before we get into questions, let me just add that I understand, Mrs. Harriman, you are here on behalf of your husband and yourself and you are not posing as a Soviet expert, but we may have questions that you would want to give to Governor Harriman who is unable to be here. We can have those questions for the record.

I will just make a couple of comments in response to not only your testimony, but to the others. It seems to me it is beyond dispute that never in all of history has it been so important that two nations understand each other and not miscalculate than it is today between the Soviet Union and the United States.

If that is the case—and it seems to me that is indisputable—then, understanding what the other side is doing and thinking is a much greater priority than we have made it in our country up to this point, and that includes the area of exchanges you talked about, Mrs. Harriman. We now spend more money to construct one-fourth of a mile of an interstate highway than we do on all of our exchanges with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. That, again, looks to me like an imbalanced sense of priorities.

One of the things that you mentioned, Mr. Giffin that struck me—and you get over there regularly, and I just very occasionally do—but in visiting with their experts in the USA-Canada Institute, one of the things that strikes you is how they know little details about the United States, amazing details, and then have these huge gaps in understanding. One of the areas is they simply don't understand public opinion and how it meshes into American politics.

Is it your observation, Mr. Giffin, that there may be similar gaps in our understanding of the Soviet Union and their system and how it works?

Mr. Giffin. You know, Mr. Chairman, the concept applies both ways. The fact is that those Soviets that do spend any time over here in the United States have a much better understanding of the United States than those trained specialists in either ISKAN or EMMO in the Soviet Union, two of the main studies groups there.

The fact is that we have two problems. Our first problem is not enough Americans really get over to the Soviet Union and make an attempt to travel throughout the country to see what is really going on. Second, they don't spend enough time while they are there asking the right kinds of questions.

When the Soviets are over here, they are asking the right kinds of questions and trying to get the right information. Some people say the Soviets have an advantage because our system is more open than theirs. In actual fact, I find that if you really need to find out the kind of information you are looking for other than very sensitive military information, you can find it over in the Soviet Union. But I am afraid that there just isn't a great enough effort to find that information and to bring it back here and then to pass that information on to other people.

So I would say both sides have the same kind of a problem there. There are gaps on both sides.

Mr. Simon. Let me just add one other observation. I had the privilege of being part of the U.S. Delegation to the special U.N. Session on Disarmament in 1978. The head of our Delegation was Governor Averell Harriman. One of the great things about that special session was to visit with him and to get his insights, which were very practical, down-to-earth—as you know, Mrs. Harriman—insights into what we ought to be doing and where we are making mistakes. Those kind of insights—unfortunately, the people who have those insights are passing from the scene. So this kind of legislation becomes very important.

Mr. Coleman.

Mr. **Coleman**. Mr. Giffin, I welcome your call for private support for this project. Your suggestions about matching funds or some participation by the private sector, I think, is a very good one.

Do you in fact have positions that are going unfilled in your corporate structure because of this lack of training?

Mr. **Giffin**. Let me start with the broader problem. Some of our earlier witnesses had hinted that there were adequate job opportunities. I have 30 or 35 graduate students that come from the Law School, the Business School, and the School of International Affairs at Columbia. Year after year, those students are always in a panic at trying to find a job. The ones that find a job are the ones, generally speaking, that have a second discipline that they can get into a given business opportunity through that discipline and then somehow apply their Eastern European or Soviet expertise, except for the ones that are heading for the CIA, Defense Department or the State Department.

As far as American business is concerned, in general, as the downturn occurred after the imposition of the sanctions in January 1980, most American businesses cut back their offices. Most American businesses cut back the expansion of their economic plans. Nevertheless, many of us kept the people that we did have in those positions because we knew full well that it took such a long time to train those types of experts and make them knowledgeable.

At the present time, we have no new opportunities. Most of American businesses that I know of do not have new opportunities. But at the same time, I think that most American companies, if they saw a viable plan established, would work toward providing internships of some type for students who have a dual type of a discipline or a dual type of education, if they had something that could be related to the industry and, at the same time, had that Soviet and Eastern European experience, hoping for the time when we would come out of the present trough are in and hopefully when we have better relations.

So the answer is there are not many new opportunities, but I think business would be ready to cooperate with some type of an organization or cooperate with government and academia to find jobs for these people if there was a mechanism that was set up.

Mr. **Coleman**. Of course, this continues the questioning that I have been asking all morning. That is, we are getting these people hyped up, we are getting these people trained in the Soviet-Eastern European affairs, we are asking them to invest, as I heard, 10 years of their life doing so, and we have no opportunities for a job when they come out.

Unless you are independently wealthy and you can afford to do that. I am all for better understanding, and I am all for better training in any event, even if you can't apply, but what happens to the person who needs to go out and make a living to apply what he has trained himself to do? How are we going to accomplish that? We are talking about boom and bust. Well, here we go. We are getting everybody going in there, and we are going to train these people, and if there is no demand out there for them, how are we going to in 10 years or 5 years from now absorb these people? We have provided training and stimulated them and there is nowhere to go.

Maybe things stall, maybe things get better, maybe they don't. What are we going to do? What kind of plans will be made? Is this a hoax that we are perpetrating on the people? We don't want to flim-flam on this.

Mr. GIFFIN. There is an easy answer for many of us in business, Mr. Coleman, and that is just lift the sanctions on trade with the Soviet Union and we will provide plenty of jobs for those people.

Mr. COLEMAN. I am a little concerned about some of that. Is that the thrust of what you think this legislation is going to accomplish?

Mr. GIFFIN. No, I don't, Mr. Coleman.

I was wondering if you were going to get us on the debate of the Export Administration Act, which I would be happy to do.

But no, it isn't. You are absolutely correct as to the key issue, as far as I am concerned. What are we going to do with these bright young students when they do graduate. I simply don't believe that there are job opportunities available that some people seem to think there are.

Consider if the 10 major universities are graduating 35 Soviet studies specialists, where are the 350 jobs per year that those students are going to go into?

Mr. COLEMAN. Yet, we hear all of the testimony that we don't have these people, we don't have the understanding, we don't have the intelligence expertise. We talk about all this, and I haven't seen any documentation. You are telling me that there may not be that shortage as far as——

Mr. GIFFIN. I don't have the numbers on the job opportunities, but can say, Mr. Coleman, that some of the testimony here has been directed toward the quality of the education as opposed to the quantity, as General Odom had pointed out. I think that most of us who are involved in this area of study are concerned about a broader base of courses that are taught to our students, and that they have not just art and culture and history, but they do understand something about reading a balance sheet, and that they do understand something about Marxism and Leninism and that they do understand something about strategic aspects of the relationship.

I find with my students that far too many of them have large gaps in their understanding of the Soviet Union, and that causes misjudgments.

Mr. SIMON. If my colleague would yield, you mentioned one area that is of concern.

Are our trade restrictions beyond the point that they should be to protect the security of the United States?

Mr. GIFFIN. I just testified last week in the Senate on that very subject. I would have to say that you would have to, in three or four sentences, divide the Export Administration controls into two aspects, the foreign policy controls and the national security controls.

As to the foreign policy controls, many of us in the American business community believe that we ought to rescind them because they are not accomplishing the purpose for which they were intended and, in any case, there is authority under other legislation to allow the President to do that very same thing.

As to the national security controls, the key issue that is involved is we all understand that we should not export items which contribute directly to the military potential of the Soviet Union—for example, weapons. At the same time, even those who have philosophies to the right of Attila the Hun don't believe that we ought to be restricting food stuffs to the Soviet Union.

The key issue, Mr. Chairman, is where do you draw the line between those two areas? What most of us in the American business community are looking for are standards to which the administration can apply the act so that we can have restrictions that are clearly understood before we get involved in some of these projects and so the American business community doesn't suffer and pay the only price on the sanctions when they are applied.

Mr. SIMON. You have not really answered my question, with all due respect. That is between those two extremes that you are pointing out, are we quite some distanced from protecting American security or have we drawn that line only to protect American security interests, in your opinion?

Mr. GIFFIN. Let's put it in real terms. We export 2.5 billion dollars' worth of products to the Soviet Union currently. Only approximately $100 million of that are in machinery and equipment or technology. As far as I am concerned, $100 million in exports to a $2 trillion economy is not exactly hurting the national security of the United States.

Mr. SIMON. If I may follow through—we are obviously beyond the jurisdiction of the subcommittee here now, but it is of concern to all of us in Congress—what you are saying is that we could expand the machinery sales without having an adverse impact on the security of the United States?

Mr. GIFFIN. That is a perfect question. I was hoping you would ask that.

Mr. Chairman, the national security of the United States is dependent not only upon maintaining a strong military, it is also dependent upon maintaining a strong and viable economy. While United States-Soviet trade has never amounted to more than 0.5 to 1.2 percent of total United States turnover, nevertheless, if you take a look at the balance of payments, that positive balance of payments, that has been derived from United States-Soviet trade as compared to our total trade, you will find that it represents about 8 percent since 1914 of our total positive balance of trade in constant 1982 dollars. It creates jobs, capital formation, new sources of energy, new sources of other raw materials, and it creates new sources of technology.

When I look at some of our plants that are closed down, Mr. Chairman, and I find that 1,400 workers in Pennsylvania are out of work because I can't sell drill pipe to the Soviet Union, and companies from Japan and Western Europe are selling that same drill pipe to the Soviet Union, I have to ask myself who is getting the benefit of these restrictions and who is suffering the losses.

Mr. SIMON. You have answered my question.

Mr. Harrison.

Mr. HARRISON. I don't have any questions, Mr. Chairman, but once again I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the witnesses. It has been enlightening for me to hear Mr. Giffin's response to the last question, especially since I come from Pennsylvania. I share in the chairman's comments that it is an honor to have Mrs. Harriman with us this morning, both on her own behalf and that of her very distinguished husband.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Gunderson.

Mr. GUNDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share many of the feelings of my colleague from Pennsylvania and the honor and the insight that we all gain from this kind of testimony in your presentations. I appreciate that very much.

I would like to present a question to both of you. I have just happened to come from the Republican conference on the budget, and I understand the Democrats had a conference on the budget this morning, too, and we are going to begin debating the budget this afternoon. I think we all recognize it presents some real fiscal difficulties to each and every one of us.

You people are far more traveled worldwide and experienced in international relations than I am. My question is a followup to that of Mr. Coleman's earlier when he said, "What do we do when we finish this training?" Where do we start training and where do we stop? This focuses on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. You have traveled greatly, Mrs. Harriman. What about other areas? As we look at the developing decades in the Middle East and Africa and Central and South America, isn't there just as great a need to do this, have areas studies in those particular regions of the world as there is in the Soviet Union?

I happen to think this is a popular area. It is sort of the fad. The Soviet Union, you know, they are the bad guys, let's study them. Everybody wants to do that. What about the rest of the world? If you look at Central America, we are probably making more mistakes in our judgment in terms of international relations in Central America than we are anywhere in the world because we don't understand.

Would you comment?

Mrs. HARRIMAN. I think we all admit that the biggest danger facing us today is our relations with the Soviet Union. These other countries are very, very important. But unless we can really grapple with the big guy, which is the Soviet Union, there is no point starting at the bottom. We have got to go head on with the Soviet Union.

As far as why are we training these people, why do they need to be trained, I would like to suggest that people of the caliber of Ambassador Tommy Thompson and Ambassador Chip Bohlen, in their era, there is no real similar way today that people can get trained like they got trained. I think we have less Russian-speaking in the State Department now than there was 20 years ago.

I would like to suggest that our danger with the Soviet Union is greater than it was 20 years ago and, therefore, it is very important that we get high-level people who can take the jobs that Bohlen and Thompson represented in our country in their era.

But to get back to your question, I think, first things first, the Soviet Union is our big problem in the world over the other countries.

Mr. GIFFIN. Before I answer, I would just like to also correct one other thing. It was insinuated at the beginning that Mrs. Harriman was not an expert on the Soviet Union. She knows more about the Soviet Union than any 5 or 10 people I know. Having traveled there and dealt with them for some time, she has got firsthand experience.

I agree with Mrs. Harriman. I think our first priority is Soviet studies, simply because of their position in the world. But that does not exclude studies in other areas, other areas that are keenly important to the United States, some of which you mentioned, South America, Africa, Middle East, and Far East Asia. But we must improve our entire educational process and make this country more internationally minded. The world is going to be more internationally minded as the economies of all of our countries begin to become more interdependent.

Mr. GUNDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Packard.

Mr. PACKARD. I apologize for not being able to hear all of the testimony. It obviously has been an excellent group of witnesses before our committee, for which we are grateful.

Have you sensed that the schools themselves—and perhaps even carrying it on down to the young people of the country themselves—have taken a keen enough interest in Soviet studies to take off and run with a program that might be available to them?

Mrs. HARRIMAN. I think that since the few months the Harriman Institute at Columbia has been established, there has been an extraordinary amount of interest from schools throughout the country of people who would like to become involved and have never before had a possibility of being able to do so.

Mr. PACKARD. Are there specific institutions in the country that are expert in providing the programs for this area?

Mrs. HARRIMAN. There are. I cannot give you the details. I know that there are six or seven really interested schools and universities.

Mr. PACKARD. To your knowledge, is there a backlog? Is there such an interest in those programs that they can't fulfill the need, or at least the desire? Or would we be providing a Government-sponsored program for which we would have to go out and recruit participants?

Mrs. HARRIMAN. Jim may know better, but I would think that there were those people—if they knew they could have the added incentive, they are there.

Mr. GIFFIN. I think you have got other witnesses later, Congressman, that can probably give better expert advice on this than we can. But I can tell you that there are an awful lot of Soviet experts that find their way—so-called Soviet experts or specialists—that find their way into the business community simply because they can't find programs within the universities so that they can devote their full time to the study and still support themselves and their families.

I think that once this Congress makes it clear that the study of the Soviet Union is an important subject and has top priority, and once that message goes forth—and along with it a little financial backing—I think you will find that the interest will continue to grow.

But as I said before, what my problem is is if this surge comes, what are we going to do with this mass of students if they don't have a place to go if they are trained?

Mr. PACKARD. I suppose the real concern that I have has already been expressed, and that is you used the words "if this surge comes." My concern is with a program before the surge. Is that the appropriate way to go? Again, that is true with every good program.

Mr. GIFFIN. Yes.

Mr. PACKARD. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you both very, very much for being here and for your leadership. It was great to have you here.

Mr. GIFFIN. Thank you.

Mrs. HARRIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you very, very much.

We are pleased to have Ambassador George Kennan here as our next witness.

While I think of him as Ambassador George Kennan, I know my witness list lists you as Prof. George Kennan. I don't know which title you prefer, but we are honored to have you, in either event. You are one of the men who has contributed to the thinking in this whole area just tremendously. You made great contributions to this country.

If I can recall just a little bit of history, George Kennan was stationed in Moscow in about 1945 or 1946 and said that we ought to be little more cautious in our relations with the Soviet Union, and he was then criticized by a great many people for saying that. In recent years, he has said we ought to be trying to understand the Soviets a little bit and not view them all as having horns, and he has been criticized for that.

So we welcome the much-criticized Ambassador, Prof. George Kennan.

STATEMENT OF PROF. GEORGE KENNAN, KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES

Mr. KENNAN. Would you like me to read the statement?

Mr. SIMON. However you would like to proceed. We can enter the statement in the record.

Mr. KENNAN. It will take about 5 minutes or so.

Mr. SIMON. Let's proceed as you wish.

Mr. KENNAN. The following is a summary of my views with regard to this bill.

For this country, the Soviet Union is today, and is going to remain for the foreseeable future, the most important single object on the horizon. For this reason, our relations with that country are going to have supreme importance both for the security of the United States and for the preservation of world peace.

This policy cannot be correctly formulated and executed unless it is supported by a wide body of expert and sophisticated understanding, both within our Government and throughout the opinion-making elements of our society, of the situation in the Soviet Union, of the cultural, economic, and political background of that situation, and thus of the various factors that go to inspire and to produce Soviet policy.

Essential to the creation and preservation of such a body of understanding is the maintenance at all times of a high level of academic and professional expertise in this country relating to the Soviet Union.

This level of expertise was fairly high in the immediate postwar years. But within the past decade, it has been declining and declining, I think, alarmingly for anyone who has these matters at heart. It is clear that the resources of the various teaching institutions across the country—and there are hundreds of them—are not in themselves sufficient to correct this decline and to establish and maintain the requisite standards of training in this field.

There are several reasons for this. One of them is, of course, the heavy strains on academic budgets that have been occasioned by the economic situation of the last few years. Another is the lack of any strong body of private support for Russian/Soviet studies. In this way, they are different from many other studies of foreign nationalities in this country because there is not a large and influential and affluent colony of Russian Americans in this country comparable to what you would find with Czechs, with the Ukranians, with the Poles, with the Yugoslavs. It is dependent on other people to find the money for these forms of study.

Another reason is the tendency of American centers of higher education, the colleges and the universities, to organize the studies of foreign cultures along the lines of established academic disciplines. By that, I mean to divide them into literary studies, studies of economics, but not to study one country in all of its aspects. This last is just what is most needed in the case of study of Russia and the Soviet Union.

The final difficulty here has been the handicaps that do rest on private contacts and exchanges of American scholars with persons and institutions in the Soviet Union unless there are special facilities, as there are today, to arrange those exchanges on the basis of agreement with the Soviet Government. In other words, the Soviet Union is not just a country where it is easy for an American student just to go and get a visa and go there and travel around and meet people all on his own. There have to be special facilities to promote that as we have, and they have to be preserved.

The most important need, as I see it, in this field today—I haven't been, of course, as close to teaching institutions as some of the other people have been who will be testifying here—but as I see it, the greatest need is not today for quantity, but for quality. I believe that the number of persons who are completing training at the post-graduate level today is probably sufficient, or nearly sufficient, to fill most of the professional slots available, as teachers, as diplomats, as those people who go into the armed services, as economists, and so forth.

What is most needed is the improvement of the quality of training, with a view to providing for our society at all times a small corps of highly qualified authorities in the different branches of these studies, capable of filling with distinction the highest and the most responsible positions inside and outside of government, and of exercising a high quality of leadership in all those functions of our national life—some of them are private, some of them are official, governmental—but all those functions where a deep understanding of Soviet realities is needed.

We are talking here about training experts. One must remember that it takes a minimum of 15 years from the time a student starts to study Russian until he acquires both the knowledge and the experience to become a superior authority in this field. This is an ongoing process; you can't interrupt it; there has got to be vitality at every level of the instruction, all the way from the bottom to the top.

For this reason, private assistance which is extended, as is most, I think, of the foundation assistance, only for programs at a given institution of a limited duration—a 3-year program for this or a 2-year program for that—they are not really sufficient as a total solution to this problem. They could be very useful, but they don't solve the problem that I have in mind here. The support which we need here is support of broad scope and of long duration.

The number of teaching institutions in this country is so great, and there are such great differences in the scope and quality and instruction that they offer, that I think it would be quite out of the question that the Federal Government could try to give support in this field by dividing it among all these teaching institutions. You would have to find hundreds of them, and you would have to select between, and it would be a very, very hard thing to do. I couldn't recommend it.

For this reason, it seems to me, the best approach would be—as this bill envisages—long-term support for the three well-known and well-established off-campus organizations—by off campus, I mean they are not teaching organizations, they have other functions. They are mentioned in the bill as it now stands—the National Council, the Wilson Center which contains the Kennan Institute, and the International Research and Exchanges Board. All three of these off-campus institutions function as servicing agencies for the entire national community of colleges and universities who work in this field. Each one of these three meets certain needs of the teaching institutions which those institutions would not be able to meet in adequate degree out of their own resources.

The most important of these needs lie on the areas of facilities for advanced research—which are provided actually through the national committee, and through the Wilson Center and the Kennan Institute, and also, in part, through IREX—suitable possibilities for travel and residence in the Soviet Union, which IREX provides, arrangements for contact and interaction with the Government experts and many others in Washington who have professional interests in this field of knowledge. This last is what the Wilson Center and the Kennan Institute offer to them. It has been very deeply appreciated and many people have gained from it, both in the Government and among the scholars.

We also have the fact that what we might call the profile of Russian studies—that is, the pattern of these studies as they are offered to the student by the teaching institutions—does not cover the entire structure of our national needs. I am thinking of the needs of the country as a whole. Certain subjects tend to be overemphasized in our colleges and universities, and others underemphasized. Among these last, I would mention the cultures and the languages and the economies of the non-Russian/Soviet nationalities. After all, the Russians are becoming a minority now in the Soviet Union, and the studies of these other nationalities are underemphasized. They are very little taught in this country. Also, Soviet relations, for example, with Third World countries, with Asia, they ought to be more closely studied. This is not being adequately done anywhere.

Soviet economic history and geography are very important. We have a lack of really first-rate people in the study of the Soviet economy. This is a matter which our Government thinks about every day here, but we ought to have better expertise than we have on it. These things tend to be neglected. Now, all three of these off-campus organizations mentioned in the bill are in a position to exert influence on the teaching curricula with a view of remedying these deficiencies.

I have just one last thing. I recognize that for our Government to give this kind of support naming individual institutions in this way represents something of an innovation in governmental policy. I can understand that it requires a lot of thought and that you have a lot of questions about it. I assume that you do. I personally consider it justifiable for several reasons.

First of all, there is the great importance of the subject to which this bill is addressed, and the clear evidence that what is needed here is not going to be provided without Federal support and interest.

Second, there is the fact that each of these three institutions has been for some time, to one extent or another—if I am not mistaken—the beneficiary of Federal support, and is receiving it today. Each one of them has long been recognized as an institution that serves a public purpose rather than just a private one. So I think that what is being proposed here represents no significant change in principle.

Third, there is the fact that our Government is not being asked, as I understand it, in this bill to give the funds out of its hands; it would retain ownership and control of the capital; only the interest would be committed; and even this would be committed only so long as Congress wants to continue to see it committed.

Finally, there is the fact that, in taking these measures—if this bill were to go through—and giving this sort of support, our Government would only be matching the practice of a number of other governments and encouraging and supporting this kind of study. I think that we ought to note in this connection that the Soviet Government already spends, and will be spending even if this legislation is passed, far more in the way of encouragement and support for the study of the United States in the Soviet Union than anything envisaged even in this bill. But this bill would help enormously for us to reduce this great disparity between Soviet practice and our own.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of George Kennan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. GEORGE F. KENNAN, KENNAN INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED RUSSIAN STUDIES

The following is a summary of my views and comments on H.R. 601.

1. For this country the Soviet Union is today, and will remain into the foreseeable future, the most important object on the international horizon. For this reason our relations with that country have supreme importance both for the security of the United States and for world peace.

2. The formulation and execution of American policy towards the Soviet Union will not be carried out as effectively and successfully as it could be unless it is supported by a wide body of sophisticated understanding, both within our government and throughout the opinion-making elements of our society, of the situation in the Soviet Union, of the cultural, economic and political background of that situation, and thus of the various factors that help to determine Soviet policy.

3. Essential to the creation and preservation of such a body of understanding is the maintenance at all times of a high level of academic and professional expertise with relation to the Soviet Union.

4. This level of expertise, which was fairly high in the immediate postwar years, has within the past decade been declining seriously. It is clear that the resources of the various teaching institutions across the country are not sufficient to correct this decline and to establish and maintain the requisite standards of training. There are several reasons for this, among them: The heavy strains on academic budgets occasioned by the economic situation of recent years; the lack of any strong body of private support for Russian/Soviet studies; the tendency of American centers of higher education to organize studies of foreign cultures along the lines of established academic disciplines rather than of cross-disciplinary area studies; whereas it is precisely the latter that seems, in the case of Russian/Soviet studies, to be what is most required; and the peculiar handicaps that rest on private contacts and exchanges of American scholars with persons and institutions within the Soviet Union.

5. The most important need at this time, in the training of scholars in this field, is not for quantity but for quality. The number of persons completing training at the post-graduate level is probably now sufficient or nearly sufficient, numerically, to fill most of the professional slots available. What is most needed is improvement of quality of training, with a view to providing for our society at all times a small corps of highly qualified authorities in the different branches of the studies in question, capable of filling with distinction the highest and most responsible positions in and out of government, and of exercising a high level of leadership in all those functions of our national life for which a deep understanding of Soviet realities is necessary.

6. One must reckon with a period of at least some fifteen years between the time when a student begins this type of study and the emergence of an expert with these superior qualifications. For this reason, private assistance extended (as is most frequently the case with private foundation support) for specific training programs of relatively brief duration at individual institutions is, while often useful, not sufficient as a solution to the problem. The support for which there is the greatest need has to be wide in scope and long lasting.

7. The number of teaching institutions involved in the process of training people in this field is so great, and the differences in scope and quality of instruction offered by them so extreme, that it would be idle for the federal government to try to give useful assistance by spreading its resources among all of them or by making choices between them.

8. For this reason, the best approach to the problem would be long-term support for the three well-known and well-established off-campus organizations whose activities support this field of study as a whole. These are the ones mentioned in H.R. 601 as it now stands: the National Council, the Wilson Center (with the Kennan Institute), and the International Research and Exchanges Board. All three of these off-campus institutions function as servicing agencies for the entire national community of teaching institutions. Each of them meets certain needs of the teaching institutions which those institutions cannot meet in adequate degree out of their own resources. The most important of these needs lie in the areas of facilities for advanced research, suitable possibilities for travel and residence in the Soviet Union, and ar-

rangements for contact and interaction with the governmental experts and the many others in Washington who have professional interests in this field of knowledge.

Beyond that we have the fact that the profile of Russian/Soviet studies, as it now emerges from the prevailing patterns of instruction at the teaching institutions, does not cover the entire structure of national needs. Certain subjects are overemphasized in this respect; others, such as the cultures, languages, and economies of the non-Russian/Soviet nationalities, Soviet relations with Third World countries, and Soviet economic history and geography generally, are relatively neglected. All three of the off-campus organizations mentioned in this bill are in a position to exert influence on the teaching curricula with a view to remedying these deficiencies.

9. I recognize that for our government to give this sort of support by legislation to individual institutions appears to represent an innovation in governmental policy. I consider it justifiable, however, in the present instance; and this, for several reasons.

First, there is the great importance of the need to which this measure is addressed, and the clear evidence that this need will not be met without federal interest and support.

Secondly, there is the fact that each of the three recipient institutions is already, and has been for some time, to one extent or another the beneficiary of federal support, it having long been recognized that each of them serves a public purpose. What is being proposed here thus represents no significant change in principle.

Thirdly, there is the fact that in this instance the government is not being asked to give funds out of its hands; it would retain ownership and control of the capital; only the interest is being committed; and even this commitment could be withdrawn at any time at the pleasure of Congress.

Finally, there is the fact that by this means our government would only be matching the practice of a number of other governments in encouraging and supporting this form of study. It might be noted in this connection that the Soviet government already spends, and will be spending even if this legislation is passed, far more in the way of encouragement and support for the study of American society and government in the Soviet Union than anything contemplated, conversely, in this bill.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

I have a question that my colleague from Missouri asked before, a question we have, frankly, not addressed in the bill as it is presently drafted. How would you divide the money among the three institutions?

Mr. KENNAN. It is my recollection from looking at the bill—I saw it possibly in a somewhat earlier stage than it is now—that this was to be determined by the National Council in consultation, I suppose, with a number of other people, including the three institutions. But I personally would think that an even division between or something like that would be just about what was needed.

Mr. SIMON. One other area. I agree with you in your statement that we need to emphasize the quality of training. At the same time, I have a concern that we build up a very small elite group who understand the problems, and so forth, but somehow it isn't permeating southern Illinois. Do you have any reflections on that? How do we make sure we are spreading the knowledge and not just have kind of a little group talking to each other rather than reaching out to grassroots America?

Mr. KENNAN. Of course, there are several partial answers to that. One is that if we can elevate the whole quality and vitality of instruction in this field across the country, we are going to have far better teachers out in the universities and colleges, even in southern Illinois, and that is going to help.

But I agree that that is not enough, and one faces the great problem of feeding accurate and, I would say, well-judged—I don't like to use the word "sophisticated" because it conveys something a little different than what I mean—but there is the problem of conveying sensible and, at the same time, penetrating information about the Soviet Union to the broad mass of our public through the media. It has got to be through them, because there is nobody else who can do it.

I would hope that we might, if we are able to do what we want to do with this bill, bring in this whole process and bring through it and graduate from it as senior specialists a number of people who would be willing to go into the media and into journalism and to make their influence felt that way.

I quite agree that this is absolutely necessary. There is no use having a little closed-off body of esoteric information which doesn't get through to the American public. This is partly a problem of the techniques of the media themselves. I must say that I have great worries about this, because when you have media that say that you can never arrest the attention of the viewer for more than about 2 minutes to any one subject without them instantly dragging them away to look at an ad or to go over to some other subject, I think you have got a real educational problem there. I would like to see some corrections some day in our media which would permit them to give a little more serious type of briefing and really teaching to people in general. I think it can be done and should be done.

But in any case, to do even that, you have got to have the people, and these people have got to know what they are talking about before they can talk to people who know less. You know how quick people are to spot the person who pretends to be an expert and really isn't. If you get the proper people out of this process who really know the subject and know their Russia, and if they go out to talk to other people on TV or personally or however it is going to be, they will be effective. You don't have to worry about that.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you.

Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I gather from your comments that you, first of all, feel that we ought to beef up this area of studies for quality, as you say, and not necessarily for quantity.

Second of all, we have heard a lot about the senior statesmen like yourself who are experts in the area and we are not getting the younger generation trained in this area. How are we going to insure that we are going to have this money go to people who are in their more formative years who will be able to be a national resource for a number of years? If you look at how some of the money has been spent in the past, at least in the past 4 or 5 years, we do seem to have a little bit of an elite and some of it is growing older and older, how are we going to be sure this money gets down to the people that we are really looking toward?

Mr. KENNAN. I think the key agency here will be the National Council for Russian and Eastern European Research. It is up to them to make their decisions about the people who are going to receive support for advanced research, to make those decisions with discrimination and with knowledge of the people involved. That is the best thing I can think of.

I think they do have opportunities there for encouraging, for finding, for discovering the better people, the more promising people, for giving them the possibility to go on and have support for work of a higher order.

Mr. **Coleman**. Perhaps if we could put some language in to say, "those most promising," some of the words you say——

Mr. **Kennan**. That is correct.

Mr. **Coleman**. Given the legislative intent that we don't mean to discriminate against people who have been in the field for a number of years, but to train those who are coming forward. You would support that type of language?

Mr. **Kennan**. Yes, I would, Mr. Coleman.

I think, too, that the very passage of this act is going to give a great boost to morale throughout this field.

Might I, Mr. Chairman, in this connection say a word or two about how I got in this myself, into this whole problem? About 10 years ago, younger people in the field began to come to me and say they were worried about the courses declining, support was declining, and they didn't know to whom they should turn to get help about this. I suddenly realized that people who, in earlier days, had accepted this role—Prof. Phil Mosely at Columbia and others were no longer there. They had died. My colleague, Chip Bohlen and others who might have been interested in it were also dead or not available. And I thought that I had to do something about it, that if I didn't, nobody would.

I have held two nationwide conferences at Princeton at intervals of about 5 years to go over this with all of the authorities we could find, the best people all around the country. We have gone through all of this. Since then, I tried where I could to recognize a certain responsibility here because so many young people come to me and say, "What can you do about it?" That is really my only interest in it now.

I do believe—and this is, I hope, responsible to Mr. Coleman's question—that these three institutions are all in a position to exercise a discriminating selectivity. I know we do that in the Kennan Institute. We have an advisory committee of nine of the best professors we could get from all around the country, and they pass on every candidate who wants to come there for advanced research. Believe me, they go over these applications with a fine-toothed comb. I am absolutely delighted with the quality of the people they have produced.

I think this can be done right down that line, and that the effect is going to be electrifying down through the various institutions.

Mr. **Coleman**. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Simon**. Mr. Harrison.

Mr. **Harrison**. Mr. Ambassador, I sense we are receiving an historical perspective today that is not often available. We have just heard by proxy Ambassador Harriman, and now you are with us.

A particularly thoughtful constituent of mine, Dr. Roy Morgan, in one of his radio editorials recently observed that the crisis in our knowledge of the Soviet Union and its system was observed in the lack of knowledge and analysis on the death of Premier Brezhnev and the passsage into power of Mr. Andropov, and that we knew so very little about that happening compared to what they know about our Presidential elections. I wonder if you could reflect on that for a minute for us.

Mr. Kennan. Those people there in Moscow, as you know, they have a complex about secrecy and they retain the privacy of their own deliberations in the top organs of the Communist Party to where it is almost unbelievable from the American standpoint.

I am not sure that our various people could have done much better than they did in anticipating what happened there. I am not sure. This is a question of Sovietology. Perhaps there is even a danger in attaching too much importance to changes of individuals at the top of that government. You are dealing here with a tremendous great political machine, with 17 million members, with somewhere between one-half a million and 1 million full-time party workers, and with various echelons. It makes a great bureaucratic hierarchy in itself. This is what we are up against.

Individuals at the top like Brezhnev and Andropov certainly have a lot of influence and they are in a position to exercise initiative and to influence, as I say, on this apparatus, but they can't run it just as though they were individuals alone.

I think that our people did very well in anticipating the changes this time, and that they realized that these changes would not be a revolution overnight, that it would be still the same old party.

There is one very significant difference this time—which I think our people spotted, I am not sure—in government. Some of the journalists, I think, spotted it, but not many of them. Namely, that this is going to be the first generation of Soviet leaders at the very top who didn't have their political origins either in the Lenin or the Stalin period. In other words, all of the ones up to date, the old ones who have been dying off, they were people put in there by Stalin, and their views and their ideas of how things should be done were colored by that experience.

This is the first generation which didn't have that experience and they may be a little more flexible. Andropov's behavior suggests this to me—a little more flexible, a little more pragmatic, less ideologically fanatical, more willing to ask what works rather than to look and see what Marx said 140 years ago, whenever it was.

I think personally that, while that can be viewed as good or bad from our standpoint, depending on how you see our whole conflict with Russia coming out in the end, it is a good development, a favorable one. If we have to deal with people in Russia, and we are going to have to, I would rather deal with sensible people who ask what works than to deal with ideological fanatics.

Mr. Harrison. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Simon. Mr. Packard.

Mr. Packard. I had a couple of questions, but we have been called to vote. So I will just ask a question following up the chairman's comment.

I had a young high school graduate, a neighbor of mine out in California, who was very interested in Russian affairs right from the onset and went on to spend the last 12 of 14 years in concentrated research and studies, learning the language, and even living in Russia for a short period of time, doing much of what this program appears to be promoting. Yet, he did not, to my knowledge, attend any of these three institutions. I think one of the schools he went to was Columbia.

I am wondering if the institutions that are available in the country, exclusive of these three, would not be hindered in their programs if these were specifically pulled out and given special treatment and special funding to do what some other institutions obviously are doing in the country. I don't know how many or how qualified they are, but, nevertheless, there must be other programs in some of these learning institutions across the country. How would it affect those?

Mr. KENNAN. Of course, these three institutions are not teaching institutions, so that, in a way, there is no direct conflict between them and the training activities of the other ones. I think that in each instance here, the people who come to these three are taken from the other institutions at the highest level.

In the Kennan Institute here, for example, we have five senior scholars who are selected from among the teaching resouces of the other institutions, and then each year we bring about 20 to 30 younger scholars, just young faculty, to Washington for shorter periods of time who want to work in the resources of the Library of Congress or the National Archives. We give them a place to sit. We give them an introduction to the Library of Congress or the Archives. We give them $30 a day and we find them a cheap place to live if we can because most of them are poor. They have the opportunity of associating and eating their meals with the senior scholars at the institute whom they would otherwise never meet. These are great privileges for them. They wouldn't have this opportunity otherwise.

They go back after a short time to their own institutions, I hope and I have reason to believe, refreshed and stimulated and better able to teach than they were before.

In other words, the point I want to make is these three are servicing institutions to the institutions where teaching and training takes place. They do not perform this themselves. They try to help and enrich the people who do come from the teaching institutions.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you very much.

We have a rollcall on, so we are going to have a 10-minute recess of the subcommittee.

Mr. Ambassador, we thank you very, very much. I particularly was interested in your response to Mr. Harrison's question. I think that was an excellent answer. We thank you very, very much, not only for your testimony here, but for all you have contributed to our country.

Mr. KENNAN. Thank you, I appreciate that.

[Recess.]

Mr. SIMON. The subcommittee will resume its hearings.

Our final witnesses are Mr. Vladimir Toumanoff and Mr. Warren Lerner.

Mr. Toumanoff is the executive director of the National Council for Soviet and East European Studies.

We will hear from both witnesses before we ask any questions. Mr. Toumanoff.

STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR TOUMANOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the committee for this opportunity to testify on this bill.

I come to you as the director of the National Council, and I have submitted a written testimony which is mostly about the Council.

Mr. SIMON. We will enter the written testimony in the record.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I will be happy to answer questions about that particular institution. But as I listened to the testimony thus far, it strikes me that there are a whole series of very important issues which that committee has started to look into which, I think perhaps, with all due humility—I am not the most competent to answer all of these issues—I would like to comment on.

I have a prepared statement for you, which I think I will simply submit, and do my best to respond to a wad of little notes which have been handed to me which I have got in my pocket in response to the issues that have already been raised. I will try to comment as best I can on some of the most important ones.

I would also, before I go further, call the committee's attention to the testimony in the Senate last September which touched very deeply—it didn't touch—it really went in and dealt very deeply with many of the questions which have arisen, both in the testimony of previous witnesses and in the question of the members of the subcommittee.

Let's take a look at some of these issues which have been raised. The first is really a question of why this should be in the form of a trust fund or an endowment and the importance of reliability and duration and consistency for the funding, which bears on the question of why this is a trust rather than annual appropriations. Another one is the enormous cost of recreating the national capability which is in such really drastic decline. Another one is the question of how you insure quality in this process that the legislation addresses.

The question was raised of the role of the Department of State and the government in monitoring and the management of these programs. Mr. Coleman has several times raised the critical issue of employment. A question was raised of the duties and distribution of funds. There was the question of elitism and the proper balance between major universities, some of the outstanding centers of Soviet studies, and the proper distribution nationwide, so that the Nation as a whole, society as a whole, benefits from this legislation.

There was a question of how to introduce flexibility, and whether indeed—and I think this was the testimony of Mrs. Harriman—whether the bill should contain some language which would make it possible to address new and different issues or to correct weaknesses that evolve and develop and be demonstrated in terms of the practice of the programs legislated under this bill.

There are a couple more questions. Let me just try very, very briefly to address some of these. The first question is the question of continuity, duration. We have various testimony over the length of time that it takes to produce a really competent specialist in

Soviet and Eastern European studies, ranging anywhere from 15 years—which I think Ambassador Kennan's estimate—to my own estimate of really a minimum of 6, 7, or 8. What is involved here is not only the 3 or 4 years which are required to reach a doctorate level of competence in the appropriate discipline, economics, political science, sociology, and the others, there are very difficult languages and it takes several years to acquire competence in one, let alone two or three of these. That area is rife with extraordinarily unusual and difficult language learn.

In addition to which, there are specialized area studies to become familiar with the peculiarities of those societies. The whole aspects of those societies are very, very different from our culture.

For a talented graduate BA, a senior in college who is trying to decide what to do, what kind of a training pattern to pursue, what kind of a career commitment to pursue, he and his potential family are looking at a training period before they acquire genuine employability as qualified specialists of at least 6 or 7 years and perhaps 10.

If the legislation were to have a kind of a guillotine clause or depend upon annual appropriations, I think it introduces an issue of unreliability which would steer a talented individual away from making that kind of a commitment. It has been one of the great problems—as you will see if you see the Senate testimony—of the National Council and of the other institutions of an extraordinary fluctuation of funding and an unreliability and uncertainty about it. All of these have been funded essentially on an annual basis.

Not only do students need to have that kind of prospect, that the fellowship and scholarship program which this legislation promises, will not be terminated in midstream suddenly, but reseach scholars who are witnessing a drastic decline in the facilities and the support for advanced research need to have the same kind of assurance within this legislation to be encouraged to stay in a field which is marked by decline. They, too, and their families need to know that the research effort and, in fact, the oriented research effort which this legislation seeks to support will be supported not just for a couple or three or four years, but for some substantial duration for the legislation to accomplish its basic purposes and objectives.

That same assurance needs to be available not just the first year of the legislation, but in the fifth and in the sixth and in the eighth and in the ninth years to maintain a flow of capability, a flow of new talent into the field.

So much, I think, for that.

There have been two studies of funding for centers of advanced research and the universities of this country, one done by Stanford University and one by done by the Rockefeller Foundation. They requested information on the budgets of centers of advanced research and training in Soviet and Eastern European studies for the period 1965-82. If you combine those two studies, they are slightly different in their orientation and the time period which they covered.

What emerged was a decline of 77 percent in constant dollars from 1965 to 1982. What that means is that the university centers for advanced research and advanced training, their budgets have been cut to 23 percent of what they were in 1965. That is, I think, probably the best and most accurate measure we have of what is happening to advanced research and training in this field. They are trying to limp along on 23 percent of what they were in 1965. They are not doing very well.

The entire apparatus that was constructed in this Nation to give us this capability after World War II is eroding. It consists of all aspects of it. It is the fellowships and the scholarships that are available; it is the number of students who are attracted to the field; it is the number of appointments being made by universities; the research support; the secretaries; the space; the computer time; the publications. There isn't any aspect of advanced studies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which have not been affected by this drastic decline in funding.

It is in fact kind of a self-reinforcing process, because students are the first to see this decline and are the first to turn away. When students turn away, then the whole justification for this level of studies at universities declines with them. So it is a self-reinforcing process, and I have an awful feeling that if it is allowed to continue, the national capability in this field, which is already eroded, will really be in dreadful shape.

To recreate that capability, simply to reconstitute a research library, which has been discontinued for 4 or 5 years, would cost enormous amounts of money to find and hire the new faculty. To reestablish the scholarship programs and have them extend for a period of time which would in fact recreate interest and support and a flow of talented personnel would take a decade and a great deal of money. So if this national capacity is allowed to erode further, it will cost much, much more to recreate it than it would cost to sustain it.

The question of quality and the question of the role of the Government, it seems to me, are combined. The bill provides very wisely for a measure of oversight by a special committee designated by the Secretary of State. It specifies and requires consultation between the National Council and that governmental committee.

The National Council itself is composed of between 12 and 18 trustees, all of whom are prominent faculty scholars, specialists on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was carefully designed this way. It was designed jointly by the universities and the Government to create a vehicle for consultation, for collaboration, for joint design, for the monitoring by the Government of the program and the adjustment of the program, so that both the university community which are the direct beneficiaries of this legislation, and the Government which receives not only the end product of research but benefits of a trained pool of manpower, have a joint collaborative role in the conduct—and would have under this legislation in the conduct of the program.

There is, however, a danger in going too far in terms of the powers that the executive branch should have. This is a very small program. It will generate at current rates of interest maybe $4 million a year. The training aspect of it will produce somewhere between 5 and 10 people per year coming out at the end. On the scale on which the executive branch functions, which is a concern of billions, if not hundreds of dollars, the oversight function will drift down in the executive branch to very junior officers. It is just too small and it is peripheral to the center of their attention.

To have them consult, to have them assess, to have them monitor, to have them with the authority to report on the conduct of the program, I think, is beneficial, is necessary, is prudent, is wise, and will help insure not only quality, but flexibility, flexibility to adjust the program as it goes along.

To give them the power over funding, however, to withhold funds, to apportion funds, to reallocate funds, it seems to me risks having junior employees of the executive branch in a position really to impose their specific needs and requirements upon a program under the threat of termination or the withholding of funds or the reallocation of funds.

If you look at the functions which this legislation would support, advanced research, advanced training and public information, it would place them in control or might tempt them to exercise a fine control over all of those functions. Universities and scholars, by and large, under that kind of instruction and that kind of direction, would probably turn away from this program. Other organizations which might be hungry for funds would probably emerge and they would emerge eager to please. The control over funding, it seems to me, should, as it does now rest with Congress, and that the executive branch oversight be both in the design of the program, in consultation, in the assessment of the product, in reporting to Congress.

This bill, it seems to me, represents a kind of voluntary compact between the Government, Congress and the universities to make a long-term, long-range investment commitment to the intellectual capital of this Nation in a field of critical importance, the criticality of which has emerged reasonably recently in our Nation's history and is likely to increase. That voluntary collaboration, that voluntary commitment is a two-way street and shouldn't be dictated by either side.

It was with this kind of thought that these three institutions were created by the universities in consultation with Government with Government funding and have, in fact, functioned precisely that way. It is a constant interplay between the two, between the academic community and the Government community, on the best design, the best function, the best purpose. I think the legislation does precisely that.

The question of employment. Mr. Coleman has raised this issue several times. I think that there are several things that I could say. There are others here in the room who are more competent to comment on that than I am.

One of the problems has been that we have a very uneven product of the efforts of the last 30 or 40 years. We have overproduced in some fields. We have overtrained. We have more people in language, literature and history clearly than the marketplace requires. We have and are underproducing people in the fields of economics, political science, geography, anthropology, sociology, military affairs, agriculture. These social—and almost in some cases practically physical—science specialists, and especially people who can encompass several of those in the fashion that Ambassador Kennan was speaking of, are pretty few and getting fewer.

My impression from having been here in Washington now for the last 3 years, and a good many students come through my office seeking employment, is that qualified scholars in these special fields, especially those who have a variety of capacity, plus especially those who may have another competence, which the Armco vice president testified, have no problem finding employment.

I have a couple more points. The Federal Government, in the form of the executive branch—and I will think you will find this in testimony in the Senate hearings—anticipates a very substantial increase in its manpower requirements in the State Department, the intelligence community and the Department of Defense, all three. I think you will in fact find this in testimony in the Senate hearings.

We have a kind of boom and bust cycle in the business economy. When there is a prospect of trade, there is a sudden demand. When a prospect for trade declines, the demand for the manpower requirements decline. This is such a long-range program that this legislation addresses that I anticipate several fluctuations.

I think that there will be at a certain point a great deal of opportunity for employment in business, in journalism. As the nature of our relations with the Soviet Union fluctuate, as global economic conditions, weather patterns change, I think if there is a recognition of the importance of this field of study, it will in fact permeate down into the undergraduate levels, the high school levels, for teaching about those societies, for teaching about their cultures and for teaching of their languages. I think that will also create teaching positions.

Perhaps there is more that is supposed to be said, but I am not really competent to address it.

Fund distribution. The original conception was in fact, I think, to establish hard and fast proportions. That was given up with the thought that all of these functions also vary from time to time. The Soviet Union could indeed curtail us—so could the Eastern European countries—curtail of the extent of the exchange program, in which case the requirement for funds by IREX would only decrease. The research center here in Washington run by the Wilson Center has fluctuating requirements for funding. The programs to be run by the National Council could fluctuate in terms of the requirements for funding.

So no hard and fast absolute proportions were thought to be flexible enough to enable the programs to change, the allocations to change, the designs or the actual functions to change, as this constant interchange between the academic community and Government takes place and redefines and reshapes.

There is a question of elitism. Let me draw your attention to the record of the National Council over the last 5 years that it has been in existence in terms of funding advanced research.

We have issued, I think, about 84 research contracts to some 50 or better institutions in 22 States from major centers which have a critical mass of scholarships such as Columbia and Havard—the Russian Research Center at Harvard, the Harriman Institute at Columbia—Indiana, Berkeley, Stanford, Chicago, to North Texas State, to universities where there are one or two highly talented people who seek to do research which is central to the concerns of the Government and of the Council, so that there has in fact, in practice, been a very wide distribution.

The major centers are apt to get rather more than the average amount of support simply because they do have critical masses of scholars and can undertake larger, more complex research projects and training projects than the smaller universities. Nevertheless, the membership of that board of trustees is from all across the country and is conscious of the necessity to support the field broadly. So there is not only—there has been, at least in the past, and I expect it would continue—not only a balanced distribution between what you might call excellence of critical mass and separate individual work anywhere, but also a capacity to adjust to make the flexible change in those distributions as they are perceived by the universities and by the Government.

One of the advantages of this kind of flexibility that is built into these institutions, all of them, the IREX as well as the Wilson Center, is it picks up scholars from all across the country on a competitive basis, as does the National Council.

The training program could also be adjusted and made flexible. If it were thought necessary, if the consensus emerged that doable capacity—that is, to take someone who has Soviet area expertise and train them in business management, that could be done. You could expand the program. You could retrain people who are superb in language but don't know much about economics. Almost any combination can be done under this legislation as it now reads.

Perhaps I should stop there, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Vladimir I. Toumanoff follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to contribute to the information available to yourselves and the rest of the House of Representatives as you consider the legislation proposed in H.R. 601. For 601. For the most part I will speak about the National Council, of which I am the Executive Director. But I'd like to start with the most accurate financial data we have on what has been happening to Soviet and East European studies over the last 15 years or so.

According to two systematic surveys, funding dropped by almost 70 percent between 1965 and 1980, and was projected to drop by another 7 percent by the end of 1982. Stanford University conducted one of these surveys. In 1976 it requested data for the period 1965–1976 on the operating budgets of leading United States university centers of advanced research and training in the Soviet and East European field. In 1981 the Rockefeller Foundation conducted a similar survey covering the period 1975–1980, and estimated budgets for 1981 and 1982. Together, these surveys show a drop, in constant dollars, of almost exactly 77 percent from 1965 to 1982.

By these measures, programs of advanced training and research are trying to survive on 23 percent of their 1965 funds. They are not doing well. Gifted students are the first to turn elsewhere as they perceive the effects of the catastrophic decline, and with their departure goes the rationale for everything else at universities. All of the elements are affected, and reinforce each other in decline: the availability of graduate scholarships and fellowships, the staffing and maintenance of research libraries, administrative and secretarial support staff, office space and equipment, allocations of computer time, publications support, advanced course offerings, appointments for young faculty to replace those who retire, and weight in university counsels and decisions. Bit by bit the apparatus that was built after the second World War to give us our national capability for expert knowledge and analysis of the USSR and Eastern Europe is coming apart. It is a slow process, but it has been going on for more than ten years now. If it is allowed to continue, in another ten years we will not have a capability outside the government, and recruits for Government, private sector, and university needs will be unavailable. To recreate the national capability after that would take another decade or more, at enormous cost. Just to reconstitute a discontinued research library would be a staggering task. That is the nature of the national problem that has matured to the point of bringing it to Congress, and which is addressed by H.R. 601.

The legislation is not a total remedy, nor is it appropriate that the Federal Government should bear the burden of remedy alone, or even in major part. Universities, properly, provide the great preponderance of support. Foundations, corporations, private citizens, and other sources also provide a share. But in spite of continuing appeals to all of these traditional supporters, the fact is inescapable of the precipitous decline in the face of a national need that can only increase in the future. Under the circumstances it is most appropriate that the Federal Government, as the single most direct and largest beneficiary of trained personnel, and end-user of research, should contribute a share of the remedy.

The legislation seems to me carefully drawn to address those functions in the field of Soviet and East European studies for which the Government is the most natural constituent: The presence of American specialists in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the broadest public use of Washington's research data, ongoing contact between Government specialists and those outside, a modest program of advanced training in skills relevant to Government concerns, a national research program on an agenda designed in consultation with the Government, and the public dissemination of reliable, independently developed information about the Soviet bloc.

The three institutions identified in H.R. 601, the National Council, the Soviet program of the Wilson Center, and the Exchanges Board, were created and are governed by scholar specialists to carry out precisely the functions mandated by the legislation. All three are in frequent consultation with the Government and cooperate with it. Each of them already operates with at least component of government funding.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

H.R. 601 assigns primary responsibility for the conduct of the legislated program to the National Council. Its origins and function uniquely match the legislation. Let me describe them for you.

High officials of the Executive Branch have been aware for some time of the national decline in Soviet and East European studies, share the concern of scholars, and recognize the national interest in arresting it. In discussions with academic specialists during the mid 1970's they also expressed their growing concern with the decline within the Government of basic research on the USSR and Eastern Europe, and the increasing difficulty of finding qualified research specialists for government employment. A variety of steps were advocated and examined in response to these shared concerns. What emerged after several years of discussion among Government officials and scholars across the country was the national Council: a federally funded, non-profit, autonomous academic corporation whose task is to develop and sustain a long-term program of basic research, on a national scale, dealing with policy issues and questions of Soviet and East European social, political, economic and historical development. Through the conduct of this research program, the Council also seeks to encourage existing scholar-specialists to continue in this field of work, and to train new young cadres of specialists. The Council fulfills this task primarily by providing, through national competitions, research funds to independent scholars through cost-shared contracts with their universities. It does not itself perform research. The results of the research are delivered to the funding Government agencies, but the individual scholars retain the right to copyright and publish their findings.

The Council structure

The National Council, incorporated in the District of Columbia in 1978, consists of a Board of Trustees and an executive staff. The original twelve members of the Board were designated to their office by the Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley; the Provost of the University of Chicago; the Presidents of Columbia University, Duke University, Harvard University, the University of Illinois, Indiana University, the University of Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies; and the Chairman of the Academic Council of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Wilson Center. The right to designate a Trustee remains with these institutions unless, upon the departure from the Board of such a designee, the Board decides to turn to some other institution for designation. The Trustees may also elect up to six additional members of the Board for a maximum total of eighteen.

All Trustees, whether designated or elected, are nationally recognized faculty specialists on the USSR and Eastern Europe, who serve as individuals rather than as representatives of their home institutions for three year terms. No Trustee may serve more than two consecutive terms in office. The Trustees establish Council policies, review and select research proposals for funding, represent the Council for substantive questions on research contracts, and conduct most of the Council's substantive business. Administration and management are the responsibility of an Executive Director appointed by the Board.

Functions of the Council

In recognition that the national interest is served by a capacity to generate and disseminate reliable independent knowledge of the USSR and Eastern Europe, the Council was designed and created by officials of the Executive Branch and academic specialists to be the vehicle for a Government share of funds in support of that national capacity. The scholarly composition of the Council's Board of Trustees and the Council's autonomy of decision were to insure against Government prescription of research and to protect freedom of inquiry and conclusion. The support provided through the Council was intended to encourage existing scholars not to leave the field of Soviet studies, and to encourage new scholars to enter it, not just through the actual dollars transmitted, but also by having the long-term commitment of the Government serve as witness that the nation recognizes and values their work.

It was established that the Council would meet annually with representatives of Government using-agencies to review its program and discuss subject areas of special interest, and that the Council would from time to time set out, in relatively broad terms, a research agenda based on those discussions. However, on the principle that free toilers in the vineyards of knowledge are the most productive, scholars were to be free to proffer research projects of their own choosing in response to that agenda, and the central assumption was made that the overlap of what scholars wish to investigate and what the Government would wish to have investigated is sufficiently extensive that a national program of a million dollars annually would fit easily into the space. A parallel assumption was that the products of research would be useful to the Goverment, would inspire further scholarship, and through publication would help inform the public at home and abroad. It was hoped that the cumulative knowledge of the field and of the scholars in it, embodied in the Council's Trustee, would make their choices wise, and that the respect in which they would be held by their colleagues would invest proposals, labors, and products with quality and timeliness. It seemed reasonable to expect that since the Council would support the central purpose of universities, i.e., scholarship, the latter would willingly share costs, and the program would be more frugal than one the Government could run directly.

And finally, the critical supposition was accepted that the value systems, habits of thought, and bureaucratic practices of the Federal and academic communities were not so incompatible as to prevent the Council from functioning between them without being crushed. It was thought that the Council might even serve in some small way as a bridge between Government and academia to ease the estrangement and mutual distrust of the previous decade.

The Council was launched by Government and universities in the full knowledge that it was an experiment and an act of faith in a difficult society, albeit supported by ample good will and a mass of ingeniously devised legal and administrative scaffolding. How has it fared? In a word, the record has been mixed. The research production has been good. But instability, delays, and uncertainty in funding have seriously limited the achievement of the basic purposes.

Accomplishments

The Council has sought to carry out its joint academic-government mandate in three ways: contracts with universities for research by individual scholars; a variety of meetings and pilot studies to stimulate research; and a large Soviet emigre survey project.

The centerpiece of the Council's activities has been the research contracts. To date, the Council has been able to contract for 84 projects involving well over 100 scholars from 58 institutions in 22 states (see Appendix). The projects have been in a wide range of fields including economics, political science, history, sociology and law. One-fifth have been on Eastern Europe. Eight have been Soviet minority nationality studies.

The product of each study is a final report which is distributed among the various government funding agencies. The researchers themselves use their work to write articles or to expand into books. To date, contract funds provided by the National Council have led to the publication of at least 9 books, 60 articles and 35 papers presented at professional meetings. Examples of the range of studies produced include:

1. A demographic study, using Soviet statistics, of a major population shift in the USSR from Slavic peoples to Moslem nationalities and the short-term and long-term implications of that shift;
2. A historical and political study of Soviet relations with Latin America both state-to-state and within the international Communist movement:
3. A structural study of the Warsaw Pact military forces to understand their role as an internal control mechanism;
4. A study analyzing current trends in Soviet economic development and projecting trends forward to the end of the century.
5. An analysis of the political succession process in the USSR with a particular focus upon the possible outcomes of the Brezhnev succession.

Secondly, the Council has held and sponsored a number of meetings to formulate research among them three meetings, in different parts of the United States, on Eastern Europe; a workshop on political decision-making in the USSR; conferences on defense economics and on the second economy; and two workshops on law and science and technology. The Council has helped finance two research newsletters, one on agriculture and the other on the Soviet military and society.

The third major area of activity of the Council has been the Soviet Interview Project. There are now over 100,000 former Soviet citizens recently arrived in the United States. Ever since this exodus began in the early 1970s it has been the ambition of American scholars to conduct a large scale systematic survey of these newcomers to find out what they could tell us of the USSR. Recently that became a possibility. At the request of the Government, the Council undertook to sponsor the design of such a survey, and signed two contracts with the University of Illinois to that end. The design is for a project that consists of a general survey of a systematically selected sample of approximately 3000 individuals, complemented by intensive interviewing of 1,500 more for specialized topics. The project is intended to fill gaps in our knowledge of the structure and functioning of Soviet society and, to the extent possible, to measure change since the similar Harvard project of the early 1950s. It is estimated that the project, directed by a large research team with the aid of a professional survey organization, will take about five years at a total cost of about $7 million. The design was completed and the project got underway in the autumn of 1981 under a separate contract between the Council and the Department of State. The major group survey is underway. The benefits to the field and to our national knowledge should be considerable. A substantial number of established scholars will be involved, and a much larger number of graduate students and junior scholars are expected to take part. The data compiled, systematized, and made machine readable, will be available to all scholars and government specialists in the future and should provide material for much more research than even the project itself contemplates. The Harvard project of thirty years ago was the source of much valuable information and creative scholarship for years.

Problems

The major difficulty and the basic reason why the proposed legislation is so essential to the manpower and research problems facing Soviet and East European studies derives from the fragility of Executive branch funding. This funding has been subject to repeated delays, wide fluctuations and great uncertainties. Scholars, who, as it is said, punch calendars rather than time clocks, find it extremely difficult to operate under such conditions. Furthermore, in order to attract young scholars into the field, funding must be reliable over a long period of time. The following chart illustrates fluctuations and delays in the receipt of funds from one fiscal year to another for the Council's regular research program.

COUNCIL FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR

Amount received	Date received	Total for fiscal years—
$570,000 [1]	September 1978	1978, $570,000.
$600,000	April 1979	
$525,000	September 1979	1979, $1,125,000.
$67,607	October 1979	
$420,000	January 1980	
$450,000	May 1980	
$400,000	September 1980	1980, $1,337,607.

COUNCIL FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR—Continued

	Date received	Total for fiscal years—
$365,000 [2]	September 1981	1981, $365,000
$245,000	December 1981	
$250,000	April 1982	
$175,000	July 1982	
$265,000	September 1982	1982, $935, 000
Anticipated funds		1983, $530,000

[1] In August 1978, the ACDA offered an additional $50,000, but it could not be processed before the end of the fiscal year.
[2] In June of 1981 the DCI allocated $125,000 which was not processed before the end of the fiscal year.

The difficulty is three-fold. The Council and the field do not know from one year to the next whether there will be any funds, and whether, indeed, the Council will be in existence. They do not know what the level of funding will be, only that it fluctuates widely. They do not know when it may be available, but do know that contributions have been lost because the complexity of inter-agency transfers and contract modifications could not be completed before fiscal years ended.

Initial funding for the Council was provided by the Departments of Defense and State, which were joined almost immediately by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. For a variety of reasons, efforts to obtain contributions from other Departments have not been successful thus far, and, under budget constraints, the ACDA has suspended funding since 1981. However, a contribution by the Director of Central Intelligence was made in 1981 and has been repeated in 1982 and this year. The Council was caught up, in 1981 in the review by the new Administration of all funding programs. Happily, the decision was ultimately favorable, but there was a delay of almost twelve months in the Council's ability to contract for research, and until the last moment it was uncertain whether any funds could be processed before they reverted to Treasury at the end of the fiscal year. Funding in 1982 was nearly as uncertain, as it is again this year, and the amounts continue to fluctuate wildly.

The uncertainties, delays, and sudden interruptions in the Council's support of the field have damaging immediate consequences, and make the attainment of the objectives for which it was created unlikely in the long run. Applicants whose research projects have been approved are left unsure for a year or more whether they will be funded, and some are ultimately dropped when expected funding fails to materialize. The start of research is sometimes delayed by as much as two years. Other research is interrupted for varying periods in mid-stream. The Council is unable to stimulate research on important topics because it can give no assurance of support, and as much as four years can pass from the time the Council announces its research agenda to the time some of the projects designed in response to it produce results.

The Council's experience demonstrates that it is almost impossible to reconcile the academic schedule, which demands forward teaching commitments almost a year ahead, with the Federal schedule of appropriations, allocations, contract amendments and fiscal year deadlines, especially when several Government agencies are involved. The end result is that from the viewpoint of the specialists and potential trainees in the field, the entire effort is so uncertain and unreliable as to make a professional commitment dubious. That is why the funding procedure provided for in the proposed Act is so essential to achievement of the Act's long-range purposes.

The critical uncertainties of whether, at what level, and when, funds may be available from year to year put a stamp of unreliability on the effort that deters gifted individuals from making a professional commitment to the field, and thwarts the ultimate purpose of arresting the decline of our national capability to study the USSR and Eastern Europe. Why does such uncertainty mark the effort?

It happens for a number of contributory reasons, and one overwhelming one. Among the lesser reasons are:

There is no locus within the Executive Branch that has both the responsibility and the financial resources to maintain our current knowledge of the Soviet bloc, and our national capability to develop such knowledge, outside of the Government.

Funding by contribution from a number of different Departments and Agencies involves elaborate administrative machinery, the cooperation of hundreds of individuals who do not know of each others' existence, and unending problems and complications.

The personnel involved in the decisions each year whether or not to fund the effort, and if so at what level, as well as those involved in executing the decisions, turn over rapidly. As a consequence individuals who know nothing of this unique undertaking are constantly appearing in positions where their positive action, and even initiative, is critical. Catching their attention for a program costing hundreds of thousands, when their concerns are with hundreds of millions or billions, is sometimes next to impossible.

The processes of budget formation in each Department, in the Executive Branch, and in Congress, as well as the subsequent processes of appropriations, allocations, etc. are themselves uncertain. At the microscopic level of the council's funding, it simply gets overlooked, or shunted aside for larger concerns.

All of these circumstances contribute to the funding problems which threaten to defeat the purposes for which the Government and academic community created the National Council. But the overwhelming reason is the lack of a Congressional mandate.

Without a Congressional mandate, every Executive Branch official involved in supporting the Council is apprehensive that either he, or worse, his superiors in whose name he acts, will be subject to criticism. It is infinitely easier for an apprehensive official to say "No," or take no action; especially one new to his responsibility to act, and there is no basis on which to appeal inaction except conviction and courage. There lies the root cause of delay, of hazardous and haphazard existence. Without your endorsement through legislation, the entire effort flounders in accidental neglect, in administrative complication, and in doubt. Four years have taught me that this unique start of a truly collaborative program by Government and scholars to address an urgent national need, cannot be effective, and will ultimately fail without your sanction and approval. What's worse, is that having been started in the full view and support of the profession, its failure will only make matters worse.

What is its track record, is this effort worth supporting?

Economy of operation

By requiring cost sharing, the Council receives one third more research effort than it pays for. Every university that receives federal research contracts negotiates with the Government annually an administrative overhead rate that applies to every federal contract it receives. This administrative surcharge, called the "indirect cost rate," is based on a complicated formula and varies from institution to institution, and from year to year. Roughly speaking, it runs from about 50 percent to over 100 percent of the direct costs. From the start, the Council has limited this charge to 20 percent or less on all of its research contracts, and requires universities to contribute the difference as their share of the cost of the project. This is a step the Government cannot legally take. On that score alone, the Council has calculated that the universities have been contributing one dollar for every three Council dollars. Put another way, if the Government had contracted for the same research, it would have cost one third more.

Since the start, the Council's own total administrative costs have been 10.3 percent of the funds entrusted to it by the Government. All the rest have gone into the research programs. In part this is due to simple frugality. Government contracting officers estimated that the Council would need a staff of thirty to administer the program. The Council has a staff of four. In part it is the product of voluntary service by Trustees who either charge less than their usual rates, or not at all, for their work on the Council's behalf.

There are other sources of economy. In addition to indirect cost savings, the Council encourages university contributions to direct costs, and makes that an element of judgment in the competition for award of contracts. Scholar-applicants know that their budgets will be scrutinized by the Trustees, who are experienced research scholars themselves, and know real costs from inflated ones. The Trustees also frequently know the financial conditions of universities and even of applicants. That awareness not only deters budget inflation in a competitive setting, but often results in further reduction of applicants' budgets by the Trustees as a condition of award. Moreover, scholars know that every dollar they save will go to make possible the work of some colleague in the profession, and therefore the researchers themselves practice economy. As a consequence, the Council had not no costoverruns, but, on the contrary, has had modest recoveries from under-expenditure on completed contracts.

It is impossible to calculate an accurate dollar figure, but the savings as against the cost of an equivalent research program contracted for directly by the Government are between 25-50 percent, and perhaps more.

Quality

Individual reactions to individual research reports done under Council auspices vary. Understandably so, given the wide variety of knowledge and interests among the Government readers. There has been only one systematic judgment, and the results of that were gratifying. The CIA requested an evaluation by its onw specialists of 25 of the Council's reports on two counts, quality of research, and usefulness. Twenty one of the reports were judged "good" or "excellent" on both counts.

The Council has built quality control into the program from start to finish. The proposals are reviewed by all the Trustees, who know their professional colleagues (and have taught many of them), know the subject matter, the research methods, available data, and current, as well as past, work in the field. Once a contract is awarded, they designate one of their number best qualified in the subject to stay in close touch with the researchers to monitor progress, and to help with problems should they arise. The Trustees also review all research reports, and frequently request additions or improvements, before submitting them to the Government.

There have also been two outside reviews of the structure and functions of the Council overall. Both the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, and the General Accounting Office have commended the Council as a model for federal funding of advanced research.

Finally, it seems appropriate to identify the ways in which the Government would maintain oversight of the programs to be conducted under the provisions of the proposed legislation.

The research agenda which would guide the national research program on the USSR and Eastern Europe would be drawn up in consultation with federal officials designated by the Secretary of State. If current practice is any indicator, these same individuals would be among those who would receive the reports of research and findings, and would thereby monitor the program.

The annual disbursement from the Government to the National Council would be preceded by application to the Secretary of the Treasury which would have to describe the purposes and programs for which the payment would be used. The Secretary of the Treasury would be free to seek the advice of other knowledgeable individuals he might choose.

The National Council would submit annual reports of its activities under the Act, including an annual financial audit, to the Secretary of the Treasury, the President and Congress.

The principal of the fund, kept within Treasury, could, of course, be withdrawn from the fund and retired to general funds whenever the Government wished to terminate the program.

It is also one of the duties under the Act to facilitate research collaboration between Government and academic specialists, which will ensure a wide awareness within knowledgeable Government circles of the quality of the work sponsored under the Act.

There comes a point, however where too much "oversight" power in the hands of Executive Branch employees could also threaten the purpose of the Act to sustain advanced research and training in the nation's academic community. That point is reached if they have the power to withhold funds unless their particular wants are satisfied: in the subject matter, conduct, and results of research, in which universities, or individuals, shall receive funding, and which shall not, in what the advanced training curriculum shall be, in what information shall be made public and what shall not.

The Executive Branch power of oversight should be to consult, monitor assess, and report to Congress, but not to terminate if the universities fail to please and obey middle or low level employees.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

APPENDIX I

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

RESEARCH CONTRACT AWARDS BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

Since its formation in February 1978, the National Council has concluded 84 research contracts allocating a total of $3,493,589 to research projects on the USSR and Eastern Europe. The investigators, their institutional affilation, the project titles, the contracting institutions, and the allotted amounts in that order are listed below. Asterisk signifies that a Final Report has been submitted to the Government.

Robert Axelrod, University of Michigan, "Politics and Deception in the Soviet Press"; University of Michigan, $19,558.

Alexandre Bennigsen, University of Chicago; Rasma Karklins, University of Chicago; "Ethnic Relations in the USSR"; University of Chicago, $44,095.

Abram Bergson, Harvard University; "The Soviet Economy to the Year 2000"; Harvard University, $24,600.

Joseph Berliner, Brandeis University; Barney Schwalberg, Brandeis University; Christopher Davis, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom; "The Economics of Soviet Social Institutions"; Harvard University, $163,263.

Seweryn Bialer, Columbia University; "The Politics of Change in the Soviet Union"; Columbia University, $20,832.

Yaroslav Bilinsky, University of Delaware; Tönu Parming, University of Maryland; "The Helsinki Watch Committees in the Soviet Republics"; University of Delaware, $33,660

Cole Blasier, University of Pittsburgh; "Soviet Relations with Latin America"; University of Pittsburgh, $51,108.

Daniel Bond, SRI International-WEFA: "Study of Soviet Research on Multi-regional Modeling"; International Research and Exchanges Board, $18,720.

Morris Bornstein, University of Michigan; "Pricing of Research and Development Services in the USSR"; University of Michigan, $47,309.

George Breslauer, University of California, Berkeley; "Policy Orientation of 1st Party Secretaries in the RSFSR," University of California, Berkeley, $35,000.

Paul Cocks, Stanford University; "The Role of the Party in Soviet Science and Technology"; Stanford University, $22,740.

Stephen F. Cohen, Princeton University; "The Social Dimensions of De-Stalinization"; Princeton University, $20,000.

Stanley Cohn, SUNY-Binghamton; "Soviet Investment Policy Imperatives," SUNY-Binghampton, $30,000.

Vera Dunham, City University of New York-Queens College; "The Worker and the Soviet System"; Columbia University, $27,216.

Murray Feshbach, The Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies; "A Study of the Multi-Dimensional Impact of Current Demographic Trends of Soviet Society"; Georgetown University, $21,168.

Mary Ellen Fisher, Skidmore College; "The Romanian Political Leadership"; Harvard University, $38,388.

Raymond Garthoff, The Brookings Institution; "American-Soviet Relations in the 1970s"; The Brookings Institution, $52,504.

Zvi Gitelman, University of Michigan; "Bureaucratic Encounters in the USSR"; University of Michigan, $74,920.

Seymour Goodman, University of Arizona; "Intergration of the COMECON Computer Industries"; University of Virginia, $34,340, University of Arizona, $6,622.

Kenneth Gray, North Texas State University; "Liverstock Cycles in the Soviet Union with US Comparisons"; North Texas State University, $22,477.

Kenneth Gray, North Texas State University; "Research Newsletter on Russian, Soviet and East European Agriculture," North Texas State University, $4,875.

Paul Gregory, James Griffin, University of Houston; "The Anlytical and Econometric Estimation of 'Correct' Measures of Relative Soviet Defense Effort"; Transecon, Incorporated, $52,423.

Jan Gross, Yale University; "Russian Rule in Poland, 1939-1941; Yale University, $53,374.

Gregory Grossman, University of California, Berkeley; "A Workshop and a Conference on the Second Economy of the USSR"; University of California, Berkeley, $74,928.

Edward Hewett, University of Texas at Austin; "A Theoretical Approach to CPE Macro Models and An Experimental Application for Hungary"; University of Texas at Austin; $45,873.

Franklyn Holzman, Tufts University; "US-Soviet Economic Relations"; Tufts University, $30,000.

Franklyn Holzman, Tufts University; "A Comparison of US and Soviet Defense Expenditures"; Tufts University, $10,000.

Holland Hunter, Haverford College; "Testing Soviet Economic Policies, 1928-1941"; Haverford College, $32,400.

Christopher Jones, Marquette University; "Perfecting Mechanisms of the Warsaw Pact"; Harvard University, $41,432.

Arcardius Kahan, University of Chicago; D. Gale Johnson, University of Chicago; "East European Agriculture"; University of Chicago, $82,477.

Aron Katesnelinboigen, University of Pennsylvania; "Toward the Concept of Measuring Economic Potential: The Soviet-American Case"; University of Pennsylvania, $63,000.

Mark Kuchment, Harvard University; Stephen Sternheimer, Boston University; Harley Balzer, Harvard University; "An Assessment of Soviet R & D Capabilities"; Harvard University, $120,276.

Fyodor Kushnirsky, Temple University; "The Regional Economy of the Soviet Union: A Modeling Study"; Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc., $103,138.

Gail Lapidus, University of California, Berkeley: "Workshop on Contemporary Soviet Policy-Making"; University of California, Berkeley, $21,350.

Richard Laurino, Center for Planning and Research, Incorporated: "A Study of Red Army History"; Center for Planning and Research, Incorporated, $15,000.

Wassily Leontief, New York University; "The Position of the Soviet Union in the World Economy"; New York University, $50,000.

Ronald Linden, University of Pittsburgh; "The Impact of International Change on Romania and Yugoslavia," University of Pittsburgh, $50,000.

Bernice Madison, San Francisco State University; "The Soviet Welfare System"; San Francisco State University, $53,055.

Peter Maggs, University of Illinois, Donald Barry, Lehigh University; Gordon Smith, University of South Carolina; "Soviet and East European Law and the 'Scientific-Technical Revolution'"; University of Illinois, Urbana, $64,376.

Shane Mahoney, Eastern Washington State University; "Role of the Soviet General Staff in Military Management"; Eastern Washington State University, $29,994.

Michael Marrese, Northwestern University; Jan Vanous, University of British Columbia; "Cost and benefits of Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe"; Northwestern University, $56,645.

News—Bruce Menning, Miami University (OH) "Military and Society in Russia and Eastern letter Europe: A Research Newsletter"; Miami University, $10,246.

James Millar, University of Illinois, Urbana; "Contemporary Soviet Society: A Study Based on the Third Soviet Emigration" (Design); University of Illinois, Urbana, $254,260.

James Millar, University of Illinois, Urbana; "Contemporary Soviet Society: A Study Based on the Third Soviet Emigration" (Design); University of Illinois, Urbana, $46,500.

Martin Miller, Duke University; "Mental Illness in the Soviet Union," Duke University, $39,504.

Adel Nikolskaya, Illinois State University; Maria Neimark; Natalie Sadomskaya; "Soviet Family of Two Post-War Generations"; Illinois State University, $92,349.

Martha Olcott, Colgate University; "The Development of Nationalism in Kazakhstan"; Colgate University, $35,000.

Jeffrey Osleeb, Boston University; Craig ZumBrunnen, University of Washington; "Energy Consumption and Analysis of Optimal Interregional and International Flows in the Soviet Iron and Steel Industry"; Boston University, $34,162.

Walter Pintner, Cornell University; "Russian Army and Russian Society, 1700–1917"; Cornell University, $16,799.

Alex Pravda, University of Michigan; "Industrial Workers and Political Development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe"; University of Michigan, $39,360.

Gilbert Rozman, Princeton University; "Soviet Perceptions of Contemporary China"; Princeton University, $18,030.

Boris Rumer, Harvard University; "The Dynamics of the Capital Coefficient of USSR Industrial Output"; Harvard University, $70,974.

Boris Rumer, Harvard University; "The Investment Process in Siberian Industry," Harvard University, $27,322.

Stephen Sacks, University of Connecticut; "Large Corporations Under Yugoslav Socialism"; University of Connecticut, $20,000.

David Segal, University of Maryland; Janet Schwartz, George Mason University; "Military Service and Civilian Employment in the Soviet Union"; University of Maryland, $48,000.

Louise Shelley, American University; "The Role of Law in Soviet Society"; American University, $48,996.

Brian Silver, Michigan State University; Barbara Anderson, Brown University; "Language and Ethnic Identity in the USSR," Michigan State University, $9,546, Brown University, $10,429.

Dimitri Simes, Johns Hopkins University; "Soviet Military and Society"; Johns Hopkins University, $95,526.

Robert Stuart, Rutgers University; Paul Gregory, University of Houston; "Fertility and Labor Supply: The USSR and Eastern Europe"; Transecon, Incorporated, $44,076.

Robert Taaffe, Indiana University; "The Effects of Contemporary Soviet Approaches to Regional Planning, Locational Analysis and the Resolution of Regional Conflict on the Development of Siberia and the Soviet Far East"; Indiana University, $33,541.

Judith Thornton, University of Washington;" "Soviet Response to Changing Fuel Costs and Availabilities: The Case of Electric Power"; University of Washington, $28,281.

Robert Tucker, Princeton University; "Stalin: A Case Study in History and Personality"; Princeton University, $20,000.

Tibor Vais, Harvard University; "Studies in East European Labor Economics," Harvard University, $30,798.

Elizabeth Valkenier, Columbia University, "Soviet-Third World Relations: The Economic Bind"; Columbia University; $13,001.

Elizabeth Valkenier, Columbia University, "Soviet-LDC Relations in an Interdependent World Economy"; Columbia University, $26,361.

Nils Wessell, Lafayette College; "Ground Rules for Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts"; Foreign Policy Research Institute, Incorporated, $13,740.

Sharon Wolchik, George Washington University; Jane Curry, Columbia University and Manhattanville College; "Specialists in the Policy Process in Poland and Czechoslovakia"; George Washington Univerity, $39,430.

Alexander Yanov, University of California, Berkeley; "The Debate on De-Stalinization in the USSR, 1961-1972"; University of California, Berkeley, $21,000.

Murray Yanowitch, Hofstra University; "Work Attitudes and Work Organization in the Soviet Union"; Hofstra University, $17,499.

Under a separate contract with the Department of State, the Council has concluded another research contract, involving a number of scholars and Universities, to conduct a large scale survey of recent emigres from the USSR. The principal scholars and universities involved are as follows: James Millar, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Donna Bahry, New York University; John Garrard, University of Virginia; Paul Gregory, University of Houston; Rasma Karklins, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle; Norman Nie, University of Chicago-National Opinion Research Center; Brian Silver, Michigan State University; Michael Swafford, Vanderbilt University; Aaron Vinokur, University of Haifa; and William Zimmerman, University of Michigan: "Contemporary Soviet Society: A Study Based on the Third Soviet Emigration"; University of Illinois, Urbana, $2,200,000.

APPENDIX I, SUPPLEMENT.—RESEARCH CONTRACT AWARDS BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH SIGNED SINCE MARCH 1982

Raissa L. Berg, Washington University; "On the History of Genetics in the Soviet Union: Science and Politics; The Insights of a Witness"; Washington University, $5,000.

Seweryn Bialer, Columbia University; "The USSR as a Global Power"; Columbia University, $19,999.

Janet Chapman, University of Pittsburgh; "The Soviet Employment Service and the Search for Efficiency"; University of Pittsburgh, $30,000.

Ralph Clem, Florida International University; "A User's Guide to Soviet Censuses"; Florida International University, $14,821.

Thane Gustafson, The Rand Corporation; "The Politics of Soviet Energy", Columbia University, $33,000.

Kenneth Jowitt, University of California, Berkeley; "Communist International Relations"; University of California, Berkeley, $45,000.

Arthur E. King, Lehigh University; Josef C. Brada, Arizona State University; Marvin R. Jackson, Arizona State University; "Agriculture in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania: an Econometric Model"; Lehigh University, $50,000.

Gail Lapidus, University of California, Berkeley; "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability in the USSR"; University of California, Berkeley, $45,000.

Robert A. Lewis, Columbia University; "Regional Population Growth in the USSR and its Impact on Society: 1897-1979"; Columbia University, $74,696.

Gur Ofer, Harvard University; "Economics of the Soviet Urban Household in the 1970s"; Harvard University, $25,000.

Mervyn Matthews, Stanford University; "Poverty in the Soviet Union"; Stanford University, $48,000.

Alfred J. Reiber, University of Pennsylvania; Moshe Lewin, University of Pennsylvania; Conference on the Social Foundation of Bureaucracy in Twentieth Century Russia"; $10,000.

Vladimir Shlapentokh, Michigan State University; "Social Values in the Soviet Union After 1953"; Michigan State University, $53,430.

Paul Shoup, University of Virginia; "Political Development and Innovation in Eastern Europe"; University of Virginia, $15,590.

Ivan Szelenyi, University of Wisconsin-Madison; "Part-time Family Farming in Contemporary Hungary"; University of Wisconsin-Madison, $29,549.

APPENDIX I

Institutions which have received funds from the National Council up to September 1, 1982:

Institution	State
American University	Washington, D.C.
Boston University	Massachusetts.
The Brookings Institution	Washington, D.C.
Brown University	Rhode Island.
Center for Planning and Research, Inc	California.
Colgate University	New York.
Columbia University	Do.
Cornell University	Do.
Duke University	North Carolina.
Eastern Washington State University	Washington.
Florida International University	Florida.
Foreign Policy Research Institute	Pennsylvania.
The George Washington University	Washington, D.C.
Georgetown University	Do.
Haverford College	Pennsylvania.
Harvard University	Massachusetts.
Hofstra University	New York.
Illinois State University	Illinois.
Indiana University	Indiana.
International Research and Exchanges Board	New York.
Johns Hopkins University	Maryland.
Lehigh University	Pennsylvania.
Miami University	Ohio.
Michigan State University	Michigan.
New York University	New York.
North Texas State University	Texas.
Northwestern University	Illinois.
Princeton University	New Jersey.
San Francisco State University	California.
Stanford University	Do.
State University of New York-Binghampton	New York.
Transecon, Incorporated	New Jersey.
Tufts University	Massachusetts.
University of Arizona	Arizona.
University of California, Berkeley	California.
University of Chicago	Illinois.
University of Connecticut	Connecticut.
University of Delaware	Delaware.
University of Illinois-Urbana	Illinois.
University of Maryland	Maryland.
University of Michigan	Michigan.
University of Pennsylvania	Pennsylvania.
University of Pittsburgh	Do.
University of Texas-Austin	Texas.

Institution	State
University of Virginia	Virginia.
University of Washington-Seattle	Washington.
University of Wisconsin-Madison	Wisconsin.
Washington University-St. Louis	Missouri.
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Association, Incorporated	Pennsylvania.
Yale University	Connecticut.

SPOKEN TESTIMONY OF VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

Mr. Chairman, I would like first to thank you and the members of the Committee for this opportunity to testify on H.R. 601. I appear before you today as the Executive Director of the NCSEER, and my written testimony is mostly about that Council. I'd be glad to answer any questions you may have about it, but in these brief remarks let me just make two points that seem to me important.

The first is to underline the importance and the wisdom of the long term reliability of support which this Act provides. That long term reliability is essential to the success of the undertaking. It takes longer to train an expert on the USSR or Eastern Europe than it does to train a lawyer, or a doctor, let alone a graduate engineer or computer specialist. The normal graduate training period for a doctorate in appropriate disciplines (economics, political science, sociology, and the others) is three or four years. If you add to that, the time to acquire competence in one or more of the difficult languages involved, plus time for all of the specialized area studies to learn the peculiarities of those countries, plus a year in residence there, the training period adds up to six, seven, or eight years. That's the time college graduates must commit themselves to before they become employable as qualified specialists. If they are to embark on such a training program, and make that career commitment, talented graduates need the assurance, which this Act provides, that the scholarship program it offers will not stop in midstream. And that reliability is needed in the third or seventh or ninth years of its operation, as well as the first year, for the Act to achieve its long range purpose.

This is not to advocate a riskless environment, and Congress will and should always have the option of legislating an end to the program. But if the Bill contained an automatic termination date, a kind of guillotine clause, it would lose its effectiveness as that date approached. A graduate, weighing six or seven years of further training would begin to discount the attraction of the Act even five years before its termination. In the last two or three years before the scheduled fall of a guillotine, the Act would be nearly ineffective, and its purpose defeated.

Very much the same is true of its purpose to encourage existing research scholars not to leave the field, where research facilities and support are dwindling. Perhaps even more than beginners, they need to know that support for research under the Act does not automatically terminate five or ten years hence. I think it is an accurate assessment to say, if our Government were unwilling to make a long term commitment, how should we expect it of individuals, and their families? In a sense, this legislation is a kind of voluntary compact between Congress and a substantial segment of the society, some of its talented students and its universities, to make a lasting investment in the intellectual capital of the nation to serve a reasonably recently emerged critical need. The universities and some farsighted officials of the Executive Branch have created the machinery and made a start, which flounders and will ultimately fail without the mandate and long term support of Congress.

The other topic I'd like to take up is a related point, and concerns oversight. We are discussing a small program, that would generate some $4 million a year at current interest rates. It is especially small on the scale of the larger Executive Branch departments, whose concerns run into billions, if not hundreds of billions of dollars annually. To the extent that legislative provisions vest oversight for this small program in the Executive Branch, it will be performed by junior officers. The authority given them in the Act to consult, to monitor, to assess and to report on the conduct of the program is prudent and beneficial. But the power over funding remains wisely with Congress. To give the power to apportion, to reallocate, or to withhold funds to Executive Branch employees would introduce the same unreliability I spoke of earlier. Worse, it might tempt them, or even put them under pressure, to denfine the training, the research, and the public information programs authorized by the Act in such a way as to serve their interests, and conform to their requirements, under threat of termination. Universities and scholars would probably turn aside, while other organizations, hungry for funds would emerge, eager to please.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you.

Mr. Warren Lerner, director of graduate studies, department of history, and a member of the Committee on Soviet and Eastern European Studies at Duke University. We are very happy to have you with us, Mr. Lerner.

STATEMENT OF WARREN LERNER, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND DIRECTOR OF GRADUATE STUDIES, DUKE UNIVERSITY, DURHAM, N.C.

Mr. LERNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the disadvantages of being last is 95 percent of the points I had intended to raise have been covered by previous witnesses.

I would depart from my prepared text, which I will simply leave for the record.

Mr. SIMON. It will be entered in the record.

Mr. LERNER. I would like to address a few concerns that have been raised here this morning and see what can be said about them.

Congressman Coleman and several others have raised very real concerns as to whether we would be training a generation of people who would have unmarketable skills and for whom there would be few jobs.

One of my several responsibilities where I am now is job placement, and it is a very, very difficult position. We sweat and labor on placing the relatively few people we have who are trained the field. Immediate extrapolation would be, "Well, maybe we don't need these people."

I would beg to differ in this respect. First of all, there were several witnesses, including Mr. Toumanoff just now, who have made the point that our needs are not necessarily in the field so much where conventional training has been, but where we have enormous gaps, technology and science being the most obvious, but by no means the only ones.

Through this legislation I presume to be more targeting of the critical areas of need. The national council had in a senior scholar program operated on a critical area basis and has indeed funded several projects which are outside the normal scope of our research.

There is something more, however, even beyond that. One feature is demographic. One of the reasons there are relatively few jobs is that people like myself are damming up the good ones. The generation of the 1950's was a boom generation, so to speak. A great number of people went through to major research centers, were well placed, and have lived happily ever after.

Incidentally, I might notice that what made it possible for many of us was a massive effort by the Ford Foundation, through its foreign area training program, to simply create a body of newly trained scholars in Soviet Union and Eastern European. I remember looking 1 year at a list of scholars. The Ford Foundation in 1 year gave 50 training grants in Russian and Eastern European studies. In terms of present dollars on what it would cost to fund somebody for the travel, study and what have you, each grant would have been worth close $20,000. That is in terms of current dollars. In other words, the Ford Foundation then undertook a national responsibility, for whatever reasons, and trained a whole generation.

I also remember noting that in the years when I had a grant, out of the 50 grants, 47 went to Harvard and Columbia. Since I was a Columbia student, I felt it was a very fine ratio at the time. In retrospect, I am not too certain. I am not so sure that we didn't create a too narrow a body of people who kept talking to each other and echoing each other, and maybe our own expertise has suffered as well.

Be that as it may, the Ford Foundation went off in other directions. For a while, possibly resulting from the panic over the first Soviet Sputnik, there was considerable Federal funding through title IV and title VI and other areas. That tailed off greatly by the end of the 1960's and it disappeared, as we well know.

The result is that there is almost a missing generation of people, people who we might say that we don't need them right now, but I think we do. But as my colleagues and myself start counting the years to retirement—I am a little lucky, I still have a few years to go, and many of my colleagues do not—we have to ask the question of who are going to be our replacements and what are they going to do.

Quite coincidental, nothing to do with this hearing today, I have a meeting with the dean of faculty in my own institution tomorrow to discuss the future of Slavic languages. Our concern is that two members of the department are into their sixties and will be retiring. Should we replace both of them and, if so, at what level? Obviously, we will continue to offer Russian. Should we continue to offer Polish? These are the kinds of concerns we will have. In the national interest, I would hope we would. In terms of what is going on, we have to ask hard questions as to whether these are the commitments we should make.

I would say that if this bill were funded, and I sincerely hope it will be, there would be a spinoff effect to actually create employment. It is not so much that there is no need for these people who are underemployed, it is that there is no priority for them. Any number of institutions, including good-size institutions, are doubling up. If you want to teach Russian history, you have to teach Chinese history, or vice-versa. Obviously few people are going to offer competence in both. One or the other will be offering a page-ahead-of-the-students approach to teaching the subject.

I further feel that universities, whether they admit it or not, point their priorities somewhat to what they feel the government is willing to back. These grants that will come from this fund will not go directly to the universities. But the fact that the government feels that the area is important, I think, will get a lot of universities to rethink their own priorities. In an area of scarce resources, is this where a university's priority should go? I think some decisions will fall or rise on to the extent of which commitment exists elsewhere.

As I said in my own paper, and I would not repeat here, I think there is very definitely a national need which will be met for an informed cadre of people who can assist the government in making wise informed decisions.

Let me add—and this is of great interest to Congresswoman Oakar's plea for an incorporation of lesser activities, such as the John Carroll summer program for high school students—I would hope that it would not be done, with all due respect. I think it is important. I mean, having had for years my children coming home from school saying that so and so says you are a Communist, why else would you teach about Russia? I can sympathize with what she is saying. I think it is a worthy project, but I don't think this is the vehicle. Perhaps the National Endowment for Humanities or a summer seminar program for high school teachers would be more appropriate avenue of approach for this kind of activity.

I feel this bill is specifically leveled at increasing national expertise at the highest level, and increasing a fund of knowledge and ability of our Nation to function in relationship to one of the major areas of the world. I think that is the best thing to be said about it, and I should rest on that.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Warren Lerner follows:]

Prepared Statement of Warren Lerner, Professor of History and Director of Studies, Duke University, Durham, N.C.

From the perspective of the university, funding of Soviet and East European studies as proposed in H.R. Bill Number 601 raises all sort of expectations and promises to redress a serious deficit in the this nation's capabilities to deal with these countries. Considerable evidence has already been offered as to the dramatic shortage of trained personel in the Soviet and East European fields. This shortage becomes even more dramatic when viewed in the light of specific disciplines. The number of trained sociologists specializing in this area can literally be counted on the fingers of your hands. Although there is a larger number of economists specializing in the area, they constitute but a fraction of the personnel needed to cope with the varied needs of government, business, and educational institutions.

Historically, two institutions, the Russian Research Center at Harvard and the Russian Institute at Columbia (recently renamed the Harriman Institute of Advanced Russian Studies) have dominated the field and there is every likelihood that this role of leadership will continue. However, the resources of both institutions are finite as is their capacity to train specialists in the needed fields. The strength of both institutions has been partially based on the favorable student-faculty ratio that they have maintained and no one would wish to see this strength vitiated in any way. Further, even these institutions cannot provide all of the areas of training, and all of the languages, that would be desirable for a total offering. There are a number of quality universities throughout the country, some with large programs (e.g. Indiana University), some with quite small programs (e.g. Brown University) which can provide a number of well trained personnel in certain, if not all, of the fields in which we lack qualified personnel.

In looking at my own institution, Duke University, I can see that we have by no means been able to exploit our capacity for training people in these areas. For some twenty years, we have offered a program in Russian and East European Studies and have trained perhaps two dozen people in these two decades. These people are variously placed in academic positions, in government positions—especially in intelligence-gathering activities—and in business positions. All are making a contribution to the study of the Soviet Union and East Europe. Yet it is perhaps wasteful to have a program which trains an average of barely one or two persons a year. The capacity exists to do much more but the dramatically reduced sources of support in the field, both for doctoral training and for advanced post-doctoral training, have precluded any greater output. The same scenario can be replicated in institutions of higher learning throughout the country.

My generation of Soviet specialists, trained in the 1950's, has already become involved in a countdown to our retirement years. In a decade or less, the slim contingent of scholars trained in recent years will be able to replace only a small fraction of the people retiring or dying. Even there, not all of the replacements will be in areas where need is most critical. There is in truth a "lost generation" of people who ought to be presently in entry level positions in the profession. We can never make up for a dozen years of neglect or do anything about the capable and interested people who might have trained as specialists in Soviet and East European Studies had the resources been available. These people have made career decisions that take them elsewhere and they are in almost all cases irretrievably committed to other callings. What we can do is to provide training for a new generation and, by the commitment expressed by the proposed endowment, persuade that generation that the effort is worthwhile and that there is a national and an intellectual need for their talents.

What we ought to do is to aspire to an "oversupply" of trained personnel in the field of Soviet and East European Studies. By use of the term "oversupply" I do not mean to suggest a significant number of unemployed or unemployable specialists; rather I would suggest that our need target not be determined by the specific specialists one could use today but by creating a critical mass of specialists who are versed in many aspects of Soviet and East European societies and who would form a reservoir of talent to be summoned as need arises. At this moment, I would imaging that the government could probably use any number of people conversant with Soviet energy policies what with the policy problems emanating from the Soviet gas pipeline controversy and the recent Soviet decision to slash oil prices. Two years hence new problems will have emerged which need a different type of expertise and a different area of specialization.

It is often assumed that an academician takes automatic exception to any proposal that speaks of "national needs" and does not address the more mundane problems of scholarship for its own sake. Here, I might note that I do not see them as mutually exclusive in any way. Scholarship, or the quest for knowledge, needs no justification or apology, be it in the field of Soviet and East European studies or in Greek archeology. The present proposal may not directly support many types of serious scholarly activity, but it will in no way weaken areas of scholarship which do not fall under the coverage of the "national need" envisaged by this bill. Quite to the contrary, by offering support to critical areas, this bill will indirectly make it possible for other sources of institutional and non-institutional resources to be directed towards assisting scholarly undertakings which cannot promise any payoff in terms of immediate strategic or economic benefit. In the final analysis, the term scholarship cannot be defined in pragmatic terms. We are all in the same activity: trying to learn about an area of the world that encompasses a great portion of its surface, population, and political activity and an understanding of which is critical to a rational United States policy. The more we know about the Soviet Union and East Europe, in all fields of endeavor, the better our government can make an informed and presumably wise decision.

One of the further strengths of H.R. Bill Number 601 is the endowment approach rather than an ad hoc appropriations for a specific project or projects. The need for personnel in the several disciplines will vary from time to time and through the National Council it will be possible to allocate these funds where they are most needed and to the applicants who can most fulfill their promise. It would be important that any awards from this program be subject to stringent peer review and meet the highest academic criteria. The experience of the three institutions involved here, The Kennan Center, the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, suggests that such criteria will be vigorously applied. Further, there are probably no institutions in government or in the academic world who would be better informed or where shortages of personnel exist and how these shortages can be addressed. The relatively modest investment of this endowment will yield a benefit of a new generation of scholars who can quickly close the sizeable gap in our national cadre of specialists. What better return could we ask?

Mr. SIMON. We thank both of you.

If I might follow through on that final point, Mr. Lerner, I agree that this is not the instrument for helping a group of high school students who want to go abroad. The primary aim clearly has to be to develop that body of expertise. I would hope somehow—and you touched on this a little—I would hope somehow, though, there could be a way for Duke University and Southern Illinois University and John Carroll, where they could through these three institutions somehow be participants even if they do not have someone who is going to be an expert on grain harvest in the Ukraine or whatever that particular area of expertise that would be supported by your center might be.

Can either of you respond to that?

Mr. LERNER. As a point of information, Mr. Simon, several of my colleagues are funded by the National Council at this moment for targeted areas of importance.

Mr. SIMON. OK. At Duke?

Mr. LERNER. They are Duke faculty. They are on a research project.

Mr. SIMON. They are on a research project?

Mr. LERNER. Yes.

Mr. SIMON. And they are also teaching at the same time?

Mr. LERNER. Yes.

Mr. SIMON. That is what I was trying to get.

Mr. LERNER. We are not excluded—far from it. I don't think any institution in the country which has competent faculty who can meet these targets will be excluded.

Mr. SIMON. I would be interested in getting for the record—but even more, we are going to be marking up this bill on Thursday. I would be interested in getting later today or tomorrow—and maybe this is incorporated in your statement—a list of where the grants are made, some idea of how broad-gaged this thing is. Again, I don't want to dilute the aim of this.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I would refer you to appendix 1 of my written testimony which gives a list of the research grants made by the Council, and appendix 2 is a list of the universities and the States, the colleges, universities and the States which have received grants.

Mr. SIMON. You have provided the information very rapidly. I appreciate that.

Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN. While we are looking at appendix 1, I wonder if you could characterize the recipients—are these people who are established in the field? I am not familar with these personalities. You heard of the need for younger people in the next generation to be trained from Dr. Lerner. Are these people in that category, or are these people established or, shall we say not the younger or future?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. It is both, Mr. Coleman.

I don't think I can give you the precise figures, but something on the order of one-third of our grants have gone to people younger than 35 or 36 or 37, a little more than one-third have gone to people in kind of midcareer, and a little less than one-third have gone to people in their mid to late fifties and sixties.

The interesting thing is that these awards have been made on the questions of quality, of knowledgeability, of the availability of data, and of being responsive to the research agenda which was designed in consultation with the government.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do the dollar figures track your percent of individual participation so that the dollar figures would break down one-third/one-third/one-third?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I don't know.

Mr. **Coleman**. Because that would be very significant. If you could supply that to me, I would appreciate it.

Mr. **Toumanoff**. I certainly can.

[The information requested follows:]

The National Council
for Soviet and East European Research,
Washington, D.C., March 22, 1983.

Hon. E. Thomas Coleman,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Coleman: I enclose the additional data you requested during my testimony this morning. I hope that you will find it of use.

Sincerely yours,

Vladimir I. Toumanoff.

PROFILE OF PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS OF NATIONAL COUNCIL RESEARCH CONTRACTS

	Distribution of investigators				Distribution of funds		
	Male	Female	Total	Percent	Total value	Percent	Average contract value
35 or younger	14	7	21	20.7	$620,282	14.8	$29,537
36 to 45	36	3	39	34.9	2,091,020	49.8	53,616
46 to 55	19	8	27	26.5	866,101	20.6	32,078
56 or older	15	4	19	17.9	622,072	14.8	32,741
Total	84	22	106	100.0	4,199,475	100.0	39,618

DISTRIBUTION BY DISCIPLINE

	Number	Percent
Academic discipline:		
Economics	39	36.8
Political Science	27	25.5
Domestic	(18)	
Foreign Affairs	(9)	
History	10	9.4
Sociology	10	9.4
Law	5	4.7
Other	15	14.2
Total	106	100.0

Note: As of March 23, 1983.

Mr. **Coleman**. I also was very encouraged with some of the remarks you were making about this role of the Government and participation in the process, and so forth. I wasn't taking notes when you were saying that. But then I went back and looked at the bill, and none of the things that you desire, as far as this relationship, are written into the legislation. In fact, the way I read it, the Secretary in here—I guess we are talking about the Treasury Secretary, not the State Department—shall receive this application from the National Council which provides a description of the progam and provides fiscal control procedures to insure an audit. Then it says the Secretary shall approve any application that meets these requirements.

In other words, there doesn't seem to be this role that you were developing. I personally think, without becoming an overpowering participant in this relationship, that the Department of State, perhaps more than Treasury, should have a role in trying to suggest some areas where we do need some help, that the Government should get the benefit as well as the participants in this program. Maybe we could have some clarifying language that we could draft to do this.

Mr. **Toumanoff**. I was actually looking at a different provision. I was looking on page 5, under section 6, which says that "in consultation with officials of the United States Government designated by the Secretary of State, to develop and keep current a research agenda of fundamental research dealing with major policy issues and questions of Soviet and Eastern European development."

Mr. **Coleman**. OK. That type of language could be written into the other sections would apply for money applications.

Mr. **Toumanoff**. In effect, that is what happens anyway, Mr. Coleman, because not only does the Government participate in the design of the research agenda, the research program which has to follow that agenda, but the Government receives the product of all of this research and reads it and, thereby, can monitor the quality and the relevance and the utility of the whole research program.

In fact, what has happened, because this is the same requirement which we have and have had for the last almost 5 years—really since the beginninng of the National Council—what happens is that we are in touch with the Government practically every day. There is a constant flow back and forth between the scholars and the Government on the whole program.

There is also a provision, I believe—what I was thinking of was when the application is made to the Secretary of the Treasury, my expectation is that he will turn to the same committee designated by the Secretary of State for advice.

Mr. **Coleman**. Was there any discretion granted, or do you think there should be discretion granted to the Treasury?

Mr. **Toumanoff**. To do what?

Mr. **Coleman**. To approve or disapprove an application.

Mr. **Toumanoff**. I think it is granted.

Mr. **Coleman**. There are two different sections. I was citing page 8 there, and all of the requirements that need to be met are the ones that I mentioned—provide a description and an auditing or an accounting basis. Perhaps I hope what you are suggesting is that we have more language that clarifies this role, which is what you are citing on section 6, and that we should incorporate in other sections of the bill language to encourage this type of participation.

Mr. **Toumanoff**. In actual fact, I was again looking at section 6, the first paragraph which says that upon approval of an application, funds shall be made available. I assume that approval would have to be the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. **Coleman**. What I am saying is there is no discretion. It is ministerial act that he be provided a rubber stamp, if you will. There is no authority here for him to not approve if these two criteria are met.

Mr. **Toumanoff**. I guess I didn't read it that way.

Mr. **Coleman**. That is what I would like to do. What you are suggesting is what I think needs to be written in specifically, and I hope to offer amendments to do that—not to have the Government coming down on this or to channel or to exercise that type of control, but a participation which I think needs to be enhanced in the legislation.

Mr. **Toumanoff**. I would have no difficulty at all in accepting provisions throughout that there shall be consultations, some feasibility for monitoring, some capacity to assess and some capacity to report to Congress.

Mr. **Coleman**. This for us to eventually decide in markup, but I think that you are saying that we need to perhaps emphasize it a little bit more than what it is. If you look at page 8, section 7, there is no discretion there. But I don't want to beat it to death.

Mr. Chairman, I know it is getting late, but these people, will be direct participants if this bill passes. What do you have to do to get this money, could you walk us through the procedure. When you get the money, what do you do with it? What would be your role under this?

Mr. **Toumanoff**. We would design, in consultation with the Government, first of all, a research agenda. We would advertise that research agenda, make it available to universities and colleges all across the country and to nonprofit organizations interested and capable of doing research, and solicit their research proposals in response to that agenda. We would an annual or perhaps a semiannual competition which would be judged by scholar specialists, take the best ones and fund them to the limit of the budget. That is so much for the research program.

The National Council is also charged with a scholarship and fellowship program and essentially the same process would take place. A design for fellowships, scholarships, postdoctoral would be worked out, would be made public and applications on a competitive basis would be reviewed and then funded.

The public information program, it seems to me, would probably function exactly the same way. We would design, in consultation with the Government's parameters, whether we are talking about specifically scholarly journals, specialized journals, or whether we want to go further into the field of media. For example, the University of Washington has a very imaginative joint program between its television producing training program and its Soviet area program. They have produced special PBS programs on the Soviet Union right there at the university.

That is the kind of thing that we can design into a public information program, advertise it, make it known nationally, and solicit proposals, and have competitive review of those proposals for funding.

The International Research and Exchanges Board would continue to do essentially what it is doing, which is to organize, orchestrate, systematize, and manage the exchange program for study and research in those countries.

The Wilson Center would continue its very active program of training of advanced research and stimulation of contact between Government and scholars from all across the country, again, on a nationally competitive basis. As I understand it, the center is planning to initiate the same kind of a program on Eastern Europe.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. **Coleman**. Yes, it does.

Would you say a certain percent or none of this money would go toward administrative expenses? We are always concerned about a lot of this money being eaten up and it never getting out there.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Since its beginning, which is 5 years ago, the National Council's administrative expenses have run at 10.3 percent of the total funds entrusted to us by the Government.

Mr. COLEMAN. So if we were to earmark not greater than 10 percent, you think you could live within that?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I don't know because we haven't tried it yet, Mr. Coleman. Let me say that it would depend on the level of total funding that the trust provides. The Congress and the Treasury will know precisely how much of these funds go to administration on an annual basis.

One of the wise provisions of the bill is that it requires cost sharing from the universities as well, so there is a great saving there. I cannot guarantee that we will always stay below that 10 percent or less, simply because I don't know what it will take to administer a program as elaborate as this one is designed to be. But I would certainly hope that in fact we could go below that, because the level of funding will be higher than what the Council presently has.

Mr. COLEMAN. Do you have any idea what the cost-sharing basis would be with the participating institutions?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Our current policies established by the same scholar trustees is that the maximum amount we will give the universities in indirect cost, administrative costs, is 20 percent. The normal negotiated rate varies from 50 to 100 percent. The amount of direct cost sharing is one of the competitive elements in every application.

Mr. COLEMAN. Thank you.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. If I may follow through just a few other points, I think the point my colleague from Missouri raised on page 8 is a valid point. We were preparing an amendment of a little different nature to deal with the problem.

This is the problem as I see it. I am not suggesting that you or your organization would do this. If, 5 years from now, all of a sudden your organization were saying they were taking 50 percent of this for administrative costs, there ought to be some tool for us to say, "Hold on, you can't be doing this." I think there needs to be a little tightening in the bill. I think we are probably going to be working that out.

The second question, the question I directed earlier in division of the funds, do you have any comments on that? I do not see that we really establish in this bill between the three agencies how these funds are divided.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. My instinct, Mr. Chairman, is that that is probably a wise locunae in the sense that all of these programs can fluctuate in terms of their utility, in terms of the amount of money that can be absorbed wisely—in research, for example—on an annual basis.

There are two kinds of checks and balances. One is that the three institutions would obviously have to agree in their application to the Secretary of the Treasury. If one of these institutions felt it was being shortchanged or had needs way beyond what was being allocated, the Secretary of the Treasury would hear about it and indeed so would Congress. So there is a built-in safety net against abuse.

Moreover, the trustees of the National Council are appointed by university presidents, and those same university presidents would be the first to hear an outcry of abuse or mismanagement and could make the adjustment through their appointed trustees.

Mr. SIMON. That brings me to another of my questions. How are your board of trustees members elected? Do we have a list of that board of trustees? Is that part of your appendixes? They seem to cover every question I have.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I tried.

Essentially, the Council's board of trustees is composed of 12 trustees appointed by presidents or chief executive officers of major research universities across the country. That board of trustees has the power to elect up to six additional members.

The reason for the election provision is to make sure that we have disciplinary coverage. It is theoretically possible that the university presidents would give us eight historians and no political scientists. It was necessary to give us the capacity to find some political scientists and bring them to the board to make sure that we had balanced disciplinary coverage of the field.

The board, by a two-thirds majority, can and in fact has shifted at the termination of office, which is a 3-year tour. The board of trustees has the power to shift from one designating university to another, that is to find a different designating university. That is really essentially to make sure that we get new blood, that we distribute the control of this whole operation amongst the universities of the country, and because it seemed unfair to give certain universities a kind of a perpetual hold.

We have made those changes. I can name the universities for you if you would like.

Mr. SIMON. I have just looked at the list. You have just answered my question.

The awards that you made—I don't know how many.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. We made 84.

Mr. SIMON. How many applications did you receive?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. We have funded about 15 percent of the total applications we received.

Mr. SIMON. And of that balance, the 85-percent balance, how many were applications really of substance, that you think really had merit?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. We probably would have funded, had we had the funds, somewhere closer to one-third.

Mr. SIMON. All right.

Any further questions?

Mr. COLEMAN. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SIMON. We thank you both very, very much for your testimony and for what you are doing in your respective fields.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. The subcommittee hearing stands adjourned.

We are meeting again tomorrow at 9 a.m. We will be marking up another bill tomorrow, and Thursday we will be marking up two bills.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Information submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARVARD UKRAINIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

The Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University supports the goals sought in Bill H. 601.

The USSR today plays a key role in world politics; its influence in a great many parts of the globe-Eastern Europe the Middle East, the Carribean is considerable and in places, even crucial. The crucial role thus being played by the Soviet Union has created a strong case for expanded appropriations in Soviet and East European studies.

The USSR is not just another Great Power with vast external interests and influence. For the United States, it is what Sociologists refer to as our "relevant other." The competive struggle between the United States and the USSR at the economic, political, and military levels has been called "the overriding reality" of the post-World War II era.

Given the Soviet Union's importance, especially for the United States, the need for expanded research and analysis of the Soviet system is critical. Only an informed citizenry and political leadership will be capable of making sound decisions policies toward the Soviet Union.

It is proposed that $3,000,000.00 of the foreseen endorsement of $50,000,000.00 to maintain graduate training, advanced research, public dissemination of research data, and contact and collaboration among government and private specialists be allocated for programs at the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University. As presently envisaged the bill provides funds for three major institutions of Soviet and East European studies, the National Council for Soviet and East Eurpoean Research, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the International Research and Exchanges Board of the American Council of Learned Societies. While all of these organizations have played a major role in furthering Russian and East Europeans Studies in the United States, none is primarily concerned with the essential problem of nationalities in the Soviet Union. The neglect of the almost 50 percent of the population of the USSR which is not Russian has impeded American research and understanding of the USSR. Since all issues in the Soviet Union (military cadres, education, cultural policy, demography, etc.) have a Soviet nationalities component, the systematic study of Soviet nationalities is of essential importance for the success of the purported goals of Bill H. 601.

In the generally bleak atmosphere for Soviet and East European Studies in the past decade one of the few achievements has been the establishment of an Institute devoted to research in Ukrainian studies. Formed through the generosity of the Ukrainian-American community (10,000 donors), the chairs in Ukrainian studies and Ukrainian Research Institute have assured that the largest of the non-Russian nationalities and republics, the Ukrainian SSR (approximately 50,000,000 inhabitants) and the Ukrainian (over 45,000,000 in number) are the subject of consistent and exhaustive research in historical, cultural and political dimensions. Obviously, because of its economic importance and political sophistication, the Ukraine constitutes the most important field in Soviet nationality studies. Many of the problems being researched on the Ukraine apply to the Baltic republics, the Tanscaucasus and the burgeoning population of Soviet Central Asia. Because of this it is clear that building upon the work of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute a program in Soviet nationality studies could be established at Harvard. The Institute's Director, Professor Omeljan Pritsak, is one of the country's foremost Turcologist and member of the Department of Near Eastern Languages. This, in combination with the existence of the Chair of American Studies at Harvard University and the extensive library collections on all the nationalities of the Soviet Union makes the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute the logical place to support Soviet nationality studies.

PREPARED STATEMENTS OF DONALD K. JARVIS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS OF SLAVIC AND EAST EUROPEAN LANGUAGES AND J. DAVID EDWARDS, DIRECTOR, JOINT NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LANGUAGES AND THE COUNCIL ON LANGUAGE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

The Council on Language and Other International Studies would like to voice vigorous for the Soviet and East European Research and Training Act of 1983. CLOIS and its affiliate JNCL agree with the view that neither peace nor war can be effectively waged without a profound knowledge of our allies and adversaries. Since the United States already spends prodigious sums on the art of war and weapons of destruction, surely common sense dictates at least this modest investment in understanding: it is scarcely more than the amount spent to renovate Washington's Mayflower Hotel. Many arguments for the bill have been detailed in previous testimony by prestigious witnesses and will not be repeated here except as they bear on questions which have been raised about this bill.

First is the question of focus on this particular part of the globe when a number of other crisis areas clamor for our attention. The answer, as numerous witnesses have pointed out, is that this is the one area of the world with MIRV'ed ICBM's pointed at us. As the Honorable Lee Hamilton's aide, Harley Balzer, has aptly put it, "Misunderstanding of any country is tragic. Misunderstanding of the Soviet bloc could be catastrophic."

A second question is on the focus on a few specific organizations to promote the desired ends. The reason for this is that these three groups serve the entire U.S. academic community involved with languages and area studies of Soviet Eastern Europe. It is rare to find a faculty member in any of these disciplines who has not benefited from one or more grants from IREX or the other groups.

A third criticism concerns the bill's assistance to the "theologians" of the disciplines (those at the graduate level and above) rather than to the "parish priests" (pre-college and lower division college teachers). Those raising this issue feel that the "parish priests" will do more to raise intercultural awareness than will the few expert "theologians." The answer is that this metaphor is flawed: these scholars are less comparable to theologians in a church than they are to coaches of a team. The understanding, the experience, and the leadership of the coach are what are needed first to build a team. Our most pressing need today in scholarship on the USSR is not for quantity at the bottom but for quality at the top: a significant number of U.S. students acquire basic skills in Russian, but far too few are continuing on for graduate work. We will need a broader base of language and area teaching in the long run, but our critical shortage of well-trained senior scholars must be addressed first.

A related question concerns the focus on disciplines other than language: Those aware of the crucial role of cryptologists and linguists in World War II (e.g. the battleof Midway) and those who see language as the key to profound understanding of any national area may argue for more language support. The first answer to this is that language is by no means excluded from this bill. Study of uncommonly taught languages of the area will undoubtedly benefit from this bill if it supports the fine-grained research called for in testimony before this subcommittee by Generals Tighe and Odom. Furthermore, language is a necessary but insufficient condition for understanding. Extensive and intensive scholarship using language tools is our greatest need at present, not the tools themselves.

Fifth, some legislators have worried that we might produce more Soviet bloc specialists than could be employed. That is of course a possibility, but one must remember that a disproportionate share of experts on the Soviet Union will retire in the next decade. Furthermore, this sort of federal support has a trigger effect on universities, and this effect is far larger than one might expect from the amount of the actual sums appropriated. Such legislation is a signal of federal priorities, it serves to bolster university officials who want to support the Soviet area, and it certainly does help provide continued, dependable funding for those who are employed in the field. In any case, it is far better to have some of our Soviet scholars selling insurance than to depend on novices to analyze Kremlin policy.

Finally, some fear that support of this bill would lead Congress to believe that we have "taken care of the Soviet bloc." That of course is far from the truth, and it would indeed be a tragedy if funding of this endowment resulted in a decrease of support via HEA Title VI and other sources. We depend on the good faith and responsibility of Congress and the administration not to give with one hand while taking away with the other.

We would like to support James A. Griffin, President of Armco International, in recommending the following modifications or additions to the language of the bill:

(1) The Act should recognize the need to stimulate interest in our top students to study the Soviet Union.

(2) We need better cooperation between academia, government, and the business community in the exchange of information and in the provision of opportunities for Soviet studies experts to broaden their background and to gain practical experience.

(3) It would be good if this bill could encourage universities to match funds for the purposes of the bill.

In conclusion, we heartily agree that the United States can and must do far more to promote intelligent relations with all other nations on this planet. However, since we cannot do everything at once, and we have to begin somewhere, we should start here.

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